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The study examines the ways in which the Israeli-Palestinian conflict shapes 
and transforms the interests, narratives and options of relevant actors, in 
light of the failure of peace talks and the continuing occupation of the West 
Bank. 
The first contribution examines the Israeli discourse, laying out how the 
absence of resolution creates a paradoxical situation where majorities exist 
both for a two-state solution and against a Palestinian state. This translates 
politically into growing paralysis in relation to possible peace talks. 
The second contribution analyses how the Palestinian leaderships in 
Ramallah and Gaza City relate to the Israeli occupying power, within a spec-
trum of negotiations, resistance rhetoric and direct and indirect cooperation. 
The contribution also elaborates how the leaderships unintentionally 
became accessories to the occupying power. 
The third contribution explores how the EU’s engagement suffers a dis-
crepancy between stated objectives (two-state solution, Palestinian develop-
ment) and achieved outcomes. It proposes concrete measures for resolving 
the conundrum. 
The fourth contribution examines the humanitarian organisation 
UNRWA, which operates under conditions of occupation and – inevitably 
but unwillingly – becomes a party to the conflict. 
The fifth and last contribution examines the Israel lobby in the United 
States. Whether the occupation of the West Bank lies in Israel’s interests is 
found to be increasingly controversial among American Jews, and creating 




SWP Research Paper 
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik 
German Institute for 
International and Security Affairs 
 
 
Peter Lintl (ed.) 
Actors in the Israeli-
Palestinian Conflict 












All rights reserved. 
© Stiftung Wissenschaft  
und Politik, 2018 
SWP Research Papers are 
peer reviewed by senior 
researchers and the execu-
tive board of the Institute. 
They reflect the views of 
the author(s). 
SWP 
Stiftung Wissenschaft und 
Politik 
German Institute  
for International  




Phone +49 30 880 07-0 




Translation by Meredith Dale 
(Updated English version of  
SWP-Studie 2/2018) 
This Research Paper was 
prepared as part of the 
project “Israel and its 
regional and global conflicts: 
Domestic developments, 
security issues and foreign 
affairs”.  
The project is conducted 
within the Middle East and 
Africa Division of SWP 
and funded by the German 
Federal Foreign Office. 
  
  
Table of Contents 
 5 Issues and Recommendations 
 7 Repercussions of the Unresolved Conflict on Israeli 
Power Constellations and Actor Perspectives 
  Peter Lintl 
 21 The Palestinian Authority and the Hamas Government: 
Accessories to the Occupation? 
  Muriel Asseburg 
 32 The European Union and the Israeli-Palestinian 
Conflict: From Declaration to Action? 
  René Wildangel 
 43 Why the Permanent Tensions between  
UNRWA and Israel? 
  Birthe Tahmaz 
 51 Actor in Flux:  
The Jewish Israel Lobby in the United States 
  Lidia Averbukh 
 58 Appendix 
 58 Abbreviations 








  SWP Berlin 
 Actors in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict 
 June 2018 
 5 
 
Issues and Recommendations 
Actors in the Israeli-Palestinian 
Conflict. 
Interests, Narratives and the Reci-
procal Effects of the Occupation 
Israel’s presence in the West Bank has already lasted 
more than half a century. The Israeli side describes it 
as “civil administration” while the entire international 
community regards it as an occupation. The past 
twenty-five years have seen a series of efforts to re-
solve the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians on 
the basis of “two states for two nations”. US President 
Donald Trump’s decision to recognise Jerusalem as 
Israel’s capital indirectly endorses the Israeli annexa-
tion and has even reopened debate over the Oslo 
Accords, in which the two sides recognised each 
other’s national rights for the first time. It is currently 
unclear what could bring the parties together again. 
Virtually no other conflict has attracted compara-
ble international attention or experienced as many 
mediation attempts. International actors have pur-
sued a string of initiatives to lead the peace process 
to a successful conclusion: US President Bill Clinton’s 
Camp David summit, the Middle East Quartet’s Road 
Map, the Arab Peace Initiative, and efforts by non-
state actors, such as the Geneva Initiative. On the 
ground numerous government agencies and NGOs 
work to encourage peaceful coexistence, promote 
development projects and protect human rights. Last 
but not least, many advocacy and lobbying groups 
are also involved in the conflict, seeking to draw 
international attention to the interests of both sides. 
Yet peace remains elusive and the occupation 
persists. The study examines how the conflict shapes 
and transforms the interests, narratives and options 
of different actors, and investigates the factors and 
processes that obstruct the path to resolution. Particu-
lar attention is devoted to the central role played by 
the continuing Israeli occupation of the Palestinian 
territories and how the occupation affects the actors’ 
political perspectives and the pressures shaping their 
actions. 
The study concentrates on five actors: the Israelis, 
the Palestinians, the European Union, UNRWA (the 
United Nations Relief and Work Agency for Palestine 
Refugees in the Near East), and the Jewish Israel lobby 
in the United States. After illuminating the situation 
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and roles of the immediate parties – the Palestinians 
and Israelis – the last three contributions examine 
examples of other types of actor and the question of 
how they relate to the conflict. The EU sees itself an 
international actor capable of supporting the peace 
process; UNRWA is an international humanitarian 
organisation operating under conditions of occupa-
tion; while the Israel lobby in the United States seeks 
to shape the conflict indirectly by influencing US 
politics. As we will show, not only do the actors affect 
the conflict, but even more so the conflict transforms 
the actors, although to differing extents. 
In the case of the Israeli discourse, which is exam-
ined in the first contribution, the question is how the 
absence of a resolution affects Israeli public opinion, 
political actors and power constellations. The con-
tribution lays out how the right-wing political camp 
is sceptical towards peace talks and benefits from 
their failure, while left-wing positions are increasingly 
marginalised. These trends have persisted since 2001 
and ensure today that almost nobody in Israel’s politi-
cal landscape is calling for final status negotiations 
with the goal of a two-state solution. On the other 
hand a discussion about the partial annexation of 
the West Bank seems to have become acceptable. 
The second contribution analyses how the Palestin-
ian leaderships in Ramallah and Gaza City relate to the 
Israeli occupying power within a spectrum of nego-
tiations, rhetoric of resistance, and direct and indirect 
cooperation. The contribution shows how the Pales-
tinian Authority (PA) and Hamas, for all their differ-
ences and however reluctantly, have become acces-
sories to the occupation. 
The third contribution examines the role of the Euro-
pean Union, concluding that a discrepancy exists 
between the goals the EU has set itself and the results 
it has achieved. Efforts to work towards a two-state 
solution have faltered, as has support for Palestinian 
development. Both, the author also argues, are fur-
ther undermined by the ongoing conflict. 
The fourth contribution considers the international 
humanitarian organisation UNRWA, which operates 
under conditions of conflict and occupation – and 
involuntarily becomes a party to the conflict. The 
author analyses the tensions that arise in a constella-
tion where UNRWA works with and for the Palestin-
ians but depends entirely on Israeli cooperation, and 
explores how UNRWA handles its sensitive role. 
The fifth and last contribution turns to the Israel 
lobby in the United States as a classical advocacy actor. The 
author shows how the question of what is in Israel’s 
interests has become a matter of growing controversy 
among American Jews. This is reflected concretely 
in divergent perspectives concerning the occupation, 
and in growing criticism of the Israel lobby among 
parts of the Jewish community. 
The analyses produce a range of recommendations 
for Germany and the European Union, which can be 
divided into three categories. 
Firstly, development-oriented and humanitarian 
measures are recommended to improve the lives of 
Palestinians. Concretely, the EU should both promote 
economic development in the Palestinian Territories 
– for example through infrastructure measures in 
Area C – and work to stabilise the humanitarian 
situation in Gaza, including by insisting that its bor-
ders be opened. 
Secondly, the authors recommend political initia-
tives and measures – such as strengthening Palestin-
ian statehood and democratic structures and con-
tinuing critical dialogue with Israel over the two-state 
option. At the same time, they argue, greater recog-
nition must be accorded to the pervasive Israeli threat 
perception that has also come to dominate the national 
discourse. They recommend clear communication of 
the distinction between criticism of the occupation 
and positions delegitimising the state of Israel. 
Thirdly, some of the contributions express a clear 
recommendation to combine political and economic 
measures in such a way as to give the actors incen-
tives to resolve the conflict. Two proposals in particu-
lar serve that end: Firstly a refocusing of EU policy 
through a plan that both supports statehood and dis-
courages occupation and settlement-building. Secondly, 
the development of an effective set of European in-
struments to change Israel’s calculations concerning 
settlement-building, perhaps in the form of an expan-
sion of the policy of differentiation. This restricts all 
cooperation and benefits offered by the EU to Israel in 
the borders of 1967 and excludes the settlements and 
their products. 
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The Palestinian Territories have been under Israeli 
occupation since 1967. Today, despite twenty-five 
years of peace initiatives, violence between the two 
sides remains a reality and the prospects of a quick 
end to the conflict are more remote than ever. Today 
there is little sign of a breakthrough to end the con-
flict – which appeared possible in the 1990s, encap-
sulated in the phrase “two states for two nations”. 
While majority support for the two-state solution still 
exists in Israel, a majority of Israelis have ceased to 
believe that the Palestinians can be “a partner” in 
the peace process, and therefore wish to see the occu-
pation maintained in the interests of security. 
This paradox – abstract support for a two-state 
solution but de facto rejection – results from a devel-
opment that began with the successive failures of 
peace talks. The outcome has been not simply the 
absence of a resolution, but a vicious circle creating 
ever-growing scepticism towards the peace process 
itself. One effect of this dynamic is that conflict nar-
ratives are exaggerated, belief in the prospects of 
peace talks evaporates and military options are priori-
tised over political. These tendencies shape Israeli 
politics to this day, above all in two respects: Firstly, 
they have played a decisive role in shifting the politi-
cal centre of gravity to the right. Secondly, the per-
spectives of the political actors have changed: The 
left-wing “peace camp” has increasingly abandoned 
its demand for immediate final status negotiations, 
while the right-wing camp rules out a Palestinian 
state and has begun increasingly openly calling for 
partial annexation of the West Bank. 
If we are to comprehend the current situation, it is 
important to understand the political shifts that have 
occurred in Israel concerning the question of the 
peace process and how to deal with the Occupied Ter-
ritories. This means starting by going back to 1967 
and sketching out the fundamental changes that led 
to the emergence of a majority for a two-state solu-
tion for the first time in the 1990s. Then I will de-
scribe in greater detail how that majority was succes-
sively lost again, and the sceptics gained the upper 
hand. Various developments served as catalysts: the 
repeated failures of talks, the Second Intifada of the 
early 2000s, Israel’s withdrawal from Gaza in 2005, 
and the subsequent confrontations with Hamas. The 
contribution examines these processes from a social 
psychology perspective. Its central research questions 
are: What were the repercussions of the failure of 
peace initiatives on Israeli society? What were the 
reasons for these changes? And how they are reflected 
in changing majorities? 
Israeli Positions on the Occupied Terri-
tories and the Origins of the “Peace Camp” 
Yitzhak Rabin was the first Israeli prime minister to 
initiate a peace process with the Palestinians. In 1994 
he declared that there were two possibilities for deal-
ing with a Palestinian nation that rejected Israeli rule: 
to govern by force at the price of a never-ending cycle 
of violence, or to seek a mutually acceptable peaceful 
resolution.1 
That insight had been a long time coming. For 
decades Israeli governments had refused to recognise 
the Palestinians as legitimate negotiating partners. 
Instead they were nothing more than subjects of what 
Defence Minister Moshe Dayan, shortly before the 
1967 Six-Day War, called “enlightened occupation” 
 
1 “PM Rabin’s Speech to the Opening Session of the Knes-
set”, Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs (online), 18 March 1994, 
http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/PressRoom/1994/Pages/PM%20RABIN-
S%20SPEECH%20TO%20THE%20OPENING%20SESSION%20 
OF%20THE%20KN.aspx (accessed 8 December 2017). 
Peter Lintl 
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(Kibush Naor).2 “Enlightened occupation” permitted 
civil liberties but excluded political self-determi-
nation, and as such ruled out any possibility of a 
Palestinian state emerging in a two-state solution.3 
The term was soon dropped from official communi-
cations on account of its implications for Israel’s 
position under international law. The assertion by 
Golda Meir, Israeli’s prime minister from 1969 to 
1974, that “there is no Palestinian people” exempli-
fies that perspective.4 
At the same time there was certainly a range 
of different ideas about how Israel should treat the 
Occupied Territories. During the first decade of the 
occupation (1967–1977) the governing Labor Party 
followed the so-called Allon Plan, building buffer 
settlements in the Jordan Valley, but largely prevent-
ing Israelis from settling in densely populated Pales-
tinian areas. The Allon Plan was predicated on the 
idea that parts of the West Bank would be returned to 
Jordan in the scope of a possible peace settlement.5 
Likud, which first came to power in 1977, always 
wanted to settle the Palestinian territories, which it 
regarded as part of a historic “Complete Land of Israel” 
(Eretz Israel HaShlema). So the immediate objective of 
Likud’s settlement policy was to make it impossible 
for Israel to withdraw from the West Bank.6 
In the course of the 1980s the differences between 
Likud and Labor over the Occupied Territories became 
Israel’s central domestic political conflict. The crux of 
the matter was whether or not it was in Israel’s inter-
est to withdraw from the Occupied Territories, be it 
for security-driven, demographic, moral or ideological 
reasons. Likud largely maintained its line that the 
West Bank had been liberated rather than occupied, 
and that it was Israel’s legitimate right to build settle-
ments there. Additionally, this point of view was com-
bined with the argument that settlements constitute a 
 
2 Gershon Shafir, A Half Century of Occupation: Israel, Palestine, 
and the World’s Most Intractable Conflict (Oakland, 2017), 23–25. 
3 Shlomo Gazit, Trapped Fools: Thirty Years of Israeli Policy in 
the Territories (London, 2003), 19f. 
4 Baruch Kimmerling and Joel S. Migdal, The Palestinian 
People: A History (Cambridge, 2003), xxvi. 
5 Gershon Shafir and Yoav Peled, Being Israeli: The Dynamics 
of Multiple Citizenship (Cambridge/UK, 2008), 161. 
6 Gazit, Trapped Fools (see note 3), 268; Asher Arian and 
Michal Shamir, “Two Reversals: Why 1992 Was Not 1977”, in 
The Elections in Israel 1992, ed. Asher Arian and Michal Shamir 
(New York, 1995), 17–53 (28). 
necessity for reasons of security.7 The Labor Party, on 
the other hand, gradually shifted its position towards 
withdrawal.8 By the 1990s it was arguing that peace 
talks and a territorial compromise represented the 
best option for ending the conflict. One factor behind 
this shift was the fear that demographic trends meant 
that the Palestinians might at some point come to 
represent the majority if Israel annexed the Palestin-
ian Territories. Additionally, especially after the First 
Intifada (1987–1993), the idea took hold in the Labor 
Party that peace could ultimately only be achieved 
through a deal with the Palestinians. 
That debate remains central to the Israeli political 
system to this day. One measure of its significance is 
that it defines the left/right coordinates in the Knesset 
and the division into two main blocks: Likud is the 
strongest party in the right-wing block (alongside the 
National Religious Party/Jewish Home, Moledet, Yis-
rael Beiteinu and others), also known as the “hawks”, 
while the Labor Party became the leading force in a 
left-wing block (“doves”), which also includes Meretz, 
Meimad and Gesher. 
In the 1990s the left argued increas-
ingly for “two states for two nations” 
as the guiding principle for resolving 
the conflict with the Palestinians. 
The 1990s witnessed the climax of the left/right 
confrontation, when the left-wing camp for the first 
time ever recognised the Palestinians as an autono-
mous negotiating partner with national rights. In this 
context the left – backed by a majority within the 
population – argued increasingly forcefully for “two 
states for two nations” as the guiding principle for 
resolving the conflict with the Palestinians. It was 
ready to withdraw from the Israeli-controlled Palestin-
ian Territories in the scope of a peace agreement. 
The Labor prime ministers Yitzhak Rabin (1992–95), 
Shimon Peres (1995/96) and Ehud Barak (1999–2001), 
who drove the Oslo Process and the Camp David II 
and Taba (2000/01) peace talks, were especially closely 
identified with this course. The right-wing camp con-
tinued to reject any territorial compromise and in-
sisted that the Occupied Territories belonged to Israel  
 
 
7 Arye Naor, “The Security Argument in the Territorial 
Debate in Israel: Rhetoric and Policy”, Israel Studies 4, no. 2 
(autumn 1999): 150–77. 
8 Arian and Shamir, “Two Reversals” (see note 6). 
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Figure 1 
Political camps in the Israeli parliament since 1992  
(number of seats) 
Data from Knesset website, classification into camps by author. 
 
historically and that it was imperative on grounds of 
security to maintain a military presence there. 
Political and public support for a peace settlement 
peaked during the phase of the Camp David and Taba 
talks. After 2001 majority public opinion and the con-
victions of the political actors gradually began shift-
ing rightwards. This created a new strong political 
“centre” whose principal bond was lack of trust in the 
Palestinians. At the same time power shifted first to 
the political centre and from 2009 – under Prime 
Minister Benjamin Netanyahu who has governed ever 
since – even further to the right. Figure 1 shows how 
the balance of forces in the Knesset has changed since 
the first talks between Israelis and Palestinians in 1992. 
Fundamental Shifts in Public Attitudes 
The failure of the Camp David II (2000) and Taba 
(2001) peace negotiations and the contemporaneous 
outbreak of the Second Intifada represented a water-
shed for Israeli society. Many reasons can be identi-
fied for the talks’ failure: ignorance and/or incom-
prehension of the other side’s expectations, strong 
internal political opposition, personal mistrust 
among the negotiators, and the imminent end of 
the terms of both Bill Clinton and Ehud Barak.9 The 
Palestinians argue that at Camp David, Ehud Barak 
and the Americans tried to force Yasser Arafat, as 
President of the Palestinian National Authority, to 
accept an arrangement that would have divided the 
West Bank in two. The improved offer placed on the 
table a year later in Taba was equally unacceptable, 
they say, because Barak made it just one month 
before elections he was expected to lose to Ariel 
Sharon of Likud. Barak on the other hand saw the 
Palestinians’ rejection of the first ever offer of a two-
state solution at Camp David in 2000 as evidence 
 
9 Laura Zittrain Eisenberg and Neil Caplan, Negotiating 
Arab-Israeli Peace: Patterns, Problems, Possibilities, 2nd ed. (Bloo-
mington, 2010), 222–52; Abdel Monem Said Aly, Shai 
Feldman and Khalil Shikaki, Arabs and Israelis: Conflict and 




Actors in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict 
June 2018 
10 
that they would never seek peace with Israel as long 
as Arafat was their leader. This interpretation was 
massively reinforced by the outbreak of the Second 
Intifada in October 2000, which was to become the 
bloodiest conflict between Israelis and Palestinians 
since 1947/48 – and which Barak believed had been 
planned by Arafat. 
Barak’s interpretation was largely adopted by 
Israeli society.10 A belief that the Palestinians were 
not interested in peace became the new national 
“foreign policy consensus” in Israel after 2001.11 
Critical voices such as Ron Pundak, one of the archi-
tects of the Oslo Accords, who pointed out that 
mistakes on all sides were to blame for the failure, 
largely fell on deaf ears.12 Even individual positive 
aspects such as enormous progress on security and 
the question of defining a border played no role in 
the Israeli discussion.13 The journalist Gershon Baskin 
summed it up when he noted that it was irrelevant 
whether this belief corresponded with the facts or was 
oversimplified: it was the narratives that convinced 
the majority in Israeli society.14 
The consequences become clear from a social 
psychology perspective if one examines the question 
of the repercussions of failure of negotiations on each 
of the societies. The social psychologists Halperin and 
Bar-Tal point to two factors in particular that explain 
this change. Firstly, they argue, as the most highly 
decorated soldier in Israeli history Barak was perceived 
as an “epistemic authority” in questions of security; 
in other words, he was broadly accepted as a credible 
instance.15 Barak’s line of argument undermined the 
 
10 Daniel Dor, “All the News That Fits: The Israeli Media 
and the Second Intifada”, Palestine-Israel Journal 10, no. 2 
(2003), http://www.pij.org/details.php?id=38 (accessed 8 De-
cember 2017). 
11 Raffaella Del Sarto, Israel under Siege: The Politics of In-
security and the Rise of the Israeli Neo-Revisionist Right (Washing-
ton, D.C., 2017), 1ff. 
12 Ron Pundak, “From Oslo to Taba: What Went Wrong?” 
Survival 43, no. 3 (2001): 31–45. 
13 Said Aly,Feldman and Shikaki, Arabs and Israelis 
(see note 9), 345. 
14 Gershon Baskin, “Encountering Peace: In the Land of 
Miracles, Let’s Get Real”, Jerusalem Post, 29 September 2009, 
http://www.jpost.com/Opinion/Encountering-peace-In-the-
land-of-miracles-lets-get-real (accessed 8 December 2017). 
15 Eran Halperin and Daniel Bar-Tal, “The Fall of the Peace 
Camp in Israel: The Influence of Prime Minister Ehud Barak 
on Israeli Public Opinion: July 2000–February 2001”, Conflict 
and Communication Online 6, no. 2 (2007): 1–18 (10), http:// 
central tenet of the left-wing camp, that the conflict 
could be resolved by way of peace negotiations. The 
second phenomenon behind the loss of belief in a 
political solution, Halperin and Bar-Tal argue, is the 
emergence of what they describe as an “ethos of con-
flict”. What they are referring to here is a kind of 
pattern for the public response to incisive experiences 
with long-running conflicts, which began to bite for 
Israelis (and Palestinians too) after extensive and trau-
matic experience of violence in the Second Intifada.16 
The central characteristic of the ethos of conflict is 
the consolidation on each side of world views that 
justifies their role in the conflict. Each side sees its 
own position as sensible and justified, while the 
adversary’s goals and actions are illegitimate and 
immoral, all of their actions interpreted as suspicious 
and malign. The emergence of such an ethos is asso-
ciated with a series of social psychological processes: 
an intensification of patriotism, dissemination of a 
friend/foe dichotomy, and security-focussed rhetoric 
presenting the nation’s survival as threatened – in 
short the internalisation of a siege mentality.17 Blame 
for the conflict is placed solely on the adversary (the 
conflict exists because the adversary seeks conflict 
with us), while the causes of conflict are reduced to 
black and white. The outcome of this process also 
depends on fundamental political positions already 
adopted: The establishment of the ethos of conflict 
confirms and consolidates the convictions of those 
forces that were already largely sceptical towards the 
adversary, while the proponents of compromise are 
marginalised or “converted”. 
The shift after the Second Intifada in 
the Israel public mood has been 
described as a “psychological earth-
quake”, from which the Israeli peace 
camp has never recovered. 
That process goes some way to explaining why the 
Israeli discussion about the Occupied Territories has 
 
www.cco.regener-online.de/2007_2/pdf/halperin.pdf (ac-
cessed 16 February 2018). 
16 Ronni Shaked, “Ethos of Conflict of the Palestinian 
Society”, in A Social Psychology Perspective on the Israeli-Palestinian 
Conflict: Celebrating the Legacy of Daniel Bar-Tal, ed. Keren Sharvit 
and Eran Halperin, vol. 2 (Heidelberg, 2016), 133–48. 
17 Tamir Magal, Daniel Bar-Tal and Eran Halperin, “Why 
Is It so Hard to Motivate People to Support the Peace Pro-
cess?” [in Hebrew], Politika: The Israeli Journal of Political Science 
and International Relations 1 (2015): 3–58 (5ff.). 
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changed so much since the 1990s. This applies less to 
the right-wing conservative camp, which never trusted 
the Palestinians anyway, than to the advocates of a 
two-state solution, who are found on the left and cen-
tre of the political spectrum.18 Halperin and Bar-Tal 
describe this shift in public mood as a “psychological 
earthquake”,19 from which the Israeli peace camp has 
never recovered. 
A comparison of survey findings from the 1990s 
and 2000s confirms this: In the 1990s there were 
majorities for the positions of the left-wing “peace 
camp”. The share of the population who describe 
themselves as “left-wing”, for example, peaked in 
1999, and has declined steadily since.20 This trend 
is associated with a successive abandonment of the 
belief that a two-state solution is achievable. Shortly 
before the spring 1999 elections 63 percent believed 
that regardless of the election result a final status agree-
ment would be concluded with the Palestinians in-
cluding Israeli withdrawal from the Occupied Terri-
tories and the establishment of a Palestinian state.21 
Altogether, since such surveys began in 1994, a 
majority of Israelis have always been clear that the 
logical final destination of peace talks would be 
a Palestinian state. The pollsters summarised the 
findings of their 1999 survey as follows: “[F]rom the 
standpoint of the Israeli public, the answer to the 
question of the establishment of an independent 
Palestinian state has already been determined.”22 
55.6 percent also believed that the Palestinians’ 
demand for a state of their own was justified and 
fulfilling this in the scope of a peace agreement was 
no problem for Israel.23 All these data underline the 
dominance of the negotiation paradigm in the 1990s. 
 
18 Toby Greene, “Israel’s Two States Debate”, International 
Affairs 91, no. 5 (2015): 1009–26 (1011). 
19 Halperin and Bar-Tal, “The Fall of the Peace Camp in 
Israel” (see note 15), 8. 
20 Uzi Rebhun, Israel Today: Society, Identity, and Political Affin-
ities (Jerusalem: The Jewish People Policy Institute, 2015), 18, 
http://jppi.org.il/uploads/Israel_Today-Society_Identity_and_ 
Political_Affinities-English.pdf (accessed 8 December 2017). 
21 Ephraim Yaar and Tamar Hermann, Peace Index – Decem-
ber 1998, 
http://www.peaceindex.org/files/peaceindex1998_12_3.pdf 
(accessed 8 December 2017). 
22 Idem, Peace Index – March 1999, http://www.peaceindex. 
org/files/peaceindex1999_3_3.pdf (accessed 8 December 2017). 
23 Ibid. 
This fundamentally positive Israeli attitude to-
wards the two-state framework changed radically 
in the 2000s. Four trends illustrate this: 
One of the clearest trends, firstly, is the erosion of 
the Israeli trust in the will of the Palestinians to make 
peace. Until the Second Intifada a majority of Israelis 
assumed that the Palestinians wanted peace. That 
figure has declined noticeably.24 Since 2001 a relatively 
constant majority of more than 60 percent believe 
that the Palestinians are unwilling or unable to make 
peace.25 
This was associated, secondly, with a loss of con-
fidence in Israel’s ability to bring about peace 
through its own actions. In the 1990s the left-wing 
camp in particular still largely believed that Israel 
held the keys to a negotiated solution, by making an 
offer to the Palestinians. This attitude changed after 
the Palestinians were blamed for the failure of the 
peace talks. Broad sections of society were now emo-
tionally distanced towards the Palestinian perspective 
on the conflict and disinterested in the living con-
ditions of the Palestinians under the occupation. They 
believed that the Palestinians were at least partly to 
blame for their situation because they were unwilling 
to compromise.26 After the Second Intifada, the jour-
 
24 Yehuda Ben Meir and Olena Bagno-Moldavsky, The Voice 
of the People: Israeli Public Opinion on National Security 2012, INSS 
Memorandum 126 (Tel Aviv: The Institute for National Secu-
rity Studies [INSS], April 2013), 75, http://www.inss.org.il/wp-
content/uploads/systemfiles/memo126e%20(2)410001833.pdf 
(accessed 8 December 2017). 
25 Dov Waxman, “Living with Terror, Not Living in Terror: 
The Impact of Chronic Terrorism on Israeli Society”, in Ter-
rorism and Political Violence, ed. Caroline Kennedy-Pipe, Gordon 
Clubb and Simon Mabon (London, 2015), 181–96 (187); 
“Survey: Only 28.2 Percent of Israelis Say Palestinian Peace 
Partner Exists”, Jewish News Syndicate (online), 14 December 
2012, http://www.jns.org/news-briefs/2012/12/14/survey-only-
282-percent-of-israelis-say-palestinian-peace-pa.html#.WeTH 
f2i0OUl (accessed 8 December 2017); Del Sarto, Israel under 
Siege (see note 11), 49f. 
26 Eran Halperin, Neta Oren and Daniel Bar-Tal, “Socio-
Psychological Barriers to Resolving the Israeli-Palestinian 
Conflict: An Analysis of Jewish Israeli Society”, in Barriers to 
Peace in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, ed. Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov 
(Jerusalem, 2010), 28–57; Eran Halperin, “Emotional Bar-
riers to Peace: Emotions and Public Opinion of Jewish Israelis 
about the Peace Process in the Middle East”, Peace and Conflict: 
Journal of Peace Psychology 17, no. 1 (2011): 22–45; Amos Harel 
and Avi Issacharoff, “Years of Rage”, Haaretz, 1 October 2010, 
http://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/years-of-rage-1.316603 
(accessed 8 December 2017). 
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nalists Amos Harel and Avi Issacharoff write: “For 
most Israelis, what happens there [in the West Bank] 
is taking place on the dark side of the moon, even if 
it’s only a half hour’s drive from their homes.”27 
Thirdly, Israeli public interest in a possible peace 
agreement evaporated. Until the Second Intifada, 
Israelis named a peace agreement with the Arab 
states and the Palestinians as the most important po-
litical objective.28 But from 2001 on, a majority now 
agreed that the most important concern was to pre-
serve the state of Israel as a Jewish state. This shift in 
opinion demonstrates two things: Firstly, it signalises 
that Israelis continue to regard the preservation of 
their demographic majority in Israel as more impor-
tant than holding onto territorial control of the entire 
West Bank, and implies a willingness to cede terri-
tory. But at the same time it confirms that Israelis 
have abandoned the search for a peace settlement. In 
other words, the wish for complete spatial separation 
overrides efforts to find a resolution. 
A majority in Israel now wanted a 
two-state solution but a majority also 
believed it to be unrealisable. This 
paradox has survived to this day. 
The associated, fourth, significant trend, finally, 
was that the period of the Second Intifada saw a fun-
damental shift in the way most Israelis viewed the 
conflict. Political hopes for a final peace agreement 
were supplanted by the maxim that the most that 
could be expected was a temporary “pacification”. 
And that is an objective achieved primarily through 
military force rather than political means.29 The pri-
ority is now conflict management rather than conflict 
resolution. As Lev Grinberg puts it: If the lesson of the 
First Intifada had been that there could be no military 
solution, only a political one, the dictum was reversed 
after the Second Intifada: Now there was no political 
solution, only a military one.30 
 
27 Ibid. 
28 Ben Meir and Bagno-Moldavsky, The Voice of the People 
(see note 24), 47. 
29 Ibid., 76ff.; Bradley Burston, “The War That Palestine 
Couldn’t Lose – and Did”, Haaretz, 30 September 2004, 
http://www.haaretz.com/news/background-the-war-that-
palestine-couldn-t-lose-and-did-1.136089 (accessed 8 Decem-
ber 2017). 
30 Lev Louis Grinberg, Politics and Violence in Israel/Palestine: 
Democracy versus Military Rule (London, 2010), 172. 
Despite these shifts, even after 2000 a majority 
of Israelis basically continued to support the idea of 
a two-state solution as the formula for conflict reso-
lution, above all because that would guarantee the 
preservation of the Jewish majority in Israel.31 But the 
new sense of scepticism meant that most Israelis no 
longer believed that peace could by achieved by way 
of negotiations with the Palestinians. In other words, 
a majority in Israel now wanted a two-state solution 
but a majority also believed it to be unrealisable. This 
paradox, which crystallised at the beginning of the 
2000s, has survived to this day. It also represents one 
of the fundamental tenets of the new political centre 
that subsequently emerged. Between 2005 and 2009 
half of Israelis located themselves in the centre of the 
political spectrum, even if this does not tally precisely 
with their party-political preferences (see Figure 1, 
p. 9). This documents the fading of the pro/contra 
bipolarity over the two-state solution that still charac-
terised Israeli politics in the 1990s.32 
Political Repercussions: The Left Moves to 
the Centre and Unilateralism Becomes the 
Order of the Day 
This shift in public opinion is also reflected in politi-
cal activity and in the party preferences of Israeli 
voters. The policies of the Israeli government since 
the early 2000s have been characterised above all by 
unilateral actions without consulting the Palestinians. 
This was seen especially clearly in the Israeli with-
drawal (so-called “disengagement”) from Gaza and 
four small settlements in the West Bank in 2005 and 
in the construction of the separation barrier around 
the major West Bank settlement blocs beginning in 
2002. Above all Ariel Sharon, Likud prime minister 
from 2001 to 2005, pursued this principle of unilateral 
action. But Sharon’s policy of territorial withdrawal 
provoked a split in Likud that cost him the party 
leadership. He went on to found the new centrist 
party Kadima, which won the largest vote share in the 
2006 and 2009 elections and exemplified the political 
shifts. Kadima argued that Israel had to leave parts of 
the occupied territories, but questioned the sincerity 
 
31 Yehuda Ben Meir and Olena Bagno-Moldavsky, Vox 
Populi: Trends in Israeli Public Opinion on National Security 2004–
2009, INSS Memorandum 106 (Tel Aviv: INSS, 2010), 37. 
32 Ibid. 
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of the Palestinians.33 It was open to elements from 
both right and left, as reflected in the diverging poli-
cies of its leaders: While Sharon highlighted his mis-
trust of the Palestinians and pursued a more right-
wing security-led course, his successors as leader, 
Ehud Olmert and Tzipi Livni, leant more towards 
the left, reflected for example in their willingness to 
resume peace talks in Annapolis in 2007/2008. 
Kadima was initially very successful, taking votes 
from parties on both the left and right (see Figure 1, 
p. 9). But there was a crucial difference. Although the 
right briefly lost support to Kadima it largely held its 
own line, rejecting both a Palestinian state and any 
withdrawal from the Occupied Territories. The parties 
to the right of Likud – including the National Union 
and the National Religious Party (from 2008 Jewish 
Home) – continued to press for Israeli sovereignty to 
be expanded to the West Bank. The left-wing parties 
nominally upheld their call for final status negotia-
tions, but in fact pursued a more or less unilateral 
approach. This is especially clear in the example of 
the Labor Party: Not only did it adopt a plan for uni-
lateral withdrawal in 2003, but in 2006 its leader 
Amir Peretz even declared that there was no differ-
ence between Kadima and the Labor Party over this 
issue.34 
The strategy of unilateralism – devoid of consul-
tation or negotiation with the Palestinians – was a 
double-edged sword, however. The government’s 
hopes – that the plan would “lead to a better secu-
rity, political, economic and demographic situation”35 
– were at best partially fulfilled. In fact the unilateral 
policy actually strengthened those forces on the Pales-
tinian side who argued that only violence would per-
suade Israel to give up the Occupied Territories. As far 
as these hardliners were concerned, the Israeli with-
drawal had been motivated above all by the armed 
resistance of the Palestinians.36 This phenomenon of 
reinterpretation had already been observed in Pales-
tinian society following Israel’s withdrawal from 
 
33 Asher Arian and Michal Shamir, “A Decade Later, the 
World Had Changed, the Cleavage Structure Remained: 
Israel 1996–2006”, Party Politics 14, no. 6 (2008): 685–705 
(700). 
34 Jonathan Mendilow, “The Hidden Agenda of the 2009 
Elections”, Israel Studies Forum 25, no. 2 (2010): 81–101 (94). 
35 The Prime Minister’s Office, The Cabinet Resolution 
Regarding the Disengagement Plan, 6 June 2004, https://tinyurl. 
com/yb9av4oe (accessed 8 December 2017). 
36 Said Aly, Feldman and Shikaki, Arabs and Israelis 
(see note 9), 373f. 
Lebanon.37 It demonstrates very well why unilateral 
steps – even where they consist in relinquishing 
territorial control – are no substitute for peace nego-
tiations. It is a consequence of the ethos of conflict 
described above and the inherent underlying belief 
that the other side is malign: the absence of talks 
strengthens actors seeking grounds to escalate. In line 
with this conflict logic, Israeli’s unilateral withdrawal 
contributed to an escalation of violence between 
Hamas and Israel. 
Israeli Society Loses Faith in a Solution: 
2009 to Present 
Recurring armed conflict with Hamas in 2006, 
2008/09, 2012 and 2014 further strengthened the 
trend for scepticism towards a peace settlement. 
In Israel the confrontations popularised an inter-
pretation arguing that each territorial withdrawal 
(from Area A in the 1990s, Lebanon in 2000 and Gaza 
in 2005) led to new aggression. This increasingly led 
politicians and the Israeli public to regard the relin-
quishment of occupied territory as a mistake. The 
failure of the Annapolis peace talks in 2007/2008 and 
the split between Fatah and Hamas also consolidated 
the belief in Israeli society that a peace settlement 
was impossible. Journalists in various political camps 
have commented in recent years that, as one put it: 
“Israeli society lost its faith in peace.”38 
In fact mistrust of the Palestinians has actually 
grown. Several post-2009 surveys found that more 
than 70 percent of Israelis believe that the Palestin-
ians are not partners for peace. And stable majorities 
also still believe that the Palestinians intend to grad-
ually destroy the state of Israel and that a withdrawal 
from the Occupied Territories would significantly 
harm Israel’s security.39 
 
37 PSR – Survey Research Unit, Public Opinion Poll #1, 27–29 
July 2000, https://web.archive.org/web/20110607135527/ 
http://www.pcpsr.org/survey/polls/2000/p1a.html (accessed 
8 December 2017). 
38 Baskin, “Encountering Peace” (see note 14). For a similar 
assessment from the left-leaning online magazine +972 see 
Larry Derfner, “The Silent Majority of Complacency: Israel’s 
Right-Wing Voters”, +972 (online), 14 March 2015, https:// 
972mag.com/the-silent-majority-of-complacency-israels-right-
wing-voters/104122/ (accessed 8 December 2017). 
39 Shlomo Brom and Anat Kurz, Strategic Survey for Israel 
2013–2014 (Tel Aviv: INSS, 2014), 165. 
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Israel sees itself trapped between 
the necessity to withdraw from the 
Occupied Territories and the 
impossibility in doing so. 
The opinion that there is no solution to the conflict 
with the Palestinians is shared not only by the right-
wing camp, but since 2015 by a majority of Israelis.40 
One interesting sign of this shift in opinion is the 
success of Milkud 67, which was the best-selling non-
fiction book in Israel in 2017 (“Catch 67”, referring to 
the dilemma at the heart of the popular 1960s anti-
war novel Catch 2241). Its author Micah Goodman 
argues that a withdrawal from the Palestinian Terri-
tories occupied in 1967 is necessary to maintain a 
Jewish majority in the state of Israel. But at the same 
time he notes that the lesson of the 2000s is that any 
further renunciation of territory would endanger 
Israel’s security. All attempts to resolve the conflict 
through negotiations, he adds, have ultimately failed. 
This leaves Israel trapped between the necessity to 
withdraw from the Occupied Territories and the im-
possibility of so doing – a dilemma for which, he 
argues, currently nobody has an answer.42 
The majority belief in Israeli society that there is 
no solution for the conflict with the Palestinians is a 
development of the 2010s, a period characterised by 
a further heightening of the conflict and continuation 
of the occupation. On the one hand, there is more or 
less a consensus that in the long term, in the interests 
of the demographic balance of power, there needs to 
be a withdrawal from at least the most populous 
Palestinian Territories. But at the same time any with-
drawal is now regarded as impossible on grounds of 
security, which implies and justifies maintaining the 
occupation indefinitely. 
 
40 The Israel Democracy Institute, Monthly Peace Index, 
10 March 2015, https://en.idi.org.il/press-releases/12768; 
Jehoschua Breiner, “Most Israelis Believe: There Will Never 
Be a Peace Treaty with the Palestinians” [in Hebrew], Walla 
News, 1 October 2016, https://news.walla.co.il/item/3002287 
(both accessed 8 December 2017). 
41 Joseph Heller, Catch 22 (New York, 1961). 
42 Haviv Rettig Gur, “The Peace Process Hasn’t Brought 
Peace: The Case for Moving On”, Times of Israel, 27 June 2017, 
http://www.timesofisrael.com/a-gentler-war/; Isabel Kershner, 
“A Best-Selling Israeli Philosopher Examines His Country’s 
Inner Conflict”, New York Times, 9 June 2017, http://www. 
nytimes.com/2017/06/09/world/middleeast/a-best-selling-
israeli-philosopher-examines-his-countrys-inner-conflict. 
html (both accessed 8 December 2017). 
This shift in majority public opinion in the course 
of the 2010s has also left its mark on Israel’s party 
politics, where the centre of gravity has shifted even 
further to the right. 2009 marked a turning point. 
Firstly for the majorities themselves: Since the 2009 
election the right-wing and religious bloc (the secular 
and religious nationalist parties and the ultra-Ortho-
dox) have enjoyed narrow majorities in parliament. 
However for various reasons these parties do not 
always form coalitions with one another (as in 2013–
2015). 
Secondly, a rightward shift in the political camps as 
a whole can also be observed: The idea that successful 
final status negotiations could be conducted in the 
near future was largely abandoned – even outside 
of the right-wing camp – at the latest following the 
failure of the talks initiated by US Secretary of State 
John Kerry in 2013. Instead today the centre-left camp 
speaks increasingly frequently of peace talks being off 
the table for several years. Until then, they say Israel 
must withdraw to secure borders but continue to 
control security in the Palestinian Territories. A range 
of positions are found in the right-wing camp today, 
with most believing that the conflict can at best be 
managed. But those who favour conflict management 
also include voices advocating immediate annexation 
of parts of the West Bank. The demand for immediate 
annexation is a new phenomenon of the 2010s. 
Between Conflict Management and 
Annexation: Right-Wing Camp Shifts 
Further Right 
The peace process has been largely stalled since Prime 
Minister Benjamin Netanyahu took office in 2009. Al-
though Netanyahu announced in 2009 – as the first 
Likud prime minister to do so – that he would not 
rule out the possibility of a two-state solution under 
certain conditions,43 his actions have never shown 
any indication of steps in that direction. Netanyahu’s 
statement that the two-state solution was conceivable 
in principle was nothing but a tribute to the fact that 
this model has become the accepted norm internation-
ally and its open rejection would have isolated Israel. 
Domestically and in election campaigning the prime 
minister repeatedly emphasised that the Palestinians 
 
43 “Full Text of Netanyahu’s Foreign Policy Speech at Bar 
Ilan”, Haaretz, 14 June 2009, http://www.haaretz.com/news/ 
full-text-of-netanyahu-s-foreign-policy-speech-at-bar-ilan-
1.277922 (accessed 8 December 2017). 
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were not partners for the Israeli government, that 
there will be no Palestinian state as long as he is 
prime minister,44 and that Israel is “here to stay, for-
ever” in the West Bank.45 Netanyahu accordingly 
pursued a policy designed above all to minimise the 
conflict with the Palestinians while simultaneously 
retaining strategic control over the West Bank and 
pressing ahead with settlement-building. A climate 
where conflict resolution is regarded as unlikely has 
always been fundamentally favourable for Likud, 
which has been saying just that for more than thirty 
years. In fact to date Netanyahu’s sceptical stance 
has been his guarantee of re-election and the strategic 
foundation of his election campaigns: Netanyahu 
injected threat discourses into the media discourse 
which – so the message – only he was capable of 
tackling.46 The 2015 campaign represented a prime 
example.47 On top of this comes a policy of targeted 
discreditation of domestic critics, with Israeli human 
rights organisations depicted as the “fifth column” 
of Israel’s enemies. In the discourse of parts of Netan-
yahu’s government (especially Likud and Jewish 
Home) “left” has become a slur. 
But it is also clear that even if he wanted to, Netan-
yahu would not be able to launch any credible initia-
tive towards a two-state solution. With a majority of 
Likud deputies categorically rejecting such a move, it 
would in all likelihood cost Netanyahu the support of 
his party and therefore also his office.48 And anyway 
 
44 Barak Ravid, “Netanyahu: Bar-Ilan 2-state Speech No 
Longer Relevant in Today's Reality”, Haaretz, 8 March 2015, 
https://www.haaretz.com/.premium-bar-ilan-speech-no-
longer-relevant-1.5333961 (accessed 28 May 2018). 
45 Yotam Berger, “Netanyahu Vows to Never Remove 
Israeli Settlements from West Bank: ‘We’re Here to Stay, 
Forever’”, Haaretz, 29 August 2017, http://www.haaretz.com/ 
israel-news/1.809444 (accessed 8 December 2017). 
46 One illustrative and perhaps unintentionally comical 
example is a campaign advert presenting Netanyahu as the 
“Bibi-sitter” (his nickname being Bibi); he asks the startled 
parents whether they would prefer him or one of the oppo-
sition leaders to look after their children. http://www. 
youtube.com/watch?v=JQ1BltDU4iM (accessed 8 December 
2017). 
47 Peter Lintl, “Understanding Coalition Formation in 
Israel: Party Positions and Cleavages in Light of the 2015 
Elections”, Orient 56, no. 3 (2015): 27–35. 
48 See Peter Lintl, The Dynamics of a Right-wing Coalition: How 
the Failure of the Peace Processes Encourages Domestic Populism in 
Israel, SWP Comment 45/2016 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft 
und Politik, October 2016), https://www.swp-berlin.org/ 
the principal conflict within Likud today is a different 
one: The internal controversy is over the question 
of whether partial annexations should already be 
carried out. At least half the current Likud deputies 
demand immediate partial annexation of the West 
Bank,49 some even complete annexation.50 Netanyahu 
himself and former coalition chair David Bitan take 
a different position: Neither opposes annexations in 
principle, but in light of international circumstances 
they regard such a move as impractical and fear it 
would worsen relations especially with the United 
States.51 One can describe Likud’s policy since 2009 
above all as a policy of conflict management aiming 
no higher than pacification. Likud continues to reject 
a Palestinian state, instead encouraging settlement 
construction and discussing partial annexation (on 
the question of which party supports which solution 
for the Occupied Territories, see also the overview 
on page 16). Similar positions are also advanced by 
Yisrael Beiteinu and Jewish Home. The latter is the 
most vociferous advocate of annexation of at least 
Area C. The former supports a two-state solution, but 
makes this conditional on the transfer of Israeli Arabs 
to the new Palestinian state. That option remains un-
realistic because Israel’s Arab population cannot be 
expected to support it. Thus in day-to-day politics 
Yisrael Beiteinu also tends towards a policy of conflict 
management. Unlike Jewish Home, however, Yisrael 
Beiteinu defers to American opposition and opposes 




(accessed 8 December 2017). 
49 Including Tzipi Hotovely, Yariv Levin, Zeev Elkin, Yuli 
Edelstein, Danny Danon, Miri Regev, Yoav Kish, Yehuda 
Glick, Yisrael Katz, Yuval Steinitz, Haim Katz, Nava Boker, 
Avi Dichter, Oren Hazan, Miki Zohar. 
50 Raphael Ahren, “The Newly Confident Israeli Propo-
nents of a One-state Solution”, Times of Israel, 16 July 2012, 
http://www.timesofisrael.com/at-hebron-conference-
proponents-of-the-one-state-solution-show-their-growing-
confidence/ (accessed 8 December 2017). 
51 Ravit Hecht, “Which Direction Does the Strongest Man 
in Israeli Politics Want to Take the Country?” Haaretz, 4 Octo-
ber 2017, http://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-
1.815717 (accessed 8 December 2017). 
52 Udi Shaham and Tovah Lazaroff, “Liberman: Israeli 
Annexation of West Bank Will Cause ‘Immediate Crisis’ 
with US”, Jerusalem Post, 6 March 2017, http://www.jpost.com/ 
Israel-News/Politics-And-Diplomacy/Liberman-Israel-warned-
West-Bank-annexation-will-cause-immediate-crisis-with-US-
483345 (accessed 8 December 2017). 
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Positions of parties represented in the Knesset towards the Occupied Territoriesa 
Knesset camp Demands, positions 
Political objective:  
Negotiation 
Supporters: Meretz, United 
Arab List, parts of Labor Party 
Size: ~ 20 percent of Knesset 
∎ Final status negotiations on the basis of “two states for two nations” 
∎ Land swap: settlement blocs in exchange for land parcels in Israel 
∎ Jerusalem as open capital of two states with separate administrations 
∎ Negotiations on the basis of the Arab Peace Initiative, scepticism towards 
bilateral talks on the existing pattern (exception: United Arab List)  
Political objective: 
Conflict transformation  
Supporters: Labor Party, Yesh 
Atid, parts of Kulanu 
Size: ~ 30 percent of Knesset 
∎ Adherence to two-state solution 
∎ Jerusalem as undivided capital of Israel 
∎ Preservation of the Jewish state as top priority 
∎ Scepticism towards chances of direct talks 
∎ Evacuation of isolated settlements, retention of settlement blocs 
∎ Completion of separation barrier 
∎ Economic development of Palestinian Territories 
∎ Transitional period for conflict transformation and confidence-building 
∎ Subsequent final status negotiations 
Political objective: 
Conflict management 
Supporters: parts of Likud, 
Yisrael Beiteinu, parts of 
Kulanu, parts of the ultra-
Orthodox parties 
Size: ~ 30 percent of Knesset 
∎ Basic assumption: conflict is unresolvable 
∎ Settlement expansion 
∎ No territorial withdrawal 
∎ Jerusalem as undivided capital of Israel 
∎ Rejection of Palestinian statehood, instead autonomy  
∎ Control of large parts of the West Bank, especially Area C 
∎ No vision for conflict resolution, economic development of Palestinian 
Territories for “pacification” 
Political objective:  
Annexation 
Supporters: parts of Likud, 
Jewish Home 
Size: ~ 20 percent of Knesset 
∎ Various annexation proposals: “Greater Jerusalem”, all settlement blocs, 
Area C, the entire West Bank 
∎ Rejection of a Palestinian state: proposals include autonomy, granting of 
partial rights, and population transfer 
∎ Permanent expansion of settlements and their infrastructure 
∎ Apart from annexation: conflict management 
a The ultra-Orthodox parties have no clear line on the Occupied Territories. Their 
positions lean right, but the issue is clearly secondary to others such as the relationship 
between state and religion and financial support for their base. Knesset deputy Yaakov 
Litzman explicitly articulated the refusal of the ultra-Orthodox to take a firm position on 
this question: “Nobody knows whether I am in favour of a territorial compromise, Eretz 
Israel HaShlema [Complete Land of Israel] or a two-state solution” (Michael Tuchfeld, 
“I do not say no to a coalition with Gabbai” [in Hebrew], interview with Yaakov Litzman, 
in Makor Rishon, 10 November 2017). 
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From Negotiated Solution to Conflict 
Transformation in the Centre-Left Camp 
After Kadima’s election defeat in 2013 other parties 
– like Kulanu and above all Yair Lapid’s Yesh Atid – 
occupied the political centre ground. In broad terms 
their views on the peace process are similar to other 
centre parties before them, supporting a two-state 
solution but retaining deep mistrust towards the 
Palestinians.53 Kulanu tends a little to the right, Yesh 
Atid slightly to the left. But neither prioritises the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Convinced that it cannot 
currently be resolved, they propagate instead a “nor-
malisation” of Israeli politics, as Lapid puts it.54 What 
this means above all is concentrating on socio-eco-
nomic issues. In relation to the Occupied Territories 
the centrist parties have not to date formulated any 
substantive plan of action. But they regard the prin-
ciple of separation as important: withdrawal to the 
settlement blocs and completion of the separation 
barrier.55 Another Israeli-Palestinian rapprochement, 
says Yair Lapid for example, will have to wait for the 
next generation.56 
The Labor Party has also adopted these positions 
and thus moved still further towards the centre. Its 
then leader Shelly Yachimovich explicitly acknowl-
edged this in 2013, asserting that Labor had always 
been a party of the centre.57 Although the wish to 
overcome the conflict with the Palestinians through 
a two-state solution remains part of the party’s pro-
gramme,58 today that objective appears more than 
 
53 Ofra Edelman, “Lapid Drops Demand for Palestinian 
State”, Haaretz, 26 March 2017, http://www.haaretz.com/israel-
news/.premium-1.779437 (accessed 8 December 2017). 
54 Israel Hayom Editorial, “Lapid Declares: We Will Not 
Form A Block with Haneen Zoabi” [in Hebrew], Israel 
Hayom, 23 January 2013, http://www.israelhayom.co.il/site/ 
newsletter_article.php?id=26144&hp=1&newsletter (accessed 
8 December 2017). 
55 TOI Staff, “Lapid: We Need to Build a High Wall and Get 
the Palestinians Out of Our Sight”, Times of Israel, 10 Decem-
ber 2016, http://www.timesofisrael.com/lapid-israel-needs-to-
separate-from-the-palestinians/ (accessed 8 December 2017). 
56 Edelman, “Lapid Drops Demand for Palestinian State” 
(see note 53). 
57 Jonathan Lis, “Shelly Yacimovich: Labor Is Not a Left-
wing Party”, Haaretz, 8 November 2012, http://www.haaretz. 
com/israel-news/shelly-yacimovich-labor-is-not-a-left-wing-
party-1.476264 (accessed 8 December 2017). 
58 Electoral Programme of the Zionist Camp 2015 [in Hebrew], 
5, https://www.idi.org.il/media/6070/ הנחמה-ינויצה-2015 .pdf 
(accessed 8 December 2017). 
ever a far-off vision. In February 2017 Yitzhak Herzog, 
the current opposition leader from the Zionist Union 
(a formal alliance of the Labor Party with two deputies 
from the small centre-left HaTnua), presented a ten-
point plan whose implementation would ultimately 
lead to realisation of a two-state solution. But the 
approach of direct bilateral talks, Herzog said, had 
been shown to have failed because the two sides’ 
positions were still too far apart. He therefore pro-
posed a roadmap for the next ten years. During this 
period Israel would withdraw to behind the completed 
separation barrier and work to improve the economic 
situation of the Palestinians. Final status negotiations 
would then be conducted after this phase of peaceful 
coexistence.59 The objective of political action, he 
said, had to be first of all conflict transformation, during 
which the parties would build mutual confidence. 
Only then would it be possible to resume peace talks. 
Herzog’s successor Avi Gabbay appears to wish to 
shift the Labor Party even further into the centre (and 
beyond). Gabbay has already expressed doubts as to 
whether a “partner” for talks exists on the Palestinian 
side and declared that even in the event of a peace 
treaty with the Palestinians no settlements would 
have to be vacated.60 He also announced in autumn 
2017 that he planned to rename the party in order to 
attract Likud voters. Whether or not these statements 
are principally motivated by electioneering, they rep-
resent a clear indication of the reorientation currently 
under way in the Labor Party.61 
Meretz to some extent represents an exception. It 
is the only party whose members still describe them-
selves as “Zionist left”, and the only majority-Jewish 
party still calling for an immediate start to negotia-
tions. These should, it says, be accompanied by de 
facto recognition of a Palestinian state and the dis-
 
59 Isaac Herzog, “Isaac Herzog Details His 10-point Plan for 
Israeli-Palestinian Peace”, Haaretz, 23 February 2017, http:// 
www.haaretz.com/misc/article-print-page/.premium-1.773312 
(accessed 8 December 2017). 
60 Chaim Levinson, Jack Koury and Almog Ben Zikri, “New 
Leader of Israeli Left: We Don’t Need to Evacuate Settlements 
If There’s a Peace Deal”, Haaretz, 16 October 2017, http:// 
www.haaretz.com/israel-news/1.817602 (accessed 8 Decem-
ber 2017). 
61 TOI Staff and Alexander Fulbright, “As He Moves to 
Right, Israel’s Labor Leader Said Planning to Drop Party’s 
Name”, Times of Israel, 20 October 2017, http://www. timesofis-
rael.com/as-he-moves-to-right-israels-labor-leader-said-
planning-to-drop-partys-name/ (accessed 8 December 2017). 
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mantling of military structures in the West Bank.62 
However the sea change experienced in Israeli society 
as a whole has also left its mark on Meretz. The par-
ty’s programme thus states that a “new approach”63 
is needed in talks with the Palestinians. The US-led 
bilateral negotiations to date, it says, have been fruit-
less and new formats and perspectives are therefore 
needed. In particular the Arab Peace Initiative of 2002, 
which raised the prospect of many Arab states recog-
nising Israel in the scope of a peace settlement, 
should, Meretz says, play a role in such a new start. 
The positions of the Arab parties, which formed 
the United Arab List in 2015, remain unchanged: they 
argue for negotiations towards a two-state solution.64 
There is, however, a consensus among the Zionist 
parties not to form coalitions with the Arab parties, 
and the Arab List has in turn ruled out the option 
of participating in government.65 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
Israel has been trapped in a vicious circle since 2001. 
The failure of the peace negotiations and the return 
of violence apparently confirm the ethos of conflict 
described above, under which the other side was 
looking for confrontation anyway. This dynamic has 
in turn encouraged a belief that the Palestinians 
are not interested in peace with Israel, and military 
options are therefore preferable to political talks. 
In this atmosphere alternative interpretations have 
increasingly been marginalised and discredited as 
unrealistic. The shift in opinion in turn has impacted 
on political positions and power constellations: The 
left-wing camp abandoned long-held demands for 
immediate negotiations and came out in favour of 
a unilateral strategy, while the right-wing camp con-
tinued to reject any two-state solution and gained 
 
62 Meretz, Four Point Plan for Initiating the Peace Process [part 
of Meretz’s 2013 election platform], https://en.idi.org.il/media/ 
7109/meretz_19platform.pdf (accessed 8 December 2017). 
63 Meretz Election Platform 2015 [in Hebrew], 45, https://en. 
idi.org.il/media/6685/%D7%9E%D7%A8%D7%A6-2015.pdf 
(accessed 8 December 2017). 
64 United Arab List Election Platform [in Hebrew], https:// 
www.idi.org.il/media/6072/ המישרה-תפתושמה .pdf (accessed 
8 December 2017). 
65 Elhanan Miller, “‘No Matter How Left-wing’, Arab 
Parties Won’t Join Coalition”, Times of Israel, 1 February 2015, 
http://www.timesofisrael.com/no-matter-how-left-wing-arab-
parties-wont-join-coalition/ (accessed 8 December 2017). 
growing support as the conflict dragged. The latter 
was in a sense a logical progression, as the right had 
always said that the conflict cannot be resolved: as 
talks failed and routines of violence established, con-
flict narratives confirming the positions of the right-
wing camp gained traction. In other words, the ab-
sence of a solution set in motion a mechanism in 
which the opposing sides increasingly frequently and 
strongly saw their own interpretations confirmed, 
and which thus also generated actions that further 
distanced the conflicting parties. A parallel develop-
ment can, incidentally, be observed on the Palestinian 
side, where the failure of the peace negotiations 
weakened those currents in Fatah that wish to resolve 
the conflict politically, and strengthened the sup-
porters of military options – especially Hamas but 
also including other forces. 
It should not be forgotten that as long as the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict remains unresolved the 
occupation will continue and Israel will continue to 
expand its settlements in the West Bank. The sheer 
number of settlers – roughly 650,000 – and the in-
exorable growth of the area occupied by settlements 
are steadily eroding the chances of a two-state solu-
tion even without an active policy of annexation. 
Within Israel today there is such massive resistance 
against stopping settlement-building that such a step 
is only conceivable in conjunction with a negotiated 
solution. And that, as we have seen, is currently 
highly unlikely. 
Despite this self-reinforcing dynamic, there are also 
positive signs. A majority of Israelis continue to sup-
port a two-state solution; surveys also indicate that 
confidence in the Palestinians would increase signifi-
cantly if they were to concede central Israeli demands 
(such as recognising Israel as a Jewish state).66 The 
same applies on the Palestinian side: confidence in 
Israel would grow immediately if the Israeli govern-
ment were to show openness to central Palestinian 
demands. At the same time, any process that re-
opened the possibility of a negotiated solution in 
Israeli politics and society is liable to be a protracted 
one,67 because entrenched narratives change only 
 
66 Olena Bagno-Moldavsky and Yehuda Ben Meir, “Who in 
Israel Is Ready for a Peace Agreement with the Palestinians?” 
INSS Strategic Assessment 17, no. 1 (April 2014): 47–56, 
http://www.inss.org.il/wp-content/uploads/systemfiles/Bagno-
Moldavsky%20and%20Ben%20Meir_adkan17_1ENG5.pdf 
(accessed 8 December 2017). 
67 Yossi Verter, “Reviving the Israeli Left Is a Ten Year 
Project, Says Think Tank”, Haaretz, 9 August 2012, http:// 
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slowly. Yet that would be a process in which the EU 
could play a role. 
Options for the European Union 
With belief in the two-state solution fading in Israeli, 
it will fall to the EU to uphold it in the international 
discourse. This is especially important in a time in 
which US President Trump’s special advisor Jared 
Kushner has declared that “there may be no solution” 
to the conflict.68 Statements of that kind strengthen 
actors who are only interested in managing the con-
flict. The necessity of defending the discourse on the 
two-state option is dual in nature. Firstly it is very 
likely that its normative character has deterred the 
present Israeli government from annexing parts of 
the West Bank, which parts of the coalition explicitly 
demand. Secondly, it is of great relevance for the so-
called “peace camp” that it has international partners 
to which it can turn if the right-wing bloc were to lose 
its majority. The relevance of this factor is reflected in 
the significance generally assigned to Israel’s relation-
ships with the United States and Europe in centre-left 
party programmes of recent decades. 
More broadly, in the current situation the EU is 
likely to be forced into a balancing act. On the one 
hand the EU should maintain its criticism of settle-
ment-building, continue to place the deteriorating 
living conditions of the Palestinians on the agenda, 
and explore how it can influence both using the 
means at its disposal.69 
On the other hand the EU must make it clear that 
this criticism is not associated with a delegitimisation 
of the state of Israel. That is preconditional for coun-
tering the erosion of support for the two-state solu-
tion described above, at least in the centre-left camp. 
Broad sections of the right-wing camp assert namely 
exactly that: that criticism of the occupation is iden-
tical with delegitimisation of the state of Israel. Be-
cause the occupation is imperative for security, they 
argue, any criticism of it represents a threat to the 
 
www.haaretz.com/israel-news/reviving-the-israeli-left-is-a-ten-
year-project-says-think-tank-1.456919 (accessed 8 December 
2017). 
68 Amir Tibon, “Jared Kushner Warns ‘There May Be No 
Solution’ to Israeli-Palestinian Conflict”, Haaretz, 2 August 
2017, http://www.haaretz.com/us-news/1.804604 (accessed 
8 December 2017). 
69 On possible options see the contributions in this pub-
lication by Muriel Asseburg (pp. 20ff.) and René Wildangel 
(pp. 34ff.). 
Israel’s existence. Politicians like the leader of the 
pro-settler Jewish Home, Naftali Bennett, and Prime 
Minister Netanyahu systematically equate all objec-
tions to the occupation with positions denying legiti-
macy to the state of Israel itself. 
In the atmosphere outlined above, where a majority 
of the public believes that there is “no solution” to 
the conflict and the occupation must be maintained 
for the foreseeable future, such arguments appear 
increasingly plausible. That view is cemented by in-
ternational campaigns, in particular that conducted 
by the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) move-
ment whose activists advocate positions ranging from 
criticism of the occupation to rejection of the state 
of Israel’s right to exist.70 Right-wing politicians con-
sequently feel justified in dismissing any objection 
to the occupation as delegitimisation of Israel. 
Even the European Union is increasingly viewed 
from that angle in Israel. In one survey about 73 per-
cent of Israelis said that Brussels was not a neutral 
actor and a majority thought that the EU was not a 
strong defender of Israel’s right to exist.71 In view of 
such mistrust the EU’s influence on Israel will inevi-
tably shrink, especially if the EU intends to operate 
not as a pure power actor, but also as a norm actor, 
for example by underlining the necessity to resolve 
the conflict through a two-state solution. 
The EU should therefore be interested in explain-
ing its positions more precisely in Israel. For example 
it would be well-advised to communicate clearly that 
steps that exert pressure on Israel are solely related to 
the fields of conflict resolution, and to avoid creating 
the impression that these are punitive measures. This 
includes, on the one hand, ensuring greater publicity 
is given to the positive incentives the EU is offering in 
the event of a settlement. Few Israelis for example 
(16 percent), are aware of the EU’s offer of a “special 
 
70 The BDS movement is openly modelled on the boycott 
of the South African apartheid regime, and calls for cultural, 
political and economic isolation of Israel until it has ended 
“its occupation and colonization of all Arab lands”. The 
movement leaves open whether this means Israeli with-
drawal from the territories occupied in 1967, or complete 
rejection of Israeli statehood. But some parts of the move-
ment openly reject the existence of the state of Israel. 
See FAQs on the BDS movement’s website, https://bdsmove-
ment.net/faqs#collapse16233 (accessed 8 January 2018). 
71 Michael Borchard, Israel’s View of Europe-Israeli Relations 
(Jerusalem: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, September 2017), 
6f, http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas_49967-1522-2-30.pdf?17090 
5170514 (accessed 8 December 2017). 
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privileged partnership” in the event of peace with the 
Palestinians, which would grant Israel the prospect of 
easier access to European markets, intensified cultural 
and scientific cooperation and intensified security 
cooperation.72 
This must, on the other hand, also involve a com-
munication strategy that distinguishes clearly be-
tween criticism of settlement construction and initia-
tives that seek to delegitimise Israeli statehood. Even 
if the legitimacy of the state of Israel is beyond ques-
tion in the European discourse – or regarded as 
irrelevant in light of Israel’s military superiority – it 
remains crucial for Israeli society. If the EU wants its 
positions to find an echo in Israel, despite the erosion 
of support for the peace process, it must draw a sharp 
distinction between legitimate criticism of settlement-
building and challenges to Israel’s right to exist. 
 
 
72 Mitvim and Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, A Special Privileged 
Partnership with the EU as an Incentive for Israeli-Palestinian Peace 
(Ramat Gan, June 2016), http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/ 
israel/13105.pdf (accessed 8 December 2017). 
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It might at first glance appear unusual to call the 
Palestinian Authority (PA) and the Hamas govern-
ment accessories to the occupation. After all, the 
PLO (Palestine Liberation Organisation) and Hamas 
(Islamic Resistance Movement), which form the basis 
of the two administrations, are both dedicated to the 
liberation of Palestine – albeit with different ideas 
about the extent of the territory to be liberated, 
different visions for the nature of a Palestinian state, 
and different means to achieve those goals. Yet in 
reality, both governments fulfil important functions 
in upholding and consolidating the occupation re-
gime and the blockade of the Gaza Strip. The leeway 
open to them to work towards ending the occupation 
is limited, because the consequence of assuming gov-
erning functions under conditions of ongoing occu-
pation is that they are dependent on cooperation with 
the occupying power. This even applies to the Hamas 
government, which officially has no contacts with 
Israel but cooperates indirectly in security matters. 
Ultimately both Palestinian governments give con-
solidating power in the areas they govern priority 
over the liberation struggle. 
Palestinian Self-administration 
under Occupation1 
Although Israel has formally annexed only one part 
of the Occupied Palestinian Territories – East Jeru-
salem – it also exercises far-reaching de facto control 
over the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and their 
 
1 This section is based largely on Muriel Asseburg and Jan 
Busse, The End of a Two-State Settlement? Alternatives and Priorities 
for Settling the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, SWP Comment 24/2016 
(Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, April 2016). 
See also Shai Feldman and Khalil Shikaki, Israel and the Pales-
tinians: Sliding toward a One-State Reality, Middle East Brief, 
no. 104 (Waltham, MA: Crown Center for Middle East 
Studies, Brandeis University, December 2016). 
populations. The basis for this was originally created 
by Israel’s military occupation of these areas in 1967 
and its legal and administrative codification, includ-
ing the “reunification” of Jerusalem and the Jerusa-
lem Law of 1980. The matrix of control was further 
refined by the Oslo Accords of 1993 to 1995, which 
the PLO leadership signed on the understanding that 
this was not to be a permanent arrangement, but 
rather provisions for a five-year interim period ending 
in 1999 with statehood and an Israeli-Palestinian 
peace agreement. 
Territorial Provisions in the Oslo Accords 
Although the Accords stated that the territorial unity 
of the Palestinian Territories would be preserved, they 
nevertheless divided the West Bank and Gaza into 
entities with different statuses and left East Jerusalem 
under sole Israeli control until a final peace agree-
ment. At the same time the Accords largely restrict 
the PA’s responsibilities to self-administration and 
internal order in Areas A and B, which are comprised 
of a multitude of enclaves.2 They leave what is re-
ferred to as Area C (today about 60 percent of the 
West Bank) under far-reaching Israeli control, includ-
ing responsibility for planning, internal order and 
security. In concrete terms that means that no Pales-
tinian security forces can be deployed in these areas, 
nor can infrastructure or construction work be con-
ducted without Israeli permission. 
The biggest departure from the provisions agreed 
in Oslo has been witnessed in the Gaza Strip. In late 
summer 2005 Israel unilaterally withdrew its settlers 
and armed forces from the densely populated coastal 
enclave which lacks religious or ideological signifi-
cance. That does not mean, however, that the occu-
pation ended, as Israel retains control over Gaza’s 
territorial and maritime borders, coastal waters, 
 
2 See map on p. 4 in this volume. 
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resources (above all the Gaza Marine gas field in the 
Mediterranean), airspace, electromagnetic sphere, 
trade, and development opportunities (including 
the possibility of constructing a port and airport). 
Only the border between Gaza and Egypt is no longer 
under (indirect) Israeli control, since the so-called 
Agreement on Movement and Access was suspended 
in mid-2007.3 
Today it would be absurd to speak of 
the unity of Palestinian territory, 
which has been fragmented into tiny 
parcels with different statuses. 
Today it would be absurd to speak of the unity of 
Palestinian territory, which has been fragmented into 
tiny parcels with different statuses. This is the out-
come of various developments and factors: East Jeru-
salem and the West Bank have seen great expansion 
of Israeli settlements and associated infrastructure 
(today almost 600,000 settlers live there in about 125 
settlements and 100 outposts);4 the separation barrier 
constructed since 2002 now cuts off about 8 percent 
of the West Bank and isolates East Jerusalem from its 
Palestinian hinterland; and finally Israel and Egypt 
have ensured an effective blockade of Gaza by re-
stricting the movement of people and goods, as well 
as fishing. Additionally Palestinians are prohibited 
from building on, farming or otherwise developing 
about 70 percent of Area C (amounting to about 
40 percent of the entire West Bank). These are areas 
assigned to settlements; designated as state land, 
firing ranges or nature reserves; or located on the 
Israeli side of the separation barrier.5 Israel regularly 
demolishes structures built without permits there 
 
3 Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Agreed Documents on 




aspx (accessed 17 May 2017). 
4 B’Tselem – The Israeli Information Center for Human 
Rights in the Occupied Territories, Settlements: Statistics on 
Settlements and Settler Population (updated 11 May 2017), http:// 
www.btselem.org/settlements/statistics (accessed 17 May 
2017). 
5 B’Tselem – The Israeli Information Center for Human 
Rights in the Occupied Territories, Area C: Taking Control of 
Land and Designating Areas Off-limits to Palestinian Use, 23 Octo-
ber 2013, http://www.btselem.org/area_c/taking_over_land 
(accessed 17 May 2017). 
(and in East Jerusalem). In certain areas the Palestin-
ian population is deprived of a livelihood by land 
seizures, denial of access to drinking water and sew-
age treatment, or exposure to attacks by settlers. 
The European Commission’s Directorate-General for 
European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid 
Operations writes in this connection of “forced evic-
tions”.6 The Palestinian population’s freedom of 
movement between the West Bank enclaves is heavily 
restricted by Israeli prohibitions on using certain 
roads and the large number of (fixed and temporary) 
checkpoints; travel to East Jerusalem and between the 
West Bank and Gaza requires special permits that are 
granted only in exceptional cases. 
Restricted Self-administration 
From 1994 the PA incrementally assumed responsibil-
ity for internal order, self-administration and public 
services in the Palestinian Territories, while the inter-
national community contributed the lion’s share of 
the funds.7 The Accords also provided for extensive 
security cooperation between Israel and the PA, sym-
bolised by regular joint patrols in the Palestinian Ter-
ritories.8 A Palestinian security apparatus was created 
and equipped with light arms, but Israel reserved the 
right to pursue suspects even into the A and B Areas 
(“right of hot pursuit”); to this day Israel regularly 
detains suspects there. After Israel’s withdrawal from 
the Gaza Strip in 2005, Hamas’s victory in the Pales-
tinian parliamentary elections in January 2006, and 
its violent takeover in Gaza in June 2007, de facto 
government responsibility in Gaza rests with the 
Hamas government. 
 
6 European Commission – European Civil Protection and 
Humanitarian Aid Operations, Palestine. Echo Factsheet, Brus-
sels, last update 20 January 2018, http://ec.europa.eu/echo/ 
files/aid/countries/factsheets/palestine_en.pdf (accessed 27 
February 2018). 
7 For the EU see the contribution by René Wildangel in 
this volume, pp. 48ff. 
8 Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the 
Gaza Strip (Oslo II), Chapter 2, Art. X, XII and Annex I – Protocol 
Concerning Redeployment and Security Arrangements, 28 Septem-
ber 1995, http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/ForeignPolicy/Peace/Guide/ 
Pages/THE%20ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN%20INTERIM%20 
AGREEMENT.aspx (accessed 30 May 2017). The security pro-
visions of the Oslo Accords were also supplemented by many 
informal agreements. 
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Israel retained ultimate control for 
the duration of the interim period. 
The Oslo Accords allowed Israel to rid itself of some 
of the tasks of an occupying power, which under in-
ternational law is responsible for ensuring that the 
needs of the population are met. At the same time 
Israel retained ultimate control, with the Accords 
specifying that Israel would exercise control over the 
land and sea borders, airspace and electromagnetic 
sphere of the Palestinian Territories for the duration 
of the interim period. The Accords also cemented 
Israeli dominance over the Palestinian economy 
(primarily through economic and monetary union, 
control of external borders, and access to resources 
in the Palestinian Territories). Israel even runs the 
Palestinian population registry, in which all children 
born in the West Bank and Gaza must be registered. 
Comprehensive Israeli control was enabled not least 
by the postponement of the most complicated politi-
cal and territorial issues – so-called “final status 
questions” – to later talks. These include the status 
of Jerusalem, the future of Israeli settlements, the 
exact line of the border to be drawn between Israel 
and Palestine and the refugee question. To this day 
none of those questions have been resolved. 
The PA as Service-Provider for the 
Occupation 
Since 1994 the PA has assumed responsibility for 
Palestinian self-administration in the Palestinian 
Territories, running services ranging from refuse 
collection and traffic control through education and 
health to water and electricity supply and business 
development. The PA is not only subject to the terri-
torial restrictions described above, but also dependent 
on cooperation with the occupying power in almost 
all its activities, requiring Israeli permission for im-
ports and exports, for deploying police from one 
enclave to another, for infrastructure measures, water 
extraction, and so on. Moreover, the Palestinian Terri-
tories are highly economically dependent on Israel: 
employment in Israel and Israeli settlements repre-
sents a significant source of income; most imports 
to the Palestinian Territories either originate from or 
transit through Israel; Palestinian exporters have to 
use Israeli intermediaries and exports are subject 
to high transaction costs and Israel can delay or stop 
them at any time on grounds of security.9 
The PA’s ability to govern depends to a great extent 
on the Israeli transfers agreed in the Oslo Accords,10 
under an arrangement whereby Israel passes on the 
taxes and duties it collects on Palestinian imports. 
Although the PA has recently succeeded in collecting 
more taxes, their share – about 20 percent of total 
revenues – remains small because of the weakness 
of the economy and because the PA is unable to col-
lect taxes in Area C nor (since mid-2007) in Gaza.11 
The PA’s dependency is underlined by Israel’s fre-
quent withholding of transfers (in contravention of 
the Accords) in order to punish the Palestinian leader-
ship for conduct deemed untoward. For example Is-
rael froze funds for four months after Palestine joined 
the International Criminal Court in 2015.12 
Contested Security Cooperation 
Close Israeli-Palestinian security cooperation emerged 
out of the Oslo Accords. Although joint patrols ceased 
with the Second Intifada, other forms of cooperation 
were reestablished after Mahmoud Abbas took office 
in 2005. Cooperation has since been expanded further 
with energetic support from the United States Secu-
rity Coordinator (USSC) and the European Union 
Coordinating Office for Palestinian Police Support 
(EUPOL COPPS). In this context, the Palestinian secu-
rity forces supply information that enables the Israeli 
army to detain or kill Palestinians accused of terror-
ism, while Israel supplies information to the PA to 
encourage it to arrest the “small fry” itself. 
This confronts the PA with a dilemma: On the one 
hand it depends on Israeli cooperation to check the 
growth of (armed) opposition groups in the West 
 
9 See for example United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development (UNCTAD), Report on UNCTAD Assistance to 
the Palestinian People: Developments in the Economy of the Occupied 
Palestinian Territory, 1 September 2016, http://unctad.org/en/ 
PublicationsLibrary/app2016d1_en.pdf (accessed 17 May 
2017). 
10 Transfers account for about three-quarters of the PA’s 
revenues. Ibid., para. 16, p. 5. 
11 In order to cover its expenses the PA therefore has to 
rely on international support and – increasingly in recent 
years – borrowing. International Monetary Fund, Westbank 
and Gaza – Report to the Ad hoc Committee, 10 April 2017, 8, 
http://bit.ly/2rBjZLA (accessed 30 May 2017). 
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Bank. Also, the moment it calls security cooperation 
into question or takes action contradictory to Israeli 
interests, it must expect Israeli retribution, such as 
the withholding of permits and financial transfers, 
the sealing off of particular areas, and the restriction 
of the number of work permits available for Israel 
and Israeli settlements. Western – especially Ameri-
can – support for the PA is also conditional on acqui-
escence in security cooperation.13 So it is no surprise 
if the Palestinian president describes security coopera-
tion with Israel as “sacred”.14 
Palestinians perceive the PA 
as a subcontractor of the 
occupying power. 
On the other hand that statement became the tar-
get of much mockery from Palestinians, quite a num-
ber of whom perceive the PA as a subcontractor of the 
occupying power or a collaborator with the enemy. 
In this connection they criticise that security coopera-
tion is not designed to protect the Palestinian popu-
lation against Israeli army operations and attacks 
by Israeli settlers but solely to protect Israel and the 
settlers. Moreover, the critics say, since the intra-
Palestinian split security cooperation has increasingly 
served to protect the PA regime, with opposition 
figures, in particular Hamas representatives, detained 
or killed in cooperation with Israeli security forces. 
Surveys show that a large proportion of the popula-
tion now rejects security cooperation and supports 
armed struggle against the occupation, especially 
since the loss of any a credible perspective for an end 
to the occupation and Palestinian independence.15 
 
13 Jim Zanotti, U.S. Foreign Aid to the Palestinians (Washing-
ton, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 16 December 
2016), 4 and 6, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RS22967.pdf 
(accessed 19 May 2017). 
14 “Abbas: Security Cooperation with Israel Is ‘Sacred’”, 
Middle East Monitor, 29 May 2014, https://www.middleeast 
monitor.com/20140529-abbas-security-cooperation-with-
israel-is-sacred/ (accessed 17 May 2017). 
15 For example Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey 
Research, Palestinian Public Opinion Poll No. 55, 19–21 March 
2015, 6, http://www.pcpsr.org/sites/default/files/poll%2055 
%20fulltext%20English%20final.pdf (accessed 19 May 2017). 
See also Alaa Tartir, “The Palestinian Security Forces: Whose 
Security?” Al-Shabaka, 16 May 2017, https://al-shabaka.org/ 
briefs/palestinian-authority-security-forces-whose-security/ 
(accessed 19 May 2017); Julia Lisiecka, Israeli-Palestinian Secu-
rity Cooperation: What Next? (Paris: European Union Institute 
Today Palestinians perceive security cooperation pri-
marily as a means to secure the occupation regime. 
Conflicts of Interest when 
Governing under Occupation 
The PA elites have come to an arrangement with this 
specific occupation regime, in which the PA assumes 
some functions of the occupying power – making 
it easier to maintain the occupation – rather than 
rebelling against it. There are various reasons for this 
behaviour. To start with, Palestinian elites receive 
privileges in the comprehensive permit system, which 
give them a stake in the continued existence of the 
current set-up. These include VIP status for PA leader-
ship cadres and selected entrepreneurs, granting 
them extensive freedom of travel denied to the mass 
of the Palestinian population. In the Oslo arrange-
ments the PA was also given the right to grant li-
cences and establish monopolies for the Palestinian 
market, for example in the area of telecommuni-
cations. This provision has since permitted the PA 
leadership and their families to enrich themselves.16 
At the latest since the Second Intifada (2000–
2005), incessant settlement-building and the lack 
of any perspective of independence have fostered a 
debate in Palestinian civil society and political circles 
about whether the time has not come to dissolve the 
PA and hand full responsibility back to the occupying 
power. Even President Abbas has repeatedly floated 
such a scenario, but without initiating any concrete 
steps. Sometimes this proposal is also tied to a fun-
damental strategy shift that proposes dropping the 
objective of statehood and instead prioritising the 
struggle for equal rights within a single state. To date 
however there is no majority for this idea within 
Palestinian society.17 
Apart from the personal interests of the Palestinian 
elites, three principal factors mitigate against dissolv-
 
for Security Studies [EUISS], May 2017), http://www.iss. 
europa.eu/uploads/media/Alert_12_Israel_and_Palestine.pdf 
(accessed 17 May 2017). 
16 See for example Uri Blau and Daniel Dolev, “Panama 
Papers: Leaks Reveal Abbas’ Son’s $1m Holding in Company 
with Ties to Palestinian Authority”, Haaretz, 7 April 2016, 
http://www.haaretz.com/middle-east-news/1.713347 (accessed 
30 May 2017). 
17 On this discussion and alternatives to the two-state solu-
tion see Muriel Asseburg and Jan Busse, Der Nahostkonflikt: 
Geschichte, Positionen, Perspektiven (Munich: C. H. Beck, 2016), 
109–17. 
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ing the PA and returning full responsibility to the 
occupying power. Firstly, such a move would mean 
a dramatic loss of income for more than 200,000 
national and local public employees.18 The loss would 
affect Gaza as well as the West Bank, as tens of thou-
sands of PA staff in the Gaza Strip are still paid by 
Ramallah, even though they have not been in active 
service since mid-2007.19 
Secondly, such a move would slash the standard 
of living, especially in the West Bank because inter-
national support is dependent – (considerable) 
humanitarian assistance and UNRWA contributions 
aside – on the existence of Palestinian institutions 
as partners. It would be hard to imagine international 
donors directly assisting the occupying power in dis-
charging its duties to the local population. 
Thirdly, dissolution of the PA would represent de 
facto withdrawal from the Oslo Accords. And that in 
turn would remove the basis of most of the support 
from the EU and the United States, which is orientat-
ed on Palestinian state-building in the scope of a two-
state solution. It might also call into question the 
progress the PLO leadership has made in winning 
international recognition for the state of Palestine, 
which is closely linked to the PA’s existence. On top 
of its symbolic significance, these status upgrades 
have opened up new arenas within which the Pales-
tinians are able to deploy political and legal instru-
ments to work towards an end of the occupation 
and the attainment of statehood. To give but one ex-
ample, in January 2015 the PA joined the Internatio-
nal Criminal Court (ICC) and granted it jurisdiction 
to investigate all war crimes committed in the West 
Bank and the Gaza Strip since 13 June 2014 (immedi-
ately before the last armed confrontation in Gaza). 
 
18 According to the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, 
in 2016 21.6 percent of the Palestinian workforce worked 
in the [Palestinian] public sector; 12 percent worked in Israel 
and the settlements. Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, 
Labour Force Survey – Annual Report: 2016, 30 April 2017, 25 
(in English section), http://www.pcbs.gov.ps/Downloads/book 
2266.pdf (accessed 19 May 2017). 
19 Shlomi Eldar, “Will Abbas Stop Paying Gaza Employees’ 
Salaries?”, Al-Monitor, 9 March 2017, http://www.al-monitor. 
com/pulse/originals/2017/03/israel-palestine-pa-gaza-abbas-
salaries-hamas-donor-states.html (accessed 26 May 2017); 
“Hamas Demands ‘Fair’ Sharing of Palestinian Budget 
between West Bank and Gaza” [in Arabic], Al Quds, 9 April 
2017, http://www.alquds.com/articles/1491751450111586700/ 
(accessed 26 May 2017). 
The ICC subsequently opened a preliminary exami-
nation.20 
Cooperation with the Israeli occupying power, 
which also contributes to consolidating the occupa-
tion regime, is a tricky balancing act for the PA. The 
unpopularity of security cooperation with Israel was 
behind the PLO’s March 2015 vote to suspend it, but 
the PA has declined to implement the decision.21 A 
speech by Mahmoud Abbas to the Palestinian Central 
Council in January 2018 revealed the tightrope walk 
the PA must accomplish. Responding to US President 
Donald Trump’s announcement that he would recog-
nise Jerusalem as Israel’s capital, Abbas rejected the 
United States as mediator, declared the failure of 
Oslo, demanded a reexamination of relations with 
the occupying power, committed himself to peaceful 
resistance and reconciliation with Hamas, and an-
nounced the revitalisation of the PLO.22 What Abbas’s 
speech lacked was any indication that concrete steps 
would follow. Also, in the months to follow no prac-
tical measures with the potential to fundamentally 
transform relations with Israel were instituted. 
On the one side, the PA leadership has an interest 
in securing its ability to govern, its political survival, 
its privileges and the international successes it has 
achieved. In this vein it has to exhibit great political 
acquiescence if it is to satisfy its international donors 
and avoid endangering Israeli transfers. This includes 
signalising to Israel its ongoing willingness to nego-
tiate, insisting on non-violence, agreeing to a recon-
ciliation with Hamas only under observance of the 
Middle East Quartet’s conditions (see below, p. 27), 
and continuing security cooperation. An additional 
factor that restricts the Palestinian leadership’s room 
for manoeuvre is that Arab states today show little 
 
20 International Criminal Court, Report on Preliminary Ex-
amination Activities 2015, 12 November 2015, 11–18, https:// 
www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/otp/OTP-PE-rep-2015-Eng.pdf (ac-
cessed 18 May 2017); for further investigations see also Inter-
national Criminal Court, Report on Preliminary Examination 
Activities 2016, 14 November 2016, 27–32, https://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/otp/161114-otp-rep-pe_eng.pdf (accessed 19 May 
2017). 
21 Ahmad Melhem, “Why Israel Will Not Halt Security 
Coordination with PA”, Al-Monitor, 13 January 2017, http:// 
www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2017/01/palestine-israel-
security-civil-coordination.html (accessed 19 May 2017). 
22 “Mahmoud Abbas: PLO Should Reexamine Agreements 
with Israel, Will No Longer Accept U.S. as Mediator”, Youtube, 
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interest in an escalation in the Israeli-Palestinian 
arena and therefore offer the PA no cover for a more 
assertive line towards Israel. 
On the other side, this behaviour has cost the PA 
a great loss of reputation and legitimacy among the 
population.23 Ultimately this path will lead neither to 
a united position through reconciliation with Hamas 
(or even just an improvement in the situation in Gaza 
through effective power-sharing) nor will it credibly 
support Palestinian grassroots initiatives such as the 
BDS movement (Boycott, Divestment, Sanctions) or 
the demand to expand unarmed “popular resist-
ance”.24 Not even an effective boycott of the settle-
ments is a real option for the PA, as long as Palestin-
ian workers see no alternative employment.25 The 
deep rift between the PA and the population has also 
dampened the PA’s interest in holding elections and 
contributed to its leadership style becoming even 
more authoritarian.26 A return to the democratic pro-
cess is therefore extremely unlikely. 
The Hamas Government: 
Resistance vs. Indirect Cooperation 
Unlike the PLO, Hamas has never recognised the state 
of Israel, and unlike the PA, the Hamas government 
 
23 As a consequence, almost two-thirds of Palestinians 
would like to see Mahmoud Abbas resign. Palestinian Center 
for Policy and Survey Research, Public Opinion Poll No. 63,  
8–11 March 2017, 3, http://www.pcpsr.org/sites/default/files/ 
poll%2063%20fulltext%20March%202017%20English.pdf 
(accessed 19 May 2017). 
24 Sufian Abu Zaida, “Peaceful Popular Resistance: Is It an 
Option?”, Changing the Status Quo: What Directions for the Pales-
tinians? (Ramallah: Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey 
Research, May 2016), http://www.pcpsr.org/sites/default/files/ 
Sufian%20Abu%20Zaida%20print%20English.pdf (accessed 
17 May 2017). 
25 For example, a PA campaign to boycott products from 
the settlements quickly fizzled out. See Avi Issacharoff 
and Chaim Levinson, “PA Upgrades Boycott of Settlement 
Products Despite Israeli Warnings”, Haaretz, 20 May 2010, 
http://www.haaretz.com/pa-upgrades-boycott-of-settlement-
products-despite-israeli-warnings-1.291128 (accessed 19 May 
2017). 
26 This is reflected in growing restrictions placed upon 
Palestinian civil society. See for example the case of the well-
known Palestinian pollster Khalil Shikaki: Jochen Stahnke, 
“Volkes Stimme: Ein palästinensischer Meinungsforscher in 
Bedrängnis”, in: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 23 February 
2018, 5. 
does not negotiate, coordinate or cooperate directly 
with Israel. Yet while it does not acknowledge Israel’s 
legitimacy or right to exist, it has accepted its de facto 
existence and repeatedly entered into cease-fire ar-
rangements. Hamas has also raised the prospect of 
a long-term cease-fire under two conditions: Israel 
would have to recognise an independent, sovereign 
Palestinian state in the borders of 4 June 1967 with 
Jerusalem as its capital, and enable the return of the 
Palestinian refugees and displaced persons. 
In the longer perspective Hamas still insists on 
“the liberation of all of Palestine”, meaning the entire 
former British Mandate of Palestine.27 Its May 2017 
Policy Document – agreed unanimously after a 
lengthy discussion process – supplements the Hamas 
Charter and codifies the outcomes of important devel-
opments in Hamas’s strategic thinking: the conflict is 
no longer defined as a religious one, the destruction 
of Israel is no longer a stated objective, and the PLO 
is accepted as the relevant framework of Palestinian 
representation; the document also shares the “Pales-
tinian consensus” of seeking a state within the terri-
tories occupied in 1967.28 
Israel for its part refuses to recognise Hamas as a 
legitimate government, treating it instead as a terror-
ist group and designating the Gaza Strip a “hostile 
territory”.29 All the same, since Hamas seized power 
in Gaza in June 2007 Israel has related to it as the de 
facto government and regularly holds it responsible 
for attacks launched from the territory it controls.30 
Israel’s non-recognition permits Hamas to uphold 
its resistance rhetoric when it needs to justify its 
policies to its own population and important inter-
national allies like Iran. Not least as a justification 
 
27 For greater detail on the evolvement of Hamas’s posi-
tions, see Muriel Asseburg, “Die palästinensische Hamas 
zwischen Widerstandsbewegung und Reformregierung”, 
in Moderate Islamisten als Reformakteure? ed. Muriel Asseburg 
(Bonn: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 2008), 81–98. 
28 Hamas, A Document of General Principles and Policies (Do-
ha, 1 May 2017), http://hamas.ps/en/post/678/a-document-of-
general-principles-and-policies (accessed 30 May 2017). 
29 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Security Cabinet 
Declares Gaza Hostile Territory”, 19 September 2007, http:// 
www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/pressroom/2007/pages/security%20cabin
et%20declares%20gaza%20hostile%20territory%2019-sep-
2007.aspx (accessed 4 June 2018). 
30 See for example Amos Harel, “A New Underground 
Reality Is Taking Shape along the Gaza-Israel Border”, 
Haaretz, 15 May 2017, http://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/ 
1.788824 (accessed 19 May 2017). 
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for the use of force and arming for the next confron-
tation, Hamas asserts “a legitimate right” to resist the 
occupation “guaranteed by divine laws and by inter-
national norms and laws”.31 In the same vein it also 
refuses to explicitly accept the January 2006 “Quartet 
criteria” formulated by the so-called Middle East 
Quartet (United States, Russia, EU and UN) which 
require Hamas to fulfil as preconditions for coopera-
tion and even mere contact: commitment to non-
violence, recognition of Israel, and acceptance of 
previous agreements and obligations.32 
Israel also profits from its non-recognition by 
Hamas, as this allows it to justify its own use of force 
to assert its control of the borders, uphold the block-
ade (including at sea), conduct retaliatory strikes, 
decimate the military capacities of armed groups in 
Gaza and assassinate their leaders.33 The frequency 
and brutality of armed clashes have intensified 
markedly since Hamas won the Palestinian parlia-
mentary elections in January 2006, with violence 
escalating into open warfare in 2006, 2008/2009, 
2012 and 2014. 
For Hamas this represents a 
balancing act between resistance 
rhetoric and efforts to avoid 
further armed conflict. 
At the same time Hamas has an interest in uphold-
ing a modicum of stability, without which it would 
be unable to assert its claim to power. For Hamas this 
represents a balancing act between resistance rhetoric 
and far-reaching demands on the one side, and efforts 
to avoid further armed conflict on the other. Although 
the population of Gaza largely shares the assessment 
that the PA and PLO have failed to assert Palestinian 
interests by way of negotiations, they certainly do 
not want another round of armed confrontations in 
 
31 Hamas, A Document of General Principles (see note 28), 
para. 25. 
32 Statement by Middle East Quartet, 30 January 2006, 
https://unsco.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/quartet_ 
statement_30_jan_2006.pdf (accessed 4 June 2018). 
33 Representatives of the Israeli security establishment 
have described this as “mowing the grass”. See Daniel By-
man, “Mowing the Grass and Taking Out the Trash – Israel 
Doesn’t Want to Wipe Out Hamas, and Putting It in a Corner 
Will Only Backfire”, Foreign Policy, 25 August 2014, http:// 
foreignpolicy.com/2014/08/25/mowing-the-grass-and-taking-
out-the-trash/ (accessed 19 May 2017). 
which they would suffer even worse than during the 
last one.34 
While Hamas acts harshly against Israeli collabo-
rators, not shying from executions, it also assumes 
most of the responsibility demanded by Israel: by 
seeking to prevent radical groups launching rockets 
into Israel; by patrolling the border fence to prevent 
infiltration into Israel; by banning public protests by 
the so-called “popular resistance”;35 and by suppress-
ing armed Salafist groups and al-Qaeda associates 
(as well as groups affiliated to the so-called “Islamic 
State”), which not only boast radical anti-Israel agendas 
but also represent competition to Hamas.36 Hamas 
provides this “security service” not least in the inter-
ests of consolidating its power and asserting its 
monopoly over the use of force (from the Palestinian 
side) – even if this is only possible under continuing 
occupation and the measures taken converge with the 
interests of the occupying power.37 
Indirect Cooperation 
The PA has acted as an intermediary in indirect co-
operation between the Hamas government and Israel 
concerning movement of people and goods between 
Israel and Gaza, specifically permits and paperwork. 
For example, under the Agreement on Movement and 
Access the PA deployed border officials on the Pales-
tinian side of the Gaza crossings to function as inter-
 
34 That is especially the case since the Israeli military 
adopted the Dahiya doctrine, which permits disproportion-
ate use of military force in civilian areas from which attacks 
are launched or where armed groups are present. See inter-
view with Major-General Gadi Eisenkot (today chief of staff): 
Alex Fishman and Ariella Ringel-Hoffman, “Eisenkot: I Have 
Great Force, I Will Have No Excuses”, Yediot Ahronot, 3 Octo-
ber 2008 [in Hebrew]. 
35 This changed in the run-up to the seventieth anniver-
sary of the so-called Nakba, the flight and dispossession of 
Palestinians in the context of Israel’s war of independence, 
when Hamas in concert with all other factions supported 
a grassroots initiative of demonstrations and sit-ins at the 
border fence, the “Great Return March”.  
36 Harel, “A New Underground Reality” (see note 30). 
37 At the same time Hamas has supported the establish-
ment of armed cells in Jerusalem and the West Bank and 
called in autumn 2015 for an intensification of the so-called 
“Knife Intifada”. Peter Beaumont, “Hamas Leader in Gaza 
Declares Intifada as Deadly Attacks Continue”, Guardian, 
9 October 2015, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/ 
oct/09/hamas-leader-gaza-declares-intifada-deadly-attacks-
continue (accessed 19 May 2017). 
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mediaries between Israel and Hamas. After Fatah and 
Hamas signed the reconciliation agreement in Octo-
ber 2017 the PA assumed full control of the border 
crossings (both to Israel and to Egypt);38 the additional 
checkpoints that the Hamas government had estab-
lished at the crossings were dismantled (but a new 
checkpoint was established at Erez after the assassi-
nation attempt on Prime Minister Rami Hamdallah 
in March 2018). 
Another indirect form of cooperation, also with 
the PA as an intermediary, involves deliveries of 
diesel and electricity from Israel to Gaza, which are 
funded by third states (Turkey, Qatar). In particular 
after the loss of fuel and gas supplies from Egypt and 
the closure of Rafah crossing for goods under Presi-
dent Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, this form of indirect co-
operation has become indispensable for the Hamas 
government: it is the only way to guarantee the pro-
vision of basic necessities for the population and thus 
demonstrate its ability to govern. And because exter-
nal trade is taxed, this also secures one of its few 
sources of revenue.39 In this context opportunities for 
personal enrichment also arise, because of the lack 
of transparency concerning donor contributions, but 
above all because a pervasive smuggling sector is 
taxed (at least it was until it was all but shut down 
in 2013). In this connection the family of Ismail 
Haniyyeh (from March 2006 to April 2017 prime 
minister of the de facto government in Gaza, from 
March 2006 to June 2007 also prime minister of 
 
38 Muriel Asseburg, The Fatah-Hamas Reconciliation Agreement 
of October 2017: An Opportunity to End Gaza’s Humanitarian Crisis 
and Permanently Overcome the Blockade, SWP Comment 44/2017 
(Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, November 2017), 
https://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/ 
comments/2017C44_ass.pdf (accessed 10 January 2018). 
39 Compared to the West Bank, tax revenues are even 
lower in Gaza, where the economy has collapsed almost 
completely as a result of war damage and the blockade. The 
Hamas government derives its revenues mainly from con-
sumption taxes and charges for services. The spending side 
is eased by the UN’s provision of services such as education 
and healthcare (see also the contribution by Birthe Tahmaz 
in this volume, pp. 46ff.) and external donors providing 
direct and indirect contributions (the latter via the PA). 
Adnan Abu Amer, “Hamas Scrambles to Make Up Budget 
Shortfalls”, Al-Monitor, 11 April 2016; Rushdi Abu Alouf, 
“Gazans Squeezed by Triple Taxes as Hamas Replaces Lost 
Income”, BBC News, 20 June 2016, http://www.bbc.com/news/ 
world-middle-east-36274631 (both accessed 30 May 2017). 
the unity government) has come in for particular 
criticism in recent years.40 
Israel has often temporarily tightened its blockade 
to pressure Hamas and/or to foment resentment 
among Gazans against their leadership.41 Egypt in 
turn has drastically restricted the freedom of move-
ment not only of ordinary Palestinians but also of 
leading Hamas functionaries and made the return of 
PA border officials to the Palestinian side one of its 
conditions for a lasting and more comprehensive 
opening of the crossing to the Gaza Strip. Yet despite 
Egyptian assurances, regular opening of the Rafah 
crossing had not been reinstated as of early summer 
2018 even though the Hamas government transferred 
control of its border crossings to the PA as required 
by the reconciliation agreement of October 2017 and 
clamped down on jihadist groups operating across 
the border. The PA has also repeatedly exploited its 
intermediary role to press Hamas to agree to a recon-
ciliation on its own terms. In spring 2017 for example 
Ramallah imposed sweeping punitive measures 
against Gaza, such as cutting the salaries of PA staff, 
freezing payments to Israel for electricity for Gaza, 
and curtailing health services. 
Sustainable economic development is 
impossible under present conditions. 
But it is the population of Gaza which bears the 
brunt of pressure from all sides, with sanctions im-
posed by the PA causing a dramatic deterioration 
in the humanitarian situation in 2017. Much of the 
infrastructure destroyed in the 2014 military confron-
tations has yet to be reconstructed, and sustainable 
economic development is impossible under present 
conditions. This leaves the bulk of the population 
dependent on international humanitarian assistance. 
Environmental conditions have also deteriorated 
dramatically in recent years. Gaza’s aquifer has be-
come salinified through over-extraction and infiltrated 
with waste water to a point where less than 5 percent 
of the groundwater is safe to drink; the coastal waters 
are heavily polluted, with more than 100,000 cubic 
 
40 See for example Doron Peskin, “Hamas Got Rich as Gaza 
Was Plunged into Poverty”, Ynet, 15 April 2017, http://www. 
ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4543634,00.html (accessed 
30 May 2017). 
41 Conal Urquhart, “Gaza on Brink of Implosion as Aid 
Cut-off Starts to Bite”, Guardian, 16 April 2006, https://www. 
theguardian.com/world/2006/apr/16/israel (accessed 19 May 
2017). 
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metres of waste water discharged untreated or in-
adequately treated into the Mediterranean every day. 
The main reason for these problems is that treatment 
plants cannot operate at adequate capacity due to the 
shortage of electricity. Additional treatment plants 
cannot be completed, because the blockade prevents 
import of construction materials. The environmental 
problems not only cause disease and grave deficien-
cies especially among infants; in the medium term 
they also call into question the Gaza Strip’s viabil-
ity.42 
The style of governance in Gaza is especially re-
pressive and democratic controls are lacking.43 As 
a result the de facto government in Gaza has been 
struggling with a progressive erosion of its popularity. 
Ultimately Hamas leadership circles have realised 
that they cannot govern successfully under conditions 
of occupation, blockade and far-reaching international 
isolation, and that their national ambitions have been 
overshadowed by excessive concentration on day-to-
day crisis management. In summer 2017 Hamas there-
fore initiated a shift to realpolitik, based on reconcili-
ation with Ramallah, power-sharing in Gaza and 
rapprochement with Cairo.44 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
Both governments in the Palestinian Territories have 
prioritised consolidating their limited power over 
ending the occupation. As described above, the fol-
lowing factors have been key: heavy dependency on 
Israel, which holds ultimate control of territory and 
borders; financial dependency on external sources; 
interest in consolidating achievements, amongst 
others on the international stage; and the preser-
vation of personal privileges and opportunities for 
enrichment within the existing system. Under these 
conditions the PA and the Hamas government – 
albeit unwillingly and to different degrees – have 
 
42 United Nations, Gaza Ten Years Later, July 2017, https:// 
unsco.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/gaza_10_years_later_-
_11_july_2017.pdf (accessed 10 January 2018). 
43 See for example Amnesty International, “Palestine (State 
of) 2016/2017”, in Amnesty International Report 2016/17: The State 
of the World’s Human Rights (22 February 2017), 287–90, 
https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/pol10/4800/2017/en/ 
(accessed 30 May 2017). 
44 Asseburg, The Fatah-Hamas Reconciliation Agreement of 
October 2017 (see note 38). 
contributed to entrenching the Israeli occupation 
regime. 
This state of affairs has been reinforced by the 
intra-Palestinian division which, despite the October 
2017 reconciliation agreement, has not been over-
come as of summer 2018. Firstly the split has pre-
vented emergence of a unified Palestinian strategy 
in the liberation struggle. Rather, as the two govern-
ments have sought different regional partners as their 
allies, the Palestinian struggle has become subordi-
nated to regional rivalries and conflicts (Iran vs. 
Saudi Arabia, Qatar/Turkey vs. Egypt). Secondly, it 
has served as a welcome pretext to the current Israeli 
government, which has no interest in a negotiated 
settlement. President Mahmoud Abbas can hardly 
claim to negotiate in the name of all Palestinians, nor 
would he be in a position to implement an agreement 
across the entire territory. Thirdly, the split has largely 
paralysed the democratic institutions, subverted the 
division of powers and restricted political liberties. As 
a consequence of this, progress towards a viable and 
democratic Palestinian state has increasingly been 
reversed in recent years. 
The current situation contains a great 
risk of renewed violent escalation, 
which could be triggered by various 
developments and factors. 
This leaves a negotiated settlement increasingly 
unlikely. Still, the main responsibility lies with an 
Israeli government that is not committed to a two-
state settlement, but is forging ahead with settlement 
construction and the preparations for the annexation 
of parts of the West Bank. Against this backdrop, 
grounds for pessimism remain even in the unlikely 
event of US President Donald Trump finally an-
nouncing a peace plan. At the same time the current 
situation contains a great risk of renewed violent 
escalation, which could be triggered by various devel-
opments and factors: in particular an intensification 
of the intra-Palestinian power struggle in which 
Hamas could use attacks on Israel as a valve; the 
potential for chaos inherent to a collapse of the PA 
and an unregulated succession; provocations by 
settlers in the West Bank and East Jerusalem, who 
feel encouraged by the Israeli government; approval 
of settlement construction at strategically relevant 
locations in the West Bank and East Jerusalem; dis-
putes over the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif etc. 
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Policy Options for the European Union 
The EU and its member states certainly have policy 
options both to counteract further consolidation of 
the occupation and a creeping transition to annexa-
tion, and to avert a renewed escalation of violence. 
Three points should be prioritised: 
Only if negotiations acknowledge the 
legitimate interests of both sides will 
they have any prospect of success. 
Instead of just waiting for another US-brokered 
peace process Europeans should, firstly, influence 
the framework in which negotiations take place – 
assuming talks occur at all. Only if negotiations 
acknowledge the legitimate interests of both sides 
will they have any prospect of success.45 In this con-
nection the EU and its member states should also 
work to influence the cost/benefit calculations of the 
Israeli government and population in such a way as 
to encourage them to end the occupation rather than 
consolidating and transitioning to annexation. In this 
context the EU member states should discuss what 
measures – above and beyond consistent differentia-
tion between dealings with Israel proper and Israeli 
settlements – are suited to signalise Europe’s clear 
rejection of Israel’s settlement activities in the Occu-
pied Territories, which are illegal under international 
law. And they should also think about how they can 
communicate this to Israeli politicians and its popu-
lation in a more comprehensible form than has to 
date been the case.46 
 
45 “Statement by National Security Leaders on an Israeli-
Palestinian Two-State Solution and U.S. Policy”, New York 
Times (Washington D.C. edition), 2 March 2018, https://jstreet. 
org/statement-national-security-leaders-israeli-palestinian-two-
state-solution-us-policy/#.Wp6g47eWxN0 (accessed 6 March 
2018). 
46 For greater detail see Muriel Asseburg, Shrinking Spaces in 
Israel: Contraction of Democratic Space, Consolidation of Occupation, 
and Ongoing Human Rights Violations Call for a Paradigm Shift in 
Europe’s Policies, SWP Comment 36/2017 (Berlin: Stiftung Wis-
senschaft und Politik, September 2017), https://www.swp-
berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/comments/2017C36_ 
ass.pdf (accessed 10 January 2018). See also Nathan Thrall, 
“Israel–Palestine: The Real Reason There’s Still No Peace”, 
Guardian, 16 May 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/world/ 
2017/may/16/the-real-reason-the-israel-palestine-peace-
process-always-fails (accessed 29 May 2017). Thrall criticises 
differentiation, however, on the grounds that European 
Any lasting improvement in Gaza also 
presupposes negotiating a long-term 
cease-fire and establishing a reliable 
crisis management mechanism. 
In relation to the internal political situation in the 
Palestinian Territories, Europeans should, secondly, 
support the reconciliation process between Fatah and 
Hamas, which has run out of steam since October 
2017. Implementation of the steps foreseen in the 
context of the reconciliation process is crucial to 
avoid another armed escalation between Israel and 
Gaza with devastating repercussions for the civilian 
population. Tensions in Gaza have ramped up dan-
gerously since US President Donald Trump’s Decem-
ber 2017 announcement that the United States would 
recognise Jerusalem as the Israeli capital.47 The steps 
agreed in October 2017 are also essential as the basis 
for a return to the democratic process and creating the 
preconditions for transitioning Gaza from humani-
tarian assistance to economic development and 
planning for the Strip’s future. This is a matter of 
great urgency, in light of the humanitarian emergency. 
Any lasting improvement in Gaza also presupposes 
negotiating a long-term cease-fire and establishing a 
reliable crisis management mechanism. Some of the 
measures agreed in the 2005 Agreement on Move-
ment and Access, for example regarding trade and 
movement of people, should also be re-established 
while others are no longer relevant. In this respect 
the EU mission EUBAM Rafah could play an adapted 
monitoring role at the border crossings, as well as the 
coastal waters, and contribute to a crisis management 
mechanism. But none of this can function without 
involving the Hamas government on the ground. 
What that means is that the Europeans should no 
longer support the Palestinian president’s intransi-
gence towards his rivals in Gaza. Instead it should lift 
the counterproductive ban on contacts with Hamas 
and instead include it in talks. For all its deficits, 
the 2017 Hamas Policy Document should be treated 
as a point of reference for a pragmatic approach. 
 
responses should target the Israeli government – which is 
ultimately responsible for the occupation – rather than 
the settlers and their lobby. 
47 Udi Dekel, How to Stop the Shooting from the Gaza Strip 
(Tel Aviv: Institute for National Security Studies, January 
2018), http://www.inss.org.il/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/ 
No.-1009.pdf (accessed 10 January 2018). 
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Thirdly, the EU and its member states should re-
evaluate their approach to support for the Palestinian 
Territories. Two aspects are decisive here: Firstly, 
measures to preserve livelihoods and territorial co-
hesion should be stepped up (especially in West Bank 
Area C and East Jerusalem). Secondly, considerably 
greater weight should be placed on strengthening 
Palestinian civil society – which fulfils important 
watchdog functions – and returning to democratic 
institutions and an effective division of powers. This 
also means reforming the police and security appa-
ratus to ensure they are orientated primarily on 
protecting citizens rather than serving to shore up 
authoritarian rule and uphold the occupation. 
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The Israeli government is continuing its settlement 
policy and discussing partial annexation of the occu-
pied West Bank. If the European Union wants to in-
fluence developments on the ground it will need to 
find new political initiatives to flank its development 
instruments. 
Since 1967 the EC (and later EU) has consistently 
condemned the Israeli occupation and settlement 
policy on the basis of Security Council Resolution 
242, and played a decisive role in achieving recogni-
tion for the Palestinians’ claim to self-determination 
up to and including the right to statehood. Yet the 
European Union is currently contributing little politi-
cally to realising the two-state solution – which it 
consistently calls for – in a framework of clear para-
meters, nor to ensuring that central demands such as 
a settlement moratorium and Palestinian self-deter-
mination are in fact realised. Instead of continuing to 
support the interim structures created under the Oslo 
Process and staying the course with statebuilding – 
which is now treading water after receiving billions of 
euros – the EU urgently needs to expand its options 
for action. Otherwise, given the discussions about 
(partial) annexation of Area C, it risks witnessing the 
final failure of its two-state approach. 
Positioning the EU in the 
Middle East Conflict 
The EU and Israel 
When the European Economic Community (EEC) 
was created in 1957 the six member states already 
had close relations with the state of Israel, which had 
been founded in 1948. France, in particular, which 
had intervened along with the United Kingdom on 
Israel’s side in the 1956 Suez War, was an important 
military ally of the young Israeli state and active sup-
porter of its efforts to acquire nuclear weapons tech-
nology. West Germany established its first political 
ties in the scope of reparations (which were highly 
controversial in Israel) and acknowledged its historic 
responsibility for the Shoah. The EEC established 
diplomatic relations with Israel in 1959 and concluded 
a trade agreement with the Israeli government in 
1964. Soviet-American rivalries increased in the after-
math of the Six-Day War. Moscow supplied arms and 
military advisors to Egypt and Syria, while Washing-
ton boosted its already substantial military support 
for Israel. 
Following the rapid defeat of the Arab armies 
in June 1967 and Israel’s military occupation of the 
Sinai Peninsula, the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, East 
Jerusalem and the Golan Heights, the UN Security 
Council called in November for the “withdrawal of 
Israel armed forces from territories occupied in the 
recent conflict”.1 The EC member states never left any 
doubt as to their commitment to Resolution 242, and 
in 1971 issued a joint statement calling for the with-
drawal of Israeli forces from the Occupied Territories. 
They also called for the Arab states in return to 
rescind their Khartoum Resolution2 and recognise 
Israel.3 But no practical political steps followed. 
 
1 The lack of a definite article in the English version (which 
is, however, present in the French: “Retrait des forces armées 
israéliennes des territoires occupés au cours du récent con-
flit”) gave rise to speculation whether withdrawal from all 
the occupied territories was required. Both the United Nations 
and the European Union (and its predecessors) have always 
taken the cease-fire line of 1949 to be definitive (the “Green 
Line” or “[pre-]1967 borders”). 
2 The Arab League’s “triple no” of September 1967 in Khar-
toum: no peace, no negotiations, no recognition. 
3 Schuman Declaration, see Bichara Khader, The European 
Union and the Palestinian Question (1957–2013): Soft Diplomacy 
and Hard Realities (Brussels: Medea Institute, 25 November 
2013), http://cejm.udl.cat/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/ 
khader_eu_palestine_1957_-2013_general.pdf (accessed 
29 May 2018). 
René Wildangel 
The European Union and the Israeli-Pales-
tinian Conflict: From Declaration to Action? 
 The European Union and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: From Declaration to Action? 
 SWP Berlin 
 Actors in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict 
 June 2018 
 33 
While the United Nations was calling on Israel 
to withdraw from the occupied territories, the 
first nationalist Israeli settlers were already moving 
to Hebron. In particular after Likud became the 
strongest party and formed the government in 1977, 
the settlers were able to rely on massive support from 
the highest echelons of power. This forced the EC to 
take a more determined public stance against Israeli 
settlement-building.4 In early 1979, however, Israeli 
Prime Minister Menachem Begin succeeded in ex-
tricating Israel from its regional isolation through the 
peace settlement with Egypt. After 1973 – which saw 
its first enlargement and the OPEC oil embargo – the 
EC became more open to cooperation with the Arab 
world. But neither that rapprochement nor the EC’s 
critical position towards Israeli control of the occu-
pied Palestinian territories and settlement-building 
did anything to slow the deepening of relations with 
Israel. Israel’s economic importance for the EC/EU 
also grew steadily. By 2016 the total volume of trade 
had grown to €34 billion.5 Since the 1990s the EU 
has also officially referred to relations with Israel 
enjoying “special status”.6 Milestones in this process 
were ratification of the Association Agreement in 
2000, presentation of the ENP Action Plan in 2005, 
another “upgrade” of relations in 2008 through an 
expansion of cooperation, and the 11th EU-Israel 
Association Council of 24 July 2012, which listed sixty 
 
4 Dimitris Bouris, Riding Shotgun: The EU’s Role in the Israeli-
Palestinian Conflict (Beirut: Carnegie Middle East Center, 17 
September 2014), http://carnegie-mec.org/2014/09/17/riding-
shotgun-eu-s-role-in-israeli-palestinian-conflict-pub-59158 
(accessed 1 November 2017). 
5 Only four Arab countries have more trade with the EU 
than Israel: the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Algeria 
and Morocco. European Commission, Client and Supplier 
Countries of the EU28 in Merchandise Trade, 15 February 2017, 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/september/tradoc_ 
122530.02.2017.pdf (accessed 1 November 2017). 
6 The European Council in Essen in 1994 defined the 
“special status” of the EU’s relationship with Israel: “The 
European Council considers that Israel, on account of its 
high level of economic development, should enjoy special 
status in its relations with the European Union on the basis 
of reciprocity and common interests. In the process regional 
economic development in the Middle East including in the 
Palestinian areas, will also be boosted.” European Council, 
Meeting on 9 and 10 December 1994 in Essen, Presidency Conclu-
sions, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/ess1_en. 
htm#ext (accessed 26 February 2018). 
fields in which cooperation was to be deepened.7 
However the Association Council has not convened 
again since then. In February 2017 the EU suspended 
it indefinitely in protest at the Netanyahu govern-
ment’s ongoing settlement expansion. 
The EU and the Palestinians 
The EC was much slower establishing relations with 
the Palestinians. Neither UN Resolution 242 nor 
official statements by the EEC referred to Palestinian 
rights or to the Palestinian Liberation Organisation 
(PLO) which led the international militant struggle 
against Israel. At this time the PLO’s proclaimed goal 
was still “the liberation of Palestine”, meaning the 
entire territory of the former British Mandate, and 
not just to end the occupation of Palestinian land 
occupied by Israel in 1967.8 As far as the EC’s rela-
tions with the Palestinians are concerned, the Venice 
Declaration adopted in 1980 by the European Council 
in the scope of the European Political Cooperation 
(EPC) marked a milestone. Recognising the Palestini-
ans’ right to self-determination and the PLO as their 
official representative represented a paradigm shift 
with political repercussions, as the EC was now able 
to play an autonomous role in efforts to resolve the 
conflict. In the Venice Declaration the now nine EC 
member states agreed that “the traditional ties and 
common interests which link Europe to the Middle 
East oblige them to play a special role and now 
require them to work in a more concrete way towards 
peace”.9 The response of the Likud-led Israeli govern-
ment is illustrated by the cabinet’s official commu-
niqué: “The Resolution calls upon us, and other 
nations, to include in the peace process the Arab S.S. 
known as ‘The Palestine Liberation Organization’.”10 
 
7 Council of the European Union, Eleventh Meeting of the EU-
Israel Association Council – Statement of the European Union (Brus-
sels, 24 July 2012), http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/ 
cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/132046.pdf (accessed 
1 June 2017). 
8 This is clearly expressed in the Palestinian National Char-
ter of 1968, for example. Amended Palestinian National Charter, 
17 July 1968, Articles 2 and 8, https://ecf.org.il/media_items/ 
677 (accessed 26 February 2018). 
9 EEC, Venice Declaration, 13 June 1980, http://eeas.europa. 
eu/archives/docs/mepp/docs/venice_declaration_1980_en.pdf 
(accessed 1 November 2017). 
10 Resolution of the Heads of Government and Ministers of Foreign 
Affairs of the European Council – Venice Declaration – 13 June 1980 
and the Cabinet Statement – 15 June 1980, http://www.mfa.gov.il/ 
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In the Venice Declaration the EC also took a stance 
against unilateral alterations to the status of Jeru-
salem. The Jerusalem Law adopted by the Knesset that 
same year, through which Israel officially annexed 
East Jerusalem, was dismissed by most of the inter-
national community including the EC member 
states.11 The Palestinian Declaration of Independence 
in Algiers in 1988, which de facto recognised UN 
Resolution 242 and with it the 1967 borders, opened 
the way for the PLO to participate in the 1991 Madrid 
Peace Conference and the secret talks in Oslo that led 
to the 1993 Declaration of Principles and the 1994 
Oslo I Accord. This ushered in a new era of European-
Palestinian relations, and the European Community 
became the principal backer of the new plan to in-
crementally expand Palestinian autonomy. The Euro-
pean Council’s Berlin Declaration of 1999 confirmed 
the Palestinian right to self-determination “including 
the option of a state” and declared the Community’s 
“readiness to consider the recognition of a Palestinian 
State in due course”.12 
The Peace Process and the EU’s 
Failed Development Paradigm 
In the years of the Oslo peace process the EU became 
the Palestinian Authority’s largest donor. It currently 
supports the Palestinians to the tune of about €300 
million annually, having invested several billion 
since 1993.13 Most of these funds go to supporting 
the PA’s budget and supplying relief to the Palestin-
ian refugees through the United Nations Relief and 
Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East 
(UNRWA). Even as the five-year interim phase – 
during which the territorial prerequisites for a state 
were supposed to be created – was just beginning, 




and%20mini.aspx (accessed 1 November 2017). 
11 Security Council Resolution 478 (1980) on the Status of Jeru-
salem, S/RES/478(1980), 20 August 1980, http://repository.un. 
org/handle/11176/68006 (accessed 19 March 2018). 
12 Presidency Conclusions, Berlin European Council 24 and 25 
March 1999, http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/ 
docoffic/official/regulation/pdf/berlin_en.pdf (accessed 
23 February 2018). 
13 European Commission, European Neighbourhood Policy 
and Enlargement Negotiations – Palestine, https://ec.europa.eu/ 
neighbourhood-enlargement/neighbourhood/countries/ 
palestine_en (accessed 1 November 2017). 
plying funds without settling the final status issues 
could end up perpetuating the transitional status 
created by the Oslo Accords.14 
In 1995 Israel and the PLO also joined the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership (EMP or Barcelona Pro-
cess). Through the EMP the European Community was 
seeking – in parallel to the Oslo peace process – to 
develop a positive vision for its Middle Eastern neigh-
bourhood, which it was also hoped would improve 
the prospects for a successful conclusion of the Oslo 
negotiations. While the EU vested great ambitions in 
the launch of the EMP, aspiring to an influential role 
in the transformation process of its Middle Eastern 
neighbours, the results were just as meagre as those 
of the successor project initiated by France in 2008, 
the Union for the Mediterranean, through which 
Paris hoped to place cooperation on a new footing. 
The Arab Peace Initiative of 2002, also greeted with 
great hopes by the EU, similarly failed to get off the 
ground. This proposal by the Arab League offered the 
Israeli government the prospect of normalisation of 
Arab-Israeli relations if Israel ended the occupation 
and a just solution was found for the Palestinian refu-
gees. The same year, 2002, saw the creation of the 
Middle East Quartet, in which the EU formally joined 
the United States, Russia and the United Nations as an 
equal partner. Otherwise, however, this format repre-
sented no departure from the familiar pattern: “the 
US decides …, the EU pays, the UN feeds”;15 – despite 
its massive development engagement the United 
States restricted the EU to the role of “co-pilot” in the 
search for a political solution.16 This model remained 
basically unchanged through all the negotiations from 
Camp David II (summer 2000) and Sharm al-Sheikh 
(October 2000), the preparation of the Roadmap 
(2003) and the talks in Annapolis (2007) to the Kerry 
Process (2013/14). 
 
14 For example Edward Said, “The Morning After”, London 
Review of Books 15, no. 20 (21 October 1993): 3–5, http://www. 
lrb.co.uk/v15/n20/edward-said/the-morning-after (accessed 
1 November 2017). 
15 Anne Le More, “Killing with Kindness: Funding the 
Demise of a Palestinian State”, International Affairs 81, no. 5 
(2005): 981–99 (995): “the US decides ..., the EU pays, the 
UN feeds”. 
16 Bouris, Riding Shotgun (see note 4). 
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The objective of resolving the conflict 
through the creation of a Palestinian 
state became increasingly forgotten. 
The Eastern enlargement of 2004 made it harder 
for the EU to reach unanimous positions in its foreign 
and security policy as a whole, with matters relating 
to the Middle East peace process no exception. That 
said, where common positions were achieved, these 
now enjoyed greater weight and visibility.17 In view of 
the failure of all US efforts to revive the Oslo Process, 
the EU’s largely development-focussed activities re-
mained ineffectual and the actual objective of resolv-
ing the conflict through the creation of a Palestinian 
state alongside the Israeli one became increasingly 
forgotten. 
While the EU always took a clear stance against 
Israeli settlement-building, naming it as the main 
obstacle to a two-state solution, this did nothing to 
slow the massive growth of the settlements. Through-
out the entire transitional period Israeli governments 
forged ahead with settlement expansion. Between 
1993 and 2017 the number of settlers in the West 
Bank and East Jerusalem tripled to well over half a 
million. The EU was also forced to look on as PA 
capacities it had funded were almost completely 
destroyed during the Second Intifada that began in 
September 2000. The Second Intifada, construction of 
the separation barrier (largely on the Palestinian side 
of the green line) and Israel’s withdrawal from Gaza 
in 2005 cemented a status quo that was now under 
the complete control of the Israeli government. In the 
words of one advisor to Ariel Sharon: “It supplies the 
amount of formaldehyde that is necessary so there 
will not be a political process with the Palestinians.”18 
This prevented progress not only in the peace process, 
but also in the statebuilding process in Palestine and 
in the EU-funded PA. 
 
17 For example through the activities of EU Special Repre-
sentative Miguel Ángel Moratinos (from May 1996) and 
especially the High Representative of the CFSP, Javier Solana 
(from November 1999); at the same time Israeli scepticism 
towards the EU grew, see Muriel Asseburg, Die EU und der 
Friedensprozeß im Nahen Osten, SWP-Studie 28/2003 (Berlin: 
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, July 2003), 14, http:// 
www.swp-berlin. org/fileadmin/contents/products/studien/ 
S2003_28_ass.pdf (accessed 1 November 2017). 
18 Ari Shavit, “Top PM Aide: Gaza Plan Aims to Freeze the 
Peace Process”, Haaretz, 6 October 2004, http://www.haaretz. 
com/top-pm-aide-gaza-plan-aims-to-freeze-the-peace-process-
1.136686 (accessed 1 November 2017). 
Faltering Statebuilding and Denial of 
State Recognition 
After the death of Yasser Arafat in 2004 the EU 
attempted to rebuild and reform the PA. This was 
now increasingly a climate in which the Bush 
Administration and Israel demanded a focus on 
counter-terrorism while critical Palestinian voices 
increasingly perceived the PA as corrupt and as a 
guarantor of Israeli rather than Palestinian security 
interests. The EU’s decision not to recognise the 
Hamas victory in the 2006 elections – even though 
the EU had itself observed the elections and found 
them to be free and fair – not only cost the EU a 
massive loss of credibility but also deepened the intra-
Palestinian rift which has persisted to this day. 
The EU saw the programme “Palestine – Ending 
the Occupation, Establishing the State”, published in 
2009 by Palestinian prime minister Salam Fayyad, as 
a sign of hope that new life might yet be injected into 
the process of state formation. In April 2011 the 
United Nations confirmed that the governmental ca-
pacities already created were adequate for a function-
ing administration.19 But the decisive form of support 
– political recognition – continues to be denied. In 
the UN General Assembly on 29 November 2012 four-
teen EU member states voted for recognition of Pales-
tine as a “non-member observer state”, twelve ab-
stained, one state voted against (the Czech Republic). 
Germany’s abstention was interpreted as a turn away 
from Netanyahu and registered with disappointment 
by the Israeli government,20 but with the exception of 
Sweden no EU member state has recognised the Pales-
tinian state. After two decades of working towards 
Palestinian statehood, it was clear that there was no 
consensus within the EU over the question of recog-
nition. 
 
19 Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for the 
Middle East Peace Process, Palestinian State-Building: A Decisive 
Period, Ad Hoc Liaison Committee Meeting, Brussels, 13 April 
2011, https://unispal.un.org/DPA/DPR/unispal.nsf/0/19E5539 
F9124AB2085257870004 D8264 (accessed 26 February 2018). 
20 For example Jörg Lau, “Deutschlands Enthaltung ist 
richtig”, Die Zeit, 30 November 2012, http://www.zeit.de/ 
politik/ausland/2012-11/un-palaestinenser-antrag (accessed 
1 November 2017). 
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Instead of funds being used to build 
sustainable structures, the share of 
humanitarian aid is increasing. 
The achievements of Palestinian self-government 
are coming under increasing pressure. The internal 
Palestinian democracy deficit is growing. Neither 
the Palestinian Legislative Council (which no longer 
meets in the West Bank) nor President Mahmoud 
Abbas (last elected in 2005 for four years), nor Hamas’s 
de facto rule in Gaza are currently democratically 
legitimised. Abbas rules by decree without parliamen-
tary oversight or political controls, and freedom of 
the press is increasingly restricted.21 While the EU 
continues to make its rule of law and good govern-
ance contributions, there are increasingly vehement 
accusations of arbitrary detention, mistreatment and 
torture by Palestinian security forces.22 The social and 
economic situation and the mood in the Palestinian 
Territories have deteriorated. Poverty and unemploy-
ment are rising, production capacity is falling, social 
inequality and aid dependency growing.23 The Pales-
tinian economy in Jerusalem has halved since the 
Oslo Process began.24 The EU’s development policy 
to date has failed and is increasingly called into ques-
tion.25 Instead of funds being used to build sustain-
 
21 Committee to Protect Journalists, “Palestinian Authority 
Censors at Least 11 News Websites”, cpj.org (online), 21 June 
2017, https://cpj.org/2017/06/palestinian-authority-censors-at-
least-11-news-web.php (accessed 1 November 2017). 
22 See for example “Evidence Shows Palestinian Security 
Forces Violently Suppressed Peaceful Protest in Ramallah”, 
Amnesty International (online), 17 March 2017, http://www. 
amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2017/03/evidence-shows-
palestinian-security-forces-violently-suppressed-peaceful-
protest-in-ramallah/ (accessed 1 November 2017). 
23 World Bank, Economic Monitoring Report to the Ad Hoc 
Liaison Committee, 19 September 2016, http://documents. 
worldbank.org/curated/en/474311473682340785/main-report 
(accessed 1 November 2017). 
24 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD), The Palestinian Economy in East Jerusalem: Enduring 
Annexation, Isolation and Disintegration (New York and Geneva, 
April 2013), http://unctad.org/en/pages/newsdetails.aspx? 
OriginalVersionID=491 (accessed 1 November 2017). 
25 Jeremy Wildeman and Alaa Tartir, Can Oslo’s Failed Aid 
Model Be Laid to Rest? Al-Shabaka-Briefing Paper (Washington, 
D.C.: Al-Shabaka, The Palestinian Policy Network, 18 Septem-
ber 2013), https://al-shabaka.org/briefs/can-oslos-failed-aid-
model-be-laid-rest/ (accessed 1 November 2017). 
able structures, the share of humanitarian aid is in-
creasing.26 
In view of the magnitude of funds provided by 
European taxpayers, the lack of coherent and effec-
tive political instruments is also viewed increasingly 
critically within the EU. An evaluation of EU assis-
tance to Palestine between 2008 and 2013 warned: 
“If continued in present form, the Cooperation is 
unsustainable and counterproductive to EU norma-
tive principles.”27 Twenty-five years after the begin-
ning of the Oslo Process, the prospects of constructive 
developments in the peace process are gloomy – and 
since the inauguration of US President Trump even 
more tenuous than before. Given the possibility of a 
new political initiative from Washington it is there-
fore important to scrutinise the EU’s approach to date 
and to analyse what options Europe has to improve 
the prospects for a settlement. Even if the EU is un-
likely to become a central player in any settlement 
process, it must assume considerably greater political 
responsibility. 
New Political Responsibility? 
Current EU Fields of Action 
EU Policy in Area C 
In 2011 the EU declared Area C decisive for realising 
a two-state solution and committed itself to pursuing 
a firmer strategy to reopen it for projects promoting 
Palestinian development.28 In Area C, which 
represents more than 60 percent of the West Bank 
 
26 Brigitte Herremans, The EU’s Self-Defeating Aid Policy 
towards Palestine, CEPS Policy Brief 343 (Brussels: Centre for 
European Policy Studies [CEPS], Mai 2016), http://www.ceps. 
eu/system/files/PB343%20Herremans%20Aid%20to%20OPT. 
pdf (accessed 1 November 2017). 
27 European Union, Summary of the Evaluation Report of the 
European Union’s Cooperation with Palestine and Support to Pales-
tinian People, May 2014, http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/ 
evaluation/evaluation_reports/evinfo/2014/1327_ev_en.pdf 
(accessed 1 November 2017). 
28 EU Report Area C and Palestinian State Building, July 
2011, available for example from http://www.ipk-bonn.de/ 
downloads/EU-Report-Area-C.pdf (accessed 26 February 
2018); Office of the European Union Representative (West 
Bank and Gaza Strip, UNRWA), EU in Area C, 20 October 2016, 
https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage_ 
en/12427/EU%20in%20Area%20C (accessed 1 November 
2017). 
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and stands under exclusive Israeli civil and military 
control, restrictions imposed by Israel deny essential 
resources to the Palestinian economy, especially its 
agricultural sector. A sustainable Palestinian economic 
order can only be created if it is able to rely on its 
own resources. The World Bank estimates that lack 
of access to Area C is responsible for annual economic 
losses amounting to $3.4 billion.29 
Implementation of broad-based, visible projects 
would have given the European Union the possibility 
– at a more favourable juncture under Prime Minis-
ter Salam Fayyad – to expand the PA’s real sphere of 
influence in the West Bank. In the ambitious govern-
ment programme of 2009, “Ending the occupation, 
establishing the state”, Area C is described as offering 
“natural locations for large infrastructure projects, 
such as wastewater treatment plants, landfills, water 
pipelines, and main roads”,30 but the EU hoped to 
operate in consensus with the Israeli government in 
Area C. A non-paper prepared in spring 2012 by the 
German Foreign Ministry named a series of bench-
marks to serve as points of orientation for a new 
development approach in Area C. The background 
to this was an intense debate in Germany and other 
EU member states about the destruction by Israel of 
development projects funded using European tax-
payers’ money. The paper emphasised the necessity 
to achieve “tangible results” with the EU initiative 
and to establish simple and rapid processes for en-
abling development in Palestinian communities. 
Preparation of masterplans, introduction of simplified 
procedures for construction permits and protection 
of Palestinian communities are named as benchmarks 
for a turnaround in Area C. The paper concludes that 
Germany was “willing to engage constructively with 
Israel in further developing these ideas and to advo-
cate among European and international partners such 
a non-confrontative approach.”31 
 
29 World Bank, Area C and the Future of the Palestinian 




1 November 2017). 
30 https://unispal.un.org/DPA/DPR/unispal.nsf/0/A013 
B65A5984E671852576B800581931 (accessed 29 May 2018). 
31 The author is in possession of the April 2012 non-paper 
in English. 
In the past the implementation of 
major projects that Germany in-
tended to fund and execute has been 
repeatedly obstructed or delayed. 
Five years later the projects the EU sought to 
realise in Area C must be regarded as largely having 
failed. Only 1 percent of the total area of Area C has 
theoretically been released for Palestinian develop-
ment projects, despite the Palestinian government 
having submitted outline plans to the Israeli Civil 
Administration; more than 98 percent of Palestinian 
permit applications are not approved.32 In the past 
the implementation of major projects that Germany 
intended to fund and execute has been repeatedly 
obstructed or delayed. Moreover, the Netanyahu-led 
coalition governments since 2009 have pursued a 
systematic policy of destruction of Palestinian infra-
structure and development projects, which provision-
ally culminated in 2016.33 The background to this 
is the open stance of pro-settler coalition parties that 
Area C should belong permanently to Israel. The gov-
erning parties have even placed legislation for anne-
xation or partial annexation on the agenda.  
Settlement expansion and the creeping transforma-
tion of Palestinian land into Israeli state land accel-
erate the displacement of the up to 300,000 Palestin-
ians who live in Area C under appalling conditions. 
In the past demolitions in Area C often affected build-
ings and structures built using German and European 
aid. In other cases, such as the wind and solar power 
installations in the South Hebron Hills, which had 
been constructed by partner organisations of the Ger-
man NGO Medico International, it was possible to 
reach a tacit agreement to avoid demolition. But the 
 
32 United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humani-
tarian Affairs (OCHA) in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 
“Sharp Increase in West Bank Demolitions: Aid Organiza-
tions Face Serious Constraints in Assisting Displaced Families”, 
Monthly Humanitarian Bulletin, February 2016, http://www. 
ochaopt.org/content/sharp-increase-west-bank-demolitions 
(accessed 1 November 2017). 
33 1,093 Palestinian structures were “demolished or seized” 
in the West Bank and East Jerusalem, more than 1,600 
Palestinian were made homeless; see OCHA in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territory, “Record Number of Demolitions and 
Displacements in the West Bank during 2016”, Monthly 
Humanitarian Bulletin, January 2017, http://www. 
ochaopt.org/content/record-number-demolitions-and-
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ambitious development strategy in Area C remained 
toothless. Some Israeli parties are even discussing 
legislation to prevent foreign-funded development in 
Area C altogether.34 
On 13 December 2016 the EU Representative in 
Jerusalem condemned the ongoing Israeli demolitions 
in no uncertain terms. His statement pointed out that 
in 2016 alone “humanitarian structures provided by 
the EU and EU Member States worth approximately 
EUR 536,000 have been either destroyed or confis-
cated”.35 Another six hundred buildings and structures 
worth €2.4 million are threatened.36 For the period 
2001 to 2011 the EU Commission estimates the loss 
of development projects it co-funded at about €50 
million.37 
The EU will have to oppose the 
wanton destruction of 
Palestinian infrastructure. 
If the EU sees the development of Area C as a pre-
condition for a two-state solution, as it has frequently 
declared, it will have to oppose the wanton destruc-
tion of Palestinian infrastructure and make it clear 
to the Israeli government that continuing demolitions 
will have grave consequences for the bilateral rela-
tionship. For the sake of its credibility it must demand 
compensation. It could send its own observer mission 
to assess the sustainability of European development 
 
34 Statement by the party Yisrael Beiteinu on 7 November 
2016. See Ahmad Melhem, “The EU Giveth, Israel Taketh 
Away in West Bank”, Al-Monitor, 3 January 2017, http://www. 
al-monitor.com/pulse/en/originals/2016/12/west-bank-area-c-
eu-projects-israel-destruction.html (accessed 1 November 
2017). 
35 Office of the EU Representative (West Bank and Gaza 
Strip, UNRWA), Local Statement on Israeli Demolitions and Con-
fiscations of Palestinian Structures in Area C, Jerusalem, 13 De-
cember 2016, https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/palestine-
occupied-palestinian-territory-west-bank-and-gaza-strip/ 
17114/node/17114_en (accessed 1 November 2017). 
36 European Parliament, Answer Given by Vice-President 
Mogherini on Behalf of the Commission, Parliamentary Questions, 
E-002290/2016, 3 June 2016, 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getAllAnswers.do?referen
ce=E-2016-002290&language=EN (accessed 1 November 2017). 
37 European Parliament, Answer Given by Mr Füle on Behalf of 
the Commission, Parliamentary Questions, E.000053/2012, 4 July 
2013, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getAllAnswers. 
do?reference=E-2012-000053&language=EN (accessed 26 Feb-
ruary 2018). 
work in Palestinian communities and document 
destruction by the Israeli army. 
If Area C is not to be abandoned as a possible com-
ponent of a future Palestinian state, the EU must get 
serious about implementing plans for developing 
Palestinian communities and expanding the area 
available for Palestinian agriculture. That is not pos-
sible without calling into question Israeli sovereignty 
over the occupied territories – also legally – and 
thus also the continuation of arrangements that are 
set out in the Oslo Accords. Today the military and 
civilian sovereignty enjoyed by the occupying power 
encourages a creeping policy of annexation. Under 
the Oslo Accords this sovereignty was agreed only as 
a temporary measure applying until responsibility 
was transferred to the Palestinian Authority, not as 
a permanent state of affairs. 
EU Measures to Implement the 
“Policy of Differentiation” 
The expectations of EU Middle East policy grew with 
the frustration of the Obama Administration, which 
was unable to limit Israel’s settlement-building, 
neither with a ten-month moratorium (whose impact 
was restricted and excluded East Jerusalem) nor with 
additional billions in aid. Washington then signalised 
to Brussels that it would like the EU to exert stronger 
diplomatic pressure. 
Nevertheless Washington refused in February 2011 
to support a Security Council resolution proposed by 
France, the United Kingdom and Germany (at the 
time a non-permanent member of the Security Coun-
cil) calling on Israel to stop settlement-building.38 In 
a joint declaration the three EU member states re-
iterated their parameters for a final status agreement: 
the 1967 borders as the basis, a security concept that 
guarantees Palestinian sovereignty and protects Israeli 
security interests, a just solution to the refugee ques-
tion accepted by both sides, and Jerusalem as the 
future capital of both states.39 Only in 2016, in one 
 
38 United Nations Security Council, Draft Resolution, S/2011/ 
24, 18 February 2011, https://unispal.un.org/DPA/DPR/ 
unispal.nsf/5ba47a5c6cef541b802563e000493b8c/9397a59 
ad7bfa70b8525783f004f194a?OpenDocument (accessed 
1 November 2017). 
39 Statement delivered by Sir Mark Lyall Grant on behalf of 
the United Kingdom, France and Germany, see UN Security 
Council, 6484th Meeting, New York, 18 February 2011, 
https://unispal.un.org/DPA/DPR/unispal.nsf/0/8503563C218A4
81085257FCE006BA81C (accessed 1 November 2017). 
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of the last acts of the Obama Administration, did 
Washington ensure by withholding its veto that the 
even more forceful Security Council resolution 2334 
could be adopted. It calls on all states to “distinguish, 
in their relevant dealings, between the territory of 
the State of Israel and the territories occupied since 
1967”.40 This codified in international law the prin-
ciple of “differentiation” between Israel in the borders 
of 1967 and the Occupied Territories.41 
Although the EU always distinguished formally 
between Israel and the Occupied Territories, guide-
lines for implementation were long lacking. In re-
sponse to the policies of the Netanyahu-led coalitions, 
which increasingly deliberately ignored the distinction 
between Israel in the borders of 1967 and the Occu-
pied Territories, the EU Commission began in 2013 
issuing guidelines to flesh out its positions on this 
issue and communicate them more emphatically.42 
On 11 November 2015 it published an Interpretative 
Notice on Indication of Origin of Goods from the Territories 
Occupied by Israel since June 1967.43 The Israeli govern-
ment responded with vehement protests, accusing the 
EU of discrimination and summoning EU Ambassador 
Lars Faaborg-Andersen to the foreign ministry.44 
Faaborg-Andersen reiterated the EU’s fundamental 
 
40 UN Security Council, Resolution 2334 (2016), S/RES/2334 
(2016), 23 December 2016, http://www. un.org/webcast/pdfs/ 
SRES2334-2016.pdf (accessed 1 November 2017). 
41 Hugh Lovatt and Mattia Toaldo, EU Differentiation and 
Israeli Settlements, ECFR Policy Brief 140 (London: European 
Council on Foreign Relations [ECFR], July 2015), http://www. 
ecfr.eu/publications/summary/eu_differentiation_and_israeli_ 
settlements3076 (accessed 1 November 2017). 
42 In 2013 the Commission excluded “Israeli entities and 
their activities in the territories occupied by Israel since June 
1967” from receiving “grants, awards and financial instru-
ments funded by the EU”, and in 2014 banned imports of 
poultry and milk products from the settlements. “Guidelines 
on the Eligibility of Israeli Entities and Their Activities in the 
Territories Occupied by Israel since June 1967 for Grants, 
Prizes and Financial Instruments Funded by the EU from 
2014 Onwards”, Official Journal of the European, C205/9, 
19 July 2013. 
43 European Commission, Interpretative Notice on Indication 
of Origin of Goods from the Territories Occupied by Israel since June 
1967, 11 November 2015, https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/ 
files/20151111_interpretative_notice_indication_of_origin_ 
en.pdf (accessed 1 November 2017). 
44 Barak Ravid, “European Commission Adopts Guidelines 
for Labeling Products from Israeli Settlements”, Haaretz, 
11 November 2015, http://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/ 
.premium-1.685428 (accessed 1 November 2017). 
position, that the Occupied Territories were not part 
of Israel, and that the origin labelling requirement 
was a purely technical detail required to implement 
existing law.45 Although that is true to the extent that 
goods from Israeli settlements in the West Bank were 
already excluded from tariff concessions under Israel-
EU trade agreements, the EU’s defensive communica-
tion of the differentiation strategy and its cautious 
and uneven implementation at the national level 
have restricted the its possibilities for using this in-
strument to exert political influence. In the case of 
the discussion about the Horizon 2020 research pro-
gramme, for example, the EU was able to insist its 
stance that the agreements apply only to “Israel 
proper”. But at the same time it permitted the Israeli 
government to present its own interpretation in a 
public statement. The Israeli government responded 
to EU measures against settlement-building with 
harsh criticism and diplomatic retaliation.46 
Deliberately avoiding differentiation, as practised 
for example by the Israeli government, government-
related organisations and Israeli diplomatic mis-
sions,47 encourages a “one-state reality” that in 
the meantime has more or less become a fact on 
the ground.48 In order to consolidate the strategy of 
differentiation, further proposals that the EU could 
rapidly implement have been introduced into the 
discussion: for example sensitising banks and busi-
nesses not to make investments or maintain business 
relationships that could directly or indirectly benefit 
 
45 Tovah Lazaroff, “EU Ambassador: ‘Territory beyond the 
Green Line Is Not Part of Israel’, Defends Settlement Label-
ing”, Jerusalem Post, 3 November 2015, http://www. jpost.com/ 
Arab-Israeli-Conflict/EU-Ambassador-Territory-beyond-the-
Green-Line-is-not-part-of-Israel-defends-settlement-labeling-
431944 (accessed 1 November 2017). 
46 ToI Staff, “Netanyahu Suspends EU Peace Role over 
Settlement Labeling”, Times of Israel, 29 November 2015, 
http://www.timesofisrael.com/netanyahu-suspends-eu-peace-
role-over-settlement-labeling/ (accessed 26 February 2018). 
47 At Christmas 2015 the Israeli embassy in Washington, 
D.C., distributed products from settlements in the Golan 
Heights and the West Bank. “Israeli Embassy in U.S. Sends 
Out Holiday Gift Packages with Settlement Products”, 
Haaretz, 23 December 2015, http://www.haaretz.com/israel-
news/1.693307 (accessed 26 February 2018). 
48 Muriel Asseburg, Middle East Peace Talks at the End of the 
Road? One-State Reality Consolidating, SWP Comment 21/2014 
(Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, May 2014), https:// 
www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/comments/ 
2014C21_ass.pdf (accessed 26 February 2018). 
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Israeli settlements.49 On the other hand in October 
2017 FIFA refused to exclude football clubs from the 
settlements from playing under the Israeli flag in com-
petitions, in a decision that even mentioned Security 
Council Resolution 2334.50 Some NGOs demand a com-
plete prohibition on trade in products from settle-
ments, on the grounds that these violate the Geneva 
Convention.51 For years the local EU Representatives 
have been proposing further-reaching measures in 
their reports on the situation in Jerusalem: EU entry 
bans for known violent settlers, voluntary guidelines 
to prevent EU tour operators indirectly supporting 
settlement enterprises in East Jerusalem, and streng-
thening the Palestinian presence in East Jerusalem.52 
Such measures are even more urgent in light of US 
President Trump’s December 2017 announcement 
that the United States will recognise Jerusalem as the 
Israeli capital – and thus implicitly recognise Israeli’s 
claim to sovereignty over Palestinian East Jerusalem. 
Diplomatic Initiative to 
End the Gaza Blockade 
Palestine’s downward spiral is gravest in Gaza, where 
after three wars in six years almost the entire basis 
of life has been destroyed; the UN report Gaza 2020 
warned in 2012 that the ongoing destruction and 
poisoning of natural resources could make Gaza com-
 
49 In another report on the differentiation strategy in Octo-
ber 2016, the ECFR generaly recommended the use of more 
“disincentives”. See Hugh Lovatt, EU Differentiation and the 
Push for Peace in Israel-Palestine, ECFR Policy Brief 194 (October 
2016), http://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/ECFR_194_-_EU_ 
DIFFERENTIATION_AND_THE_PUSH_FOR_PEACE_IN_ISRAEL-
PALESTINE_(1).pdf (accessed 26 February 2018). 
50 “FIFA Council Statement on the Final Report by the FIFA 
Monitoring Committee Israel-Palestine”, Fifa.com (online), 
27 October 2017, http://www.fifa.com/about-fifa/news/y=2017/ 
m=10/news=fifa-council-statement-on-the-final-report-by-the-
fifa-monitoring-comm-2917741. html (accessed 26 February 
2018). 
51 Salil Shetty, “States Must Ban Israeli Settlement Prod-
ucts to Help End Half a Century of Violations”, Amnesty Inter-
national (online), 7 July 2017, http://www.amnesty.org/en/ 
latest/news/2017/06/states-must-ban-israeli-settlement-
products-to-help-end-half-a-century-of-violations-against-
palestinians/ (accessed 26 February 2018). 
52 Peter Beaumont, “Jerusalem at Boiling Point of Polariza-
tion and Violence – EU Report”, Guardian, 20 March 2015, 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/mar/20/jerusalem-at-
boiling-point-of-polarisation-and-violence-eu-report (accessed 
26 February 2018). 
pletely uninhabitable. This already unsettling vision 
became even gloomier after the 2014 war, during 
which a sizeable part of Gaza’s businesses and infra-
structure were destroyed. In a non-paper of 5 August 
2014, Germany, France and the United Kingdom pro-
posed reviving the Agreement on Movement and 
Access (AMA) that had been agreed 2005 but never 
implemented, in order to enable the opening required 
for reconstruction.53 This was to be accompanied 
by the installation of an international monitoring 
mechanism that would respect both Israeli security 
interests and Palestinian freedom of movement. In 
June 2010 the German Bundestag had already adopted 
a cross-party motion calling for “vigorous support 
for the EU’s demand for immediate lifting of the 
blockade of Gaza”.54 But the 2014 agreement between 
the UN, Israel and the PA for a “Gaza Reconstruction 
Mechanism” (GRM) was tantamount to international 
legitimisation of the restrictive Gaza blockade that 
continues to prevent the urgently needed economic 
revival and improvement in the situation of the 
population.55 Living conditions on the ground remain 
dramatic. The population has to make do with just a 
few hours of electricity daily, 95 percent of the water 
supply is undrinkable, and healthcare is inade-
quate.56 Because the water treatment infrastructure 
has been destroyed large amounts of untreated 
sewage are discharged into the Mediterranean every 
 
53 Gaza: Supporting a Sustainable Ceasefire, non-paper, 5 
August 2014, http://www.scribd.com/document/236224929/ 
British-French-and-German-non-paper-on-Gaza (accessed 
26 February 2018). 
54 Deutscher Bundestag, 17. Wahlperiode, Antrag der Frak-
tionen CDU/CSU, SPD, FDP und Bündnis 90/Die Grünen: Ereignisse 
um die Gaza-Flottille aufklären – Lage der Menschen in Gaza ver-
bessern – Nahost-Friedensprozess unterstützen, Drucksache 
17/2328, 30 June 2010, http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/ 
17/023/1702328.pdf (accessed 26 February 2018). 
55 Treading Water: The Worsening Water Crisis and the Gaza 
Reconstruction Mechanism, Oxfam Briefing Paper (Cowley: 
Oxfam International, March 2017), http://www.oxfam.org/ 
en/research/treading-water-worsening-water-crisis-and-gaza-
reconstruction-mechanism (accessed 26 February 2018). The 
report analyses the GRM and documents how Israeli policy 
subverts humanitarian initiatives, promotes Gaza’ regression 
and intensifies its isolation. 
56 World Health Organization, “Factsheet: Health Impact 
of the Fuel/Electricity Crisis in Gaza and WHO Actions”, 
reliefweb.int (online), 14 December 2017, https://reliefweb.int/ 
report/occupied-palestinian-territory/factsheet-health-impact-
fuelelectricity-crisis-gaza-and-who (accessed 26 February 
2018). 
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day, with negative consequences for the health of 
those living there – on Israel’s coast as well as 
Gaza’s.57 
In November 2017 PA officials took control of the 
border crossings under the Palestinian reconciliation 
process. But Egypt and Israel continue to keep Gaza 
sealed off, a measure that even Israeli observers say 
increases the likelihood of violent conflict recurring 
and creates a permanent security risk.58 Even former 
members of the Israeli security establishment share 
this assessment. Because a further deterioration 
would increase the danger of escalation, Major-Gen-
eral Yoav Mordechai, Coordinator of Government 
Activities in the Territories (COGAT), has repeatedly 
warned that a crisis is imminent in Gaza and called 
in 2017 for “a Gazan version of the Marshall Plan”.59 
Projects on which the EU spent millions have also 
been destroyed in Gaza. These are civilian infrastruc-
ture facilities whose destruction cannot be justified in 
terms of Israel’s legitimate security interests and right 
to self-defence. Israel also continues to limit access 
to the Gaza Strip, regularly denying entry to foreign 
parliamentarians and high-ranking officials, as well 
as to international human rights organisations.60 
If German government and the EU jointly contrib-
ute €568 million for reconstruction in Gaza, as they 
promised in October 2014 at the international donor 
conference in Cairo, they should not neglect their 
duty of oversight and their opportunities for political 
influence and control. It will require a political 
initiative dedicated to both ensuring Israel’s security 
and restoring freedom of movement of people and 
goods for the population of Gaza to break out of the 
 
57 Gaza Gateway Blog, “Gaza’s Sewage Is Overflowing”, 
gisha.org (online), 22 July 2017, http://gisha.org/en-blog/2017/ 
07/11/gazas-sewage-is-overflowing/ (accessed 26 February 2018). 
58 Amos Harel, “The Time-bomb That May Set Off the Next 
Israel-Hamas War Is Ticking in Gaza”, Haaretz, 31 December 
2017, http://www.haaretz.com/middle-east-news/palestinians/ 
.premium-its-not-the-rockets-that-will-lead-to-war-1.5630015 
(accessed 26 February 2018). 
59 Amos Harel, “Israeli Army Calls for Gaza ‘Marshall Plan’ 
to Thwart Takeover by Forces More Extreme Than Hamas”, 
Haaretz, 5 November 2017, http://www.haaretz.com/israel-
news/.premium-israeli-army-calls-for-gaza-marshall-plan-to-
prevent-violence-1.5463158 (accessed 26 February 2018). 
60 Human Rights Watch, Unwilling or Unable: Israeli Restric-
tions on Access to and from Gaza for Human Rights Workers (New 
York, 2 April 2017), http://www.hrw.org/report/2017/04/03/ 
unwilling-or-unable/israeli-restrictions-access-and-gaza-
human-rights-workers (accessed 26 February 2018). 
now entrenched aid economy that condemns most of 
the Palestinian population to dependency. Now that 
the Palestinian Authority has reasserted control of the 
border crossings to Gaza, the EU must implement its 
own proposals for improving border controls. Instead 
of continuing to fund the inactive Border Assistance 
Mission EUBAM Rafah, which has spent more than 
ten years on call in the Israeli town of Ashkelon, it 
should in instead make an effective contribution to 
transparency and security at the border crossings, in 
the sense of contributing to restoring the freedom 
of movement of people and goods that is crucial for 
Gaza’s economic recovery. A permanent naval mis-
sion in the Mediterranean could prevent attempts to 
smuggle arms to Gaza and contribute to enabling 
Israel to lifting its maritime blockade. That in turn 
would be the basic precondition for reviving the 
fisheries sector, which is of existential importance 
for Gaza; under the Oslo Accords Palestinians are per-
mitted to fish within the twelve-mile zone. In order 
to achieve these objectives, the EU should also play a 
much more active role in the Palestinian reconcilia-
tion process. That would also mean rescinding the 
long-debated official no-contact policy to permit 
Hamas to be included directly in negotiating the 
terms.61  
Five Decades of Occupation: 
Time for an EU Action Plan 
The EU should draw together the fields of action de-
scribed above in an action plan and lay out concretely 
how it intends to implement its differentiation strat-
egy. Negotiations for a final status agreement must 
remain the ultimate objective, but the necessary pre-
conditions are lacking as long as the current Israeli 
government more or less openly rejects the establish-
ment of a Palestinian state and creates facts on the 
ground for a one-state solution. The fact that eco-
nomic and military relations between Israel and a 
number of Gulf states have already warmed without 
progress in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is likely to 
further worsen the prospects of successful negotia-
 
61 Even before the new Hamas Charter was unveiled, 
various leaders had already acknowledged the borders of 
1967. They include Ismail Haniyah, the new head of the 
Hamas political bureau, who could lead a delegation with 
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tions because the central incentive of the Arab Peace 
Initiative – normalisation of relations after the end 
of the occupation – no longer applies. 
The EU needs an action plan with 
concrete measures, for example for 
development in Area C and Jerusalem 
and for opening the Gaza Strip. 
Instead of repeating its mantra that only the two 
immediate parties themselves can negotiate peace, 
the EU should shift to addressing the conditions for 
overcoming this asymmetrical conflict using its own 
instruments. To date it has only spelled out that: “An 
unprecedented package of European political, eco-
nomic and security support to both parties can be 
expected in the context of a final status agreement.”62 
Now the EU needs to explicate in an action plan which 
concrete measures it intends to take, for example for 
development in Area C and Jerusalem and for open-
ing the Gaza Strip. The basis of its activities must be 
the parameters upon which it has always insisted and 
over which consensus exists.63 That also includes 
recognising Palestinian statehood even before a final 
status arrangement, in line with its commitment to 
Palestinian sovereignty on the basis of the 1967 bor-
ders. It would be contradictory to spend billions of 
euros on building state institutions only to deny 
recognition to the state thus created. 
The EU needs to reassess its development para-
digm. Security cooperation, economic support and 
budget assistance only create the appearance of con-
solidating a status quo that is in fact being steadily 
undermined by settlement-building. Funding should 
be channelled to projects that strengthen the cohe-
sion of municipalities and the resilience of especially 
threatened activists and communities, to boost espe-
cially those forces working non-violently to preserve 
 
62 Council of the European Union, 3286th Council Meeting 
Foreign Affairs, press release (Brussels, 16 December 2013), 12, 
https://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/EU/XXV/EU/00/82/EU_08215/ 
imfname_10431604.pdf (accessed 26 February 2018). 
63 The nature of those parameters is indicated for example 
on the EEAS website: agreement on borders; security arrange-
ments that respect Palestinian sovereignty and protect Israeli 
security; a just solution for the refugee question; Jerusalem 
as capital of both states. European External Action Service, 
Middle East Peace Process, 15 June 2016, https://eeas.europa.eu/ 
headquarters/headquarters-homepage/337/middle-east-peace-
process_en (accessed 26 February 2018). 
the foundations for Palestinian self-determination 
under Israeli occupation.64 
The objective of the action plan and ambitious 
package of measures it includes must be to influence 
the status quo in the Occupied Territories in such a 
way as to improve rather than worsen the precondi-
tions for the implementation of a two-state solution. 
This will provoke resistance from the Israeli govern-
ment. The European Union and not least Germany 
often emphasise their “special relationship” with 
Israel. But exactly that relationship is endangered 
not by the differentiation approach but by the slow 
demise of the two-state solution and the spectre of 
permanent incorporation of the West Bank by Israel. 
If Israel were to annex Area C – or even just major 
West Bank settlement blocs – the goal of a viable 
and contiguous Palestinian state would be dead. That 
would inevitably mark a new phase of Palestinian 
local self-government, in which the European con-
tribution – as in the case of Gaza – would be re-
stricted exclusively to humanitarian assistance. The 
billions the EU has invested in economic, civil society 
and state structures would then be lost for ever. It 
would certainly also be too late for differentiation 
between Israel and the settlements, which would give 
a massive boost to the growing global boycott move-
ment against Israel. An EU action plan with concrete 
political interventions would thus represent not least 
a contribution to lasting protection of the existence 
of the state of Israel. 
 
 
64 Instead a trend towards greater caution is observed in 
funding policy on the ground, with German development 
funding for non-violent Palestinian initiatives being termi-
nated for example. NGOs have also come under increasing 
pressure from the Israeli “Transparency Law”. 
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In early 2018 a tweet from US President Donald 
Trump again caused a stir in the Middle East: “with 
the Palestinians no longer willing to talk peace, why 
should we make any of these massive future pay-
ments to them?” This suggested that the United States 
would terminate its financial support for the Pales-
tinians.1 The brunt of such a decision would be 
mainly felt by the United Nations Relief and Works 
Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East 
(UNRWA). In mid-January Washington announced 
that it would hold back payments totalling $65 mil-
lion in order to encourage other countries to con-
tribute more. In recent years the United States has 
been the largest financial contributor to UNRWA. In 
2016 it donated about $368 million, $95 million of 
which for the Occupied Palestinian Territories.2 The 
decision to withhold this support unsettles both the 
Palestinians and the Israelis, because both sides ben-
efit from UNRWA’s work. UNRWA’s humanitarian 
assistance and development projects guarantee a 
certain basic level of provision for the Palestinian 
refugees. This contributes to preventing escalation 
on the ground, and that is naturally of benefit to 
the security of the Israeli state and its population. 
UNRWA was established in 1949 by the UN Gen-
eral Assembly, to supply emergency humanitarian 
relief to Palestinians displaced during the first Arab-
Israeli war in 1948 as negotiations between Israel 
and the Arab states dragged on. It began operations 
in 1950 providing humanitarian assistance, and was 
 
1 Donald J. Trump, tweet of 2 January 2018, Twitter.com, 
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/94832249760222
0032 (accessed 1 March 2018). 
2 United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine 
Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), Governments and EU 
Pledges to UNRWA’s Programmes in 2016 as 31 December 2016, 
December 2016, https://www.unrwa.org/sites/default/files/ 
government_donors_and_eu_overall.pdf (accessed 11 Janu-
ary 2018). 
soon also mitigating the economic and political 
impact of the conflict through development projects. 
Although UNRWA’s mandate also includes Pales-
tine refugees in countries neighbouring Israel, this 
contribution focuses on its work – and the ensuing 
conflicts – in the territories occupied and controlled 
by Israel. While UNRWA is officially neutral as a UN 
organisation, its mandate requires it to side at least 
indirectly with the refugees. This creates multiple 
tensions and dilemmas in its dealings with the occu-
pying power Israel. 
UNRWA is, firstly, required to supply development 
aid under the reality of an occupation that clearly 
curtails development opportunities. Secondly, Israel 
and UNRWA both depend on a certain degree of 
cooperation: UNRWA in order to be able to fulfil its 
functions at all; Israel because UNRWA – albeit in-
voluntarily – largely relieves the Israeli government 
of its duty to provide for the Palestinian population. 
At the same time the relationship is, thirdly, charac-
terised by mutual mistrust and media campaigns 
that seek to discredit the other side, with regular con-
frontations often conducted in the full glare of inter-
national publicity. The question also arises whether 
UNRWA’s presence and cooperation with Israel also 
have a bearing on the perspectives for conflict reso-
lution. 
UNRWA and Its Mandate 
The Arab-Israeli War of 1948 made 750,000 Pales-
tinians into refugees,3 for whom UNRWA provided 
humanitarian aid and organised development co-
operation from 1950. The Six-Day War 1967 caused 
the flight and expulsion of another estimated 280,000 
to 325,000 people, 40 to 50 percent of whom had  
 
3 Donna E. Arzt, Refugees into Citizens: Palestinians and the End 
of the Arab-Israeli Conflict (New York, 1997), 17. 
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already been displaced during the 1948 war and been 
under UNRWA’s care since then.4 According to the 
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), in 
the following months only 19,000 were permitted 
to return to the territories now occupied by Israel.5 
Every Palestine refugee who left the British Man-
date of Palestine between June 1946 and May 1948 
and lost their home and property in the newly founded 
state of Israel has the right to assistance from UNRWA. 
In the absence of a mutually agreed settlement their 
 
4 Donna Arzt (ibid.) arrives at this figure after comparing 
various widely diverging sources. In its 1968–69 report 
UNRWA estimated the number affected at 525,000, although 
this also included those forced to leave the territories by skir-
mishes in the months following the June War, as well as 
students and migrant labourers who were abroad when the 
war broke out and had been prevented from returning. 
United Nations General Assembly, Report of the Commissioner-
General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine 
Refugees in the Near East, 1 July 1968 – 30 June 1969, para. 1; 
Arzt, Refugees into Citizens (see note 3), 17. 
5 United Nations General Assembly, Report of the Commis-
sioner-General (see note 4), para. 10. 
refugee status passes to their descendants. Today 
there are more than five million Palestine refugees 
registered with UNRWA in the West Bank (including 
East Jerusalem), the Gaza Strip, Jordan, Syria and 
Lebanon. 
The Palestinians displaced in 1967 represent a 
special group. In the months after the war the in-
volved Arab states, Israel, the United Nations and 
humanitarian organisations negotiated over where 
these Palestinians could remain within and outside 
the Occupied Territories. In the end they agreed that 
UNRWA would also provide humanitarian assistance 
to these refugees, in consultation with the respective 
host countries.6 But they do not enjoy the same rights 
as the refugees of 1948, and UNRWA has to treat them 
accordingly. For example in Jordan members of this 
group enjoy only restricted rights to pursue employ-
ment. UNRWA fulfils its mandate to this day, provid-
ing material and financial humanitarian assistance to 
especially needy families. 
 
6 United Nations General Assembly, Resolution 2252, 
Humanitarian Assistance (A/RES/2252), 4 July 1967. 
UNRWA in the West Bank (including East Jerusalem)  
and the Gaza Stripa 
 
Founded A/RES/302(IV), 8 December 1949  
Area of operations West Bank (including East Jerusalem ), Gaza Strip,  
Jordan, Syria, Lebanon 
 
Staff West Bank: 4,820 local, 24 international 
Gaza Strip: 12,490 local, 30 international 
 
Registered refugees  West Bank: 774,170 




West Bank: 168,020 
Gaza Strip: 72,540 
 
Refugee camps West Bank: 19 (with 24 percent of refugees living in camps) 
Gaza Strip: 8 (with 42 percent of refugees living in camps) 
 
2015 budget $1.24 billion, almost exclusively voluntary contributions  
Priorities Humanitarian assistance, welfare services, education, health, 
micro-credit, refugee camp infrastructure, protection 
 
 a UNRWA, UNRWA in Figures as of 1 January 2015 (Jerusalem, 
June 2015), https://www.unrwa.org/sites/default/files/unrwa_ 
in_figures_2015.pdf (accessed 25 April 2017); UNRWA, Annual 
Operational Report 2015 for the Reporting Period, 1 January – 31 De-
cember 2015 (Amman, 2016), 3, https://www.unrwa.org/sites/ 
default/files/content/resources/2015_annual_operational_ 
report.pdf (accessed 25 April 2017). 
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UNRWA and Life under Occupation 
The military occupation of the Palestinian Territories 
impacts directly on the quality of life and prospects 
of the Palestinian population. Various factors play a 
role. Firstly, where a Palestinian family lives is deci-
sive. Since the Oslo Accords the West Bank has been 
divided into three administrative zones: Area A (18 
percent), Area B (2 percent) and Area C (62 percent) 
(see map on p. 4). In Area A the Palestinian govern-
ment is responsible for both civil and military control, 
in Area B only civil; Area C is completely controlled 
by Israel. For Palestinians in Area C in particular, this 
means that access to infrastructure and utilities are 
noticeably worse than in the other zones. Villages in 
Area C are frequently completely cut off from public 
services and attempts to change that through infra-
structure projects are often blocked by Israel. Human 
Rights Watch, for example, reported in 2010 that the 
Israeli authorities had refused to connect Palestinian 
villages to the local Israeli electricity grid. They also 
blocked the realisation of an internationally funded 
project that would have made the villages independ-
ent of the public grid using solar panels.7 
Apart from the lack of opportunities to develop 
infrastructure, everyday life for the Palestinians is 
further obstructed by Israeli army checkpoints and 
roadblocks which massively restrict freedom of 
movement. Until the mid-1990s, for example, Route 
60 was the West Bank’s principal north-south artery, 
connecting the main Palestinian cities. Today Route 
60 bypasses the Palestinian cities and may only be 
used by Palestinian vehicles in exceptional cases; 
they are now forced instead to use poorer-quality 
side roads.8 
 
7 Human Rights Watch, Separate and Unequal: Israel’s Dis-
criminatory Treatment of Palestinians in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territories, 19 December 2010, https://www.hrw.org/report/ 
2010/12/19/separate-and-unequal/israels-discriminatory-
treatment-palestinians-occupied (accessed 25 April 2017). 
8 UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 
(OCHA), The Humanitarian Impact on Palestinians of Israeli Settle-
ments and Other Infrastructure in the West Bank, July 2007, 
https://www.ochaopt.org/sites/default/files/ocharpt_update 
30july2007.pdf (accessed 29 April 2017). 
Transport of Palestinian products for 
export is subject to time-consuming 
and costly control procedures. 
The economic dimension of everyday life under 
occupation is intimately bound up with the geo-
graphical. Transport of Palestinian products for ex-
port is subject to time-consuming and costly control 
procedures that heavily impair their competitiveness. 
The potential of agriculture, for example, is further 
curtailed by numerous roadblocks, prohibitions on 
the import of particular fertilisers, inadequate irri-
gation, land seizures and destruction of farmland. 
The primary sector, which remains an important 
employer and supplier of products for the economy 
in the Palestinian Territories has been regressing 
since the early 1990s. Between 2015 and 2016 its 
share of GDP fell from 3.4 to 2.9 percent.9 
Over the years these accompanying effects of the 
occupation have caused a growth in poverty rates 
among Palestinians, especially refugees. UNRWA 
pursues three central priorities for dealing with 
the needs of the refugees: First of all humanitarian 
assistance, concretely above all basic healthcare and 
food supply. 61 percent of those registered with 
UNRWA use its medical services. In view of the high 
population density, especially in the refugee camps, 
the consistently high birth rate, the low age of 
mothers-to-be and environmental problems, UNRWA 
concentrates on three areas: prevention of trans-
missible disease, perinatal care and the treatment of 
the typical adult-onset diseases of diabetes and high 
blood pressure. Alongside medical services, UNRWA 
also addresses the increasingly precarious food situa-
tion; in the West Bank this affects one person in four, 
in Gaza half the population.10 
The second pillar is education and vocational training 
for children and young people. Whereas humanitarian 
assistance was a core task from the outset, education 
work only became significant about a decade later; its 
 
9 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD), UNCTAD Assistance to the Palestinian People: Develop-
ments in the Economy of the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 12 Sep-
tember 2017, 4, http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/ 
tdb64d4_embargoed_en.pdf (accessed 11 January 2018). 
10 UN OCHA, Food Security: Articles, Statements and Press 
Releases, https://www.ochaopt.org/theme/food-security 
(accessed 9 May 2017); UN OCHA, The Gaza Strip: The Humani-
tarian Impact of the Blockade, November 2016, https://www. 
ochaopt.org/sites/default/files/ocha_opt_gaza_blockade_ 
factsheet_14nov2016_mak.pdf (accessed 9 May 2017). 
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share of spending has grown rapidly since then. After 
finding that its measures to generate employment 
had only isolated and short-term impacts UNRWA 
concentrated – with success – on school education 
and vocational training. Thus the economic develop-
ment of the Gulf states in the 1960s and 1970s prof-
ited hugely from the employment of highly skilled 
Palestinian migrant workers. To this day skilled 
workers trained by UNRWA are in great demand in 
the region. Spending on education today represents 
more than half of UNRWA’s total budget; in the Occu-
pied Territories it employs about 12,500 teachers rep-
resenting almost three-quarters of all UNRWA staff 
in that field of operations.11 
The third pillar is stimulating local economic and 
social development. Here UNRWA’s activities include 
development projects tied to employment of Palestine 
refugees. A microcredit programme to encourage 
bottom-up initiatives offers various funding possibil-
ities. For example a loan can be granted to set up a 
small business or simply to invest in start ups. These 
services are also open to Palestinians who are not 
registered as refugees. One particular priority is to 
support disadvantaged groups, with women for 
example representing more than one-third of bor-
rowers in 2015.12 
UN organisations see a direct 
connection between lack of pros-
pects, violation of political and civil 
rights and growing radicalisation 
among Palestinian youth 
UN organisations on the ground see a direct con-
nection between lack of prospects and systematic 
violation of political and civil rights on the one side 
and growing radicalisation among Palestinian youth 
on the other.13 For that reason UNRWA regularly acts 
 
11 NRWA, UNRWA in Figures as of 1 January 2016, January 
2017, https://www.unrwa.org/sites/default/files/content/ 
resources/unrwa_in_figures_2016.pdf (accessed 9 May 2017). 
12 UNRWA Department of Finance, Annual Report 2015, 
2016, 6f., https://www.unrwa.org/sites/default/files/content/ 
resources/microfinance_department_annual_report_2015.pdf 
(accessed 25 April 2017). 
13 International Labour Organization (ILO), The Situation 
of Workers of the Occupied Arab Territories, 2017, v; Reliefweb, 
Youth at Risk of Radicalization amid Growing Insecurity, Unmet 
Humanitarian Needs, Palestine Refugees Agency Chief Tells Fourth 
Committee, 2 November 2016, https://reliefweb.int/report/ 
as the public advocate of the distressed, for which it 
sometimes receives heavy pushback. 
Confrontations: 
UNRWA on the Defensive? 
Although UNRWA sees itself as a neutral actor, and 
sometimes even attempts to mediate between the 
parties, it is not immune from being drawn into the 
conflict between Israelis and Palestinians. One prob-
lem in this context is that UNRWA staff are largely 
recruited from the local population, who live under 
the occupation and themselves belong to one of the 
two sides. UNRWA staff have frequently become 
involved in political and even violent resistance 
against the Israeli occupation. In February 2017 for 
example it was reported that a UNRWA employee 
had been elected to Hamas’s political leadership, for 
which he was dismissed by UNRWA headquarters in 
Gaza.14 Watchdog organisations critical of UNRWA 
regularly report cases of individual staff members 
glorifying violence.15 
Conservative Israeli actors regularly place the 
organisation and its staff under suspicion. Former 
Israeli finance minister Yair Lapid for example 
asserted in winter 2018 that UNRWA was working 
in the service of Hamas rather than the refugees and 
feeding a perpetual cycle of Palestinian victimhood.16 
Even if many of the Israeli accusations are unfounded, 
UNRWA remains saddled with the problem of having 
to rely on local workers who it is not in a position to 
thoroughly vet, on grounds of their sheer numbers 
(almost 17,000 in the Occupied Palestinian Territories) 
 
occupied-palestinian-territory/youth-risk-radicalization-amid-
growing-insecurity-unmet (accessed 11 January 2018). 
14 Adam Rasgon, “UNRWA Suspends Employee Allegedly 
Elected to Hamas Leadership”, Jerusalem Post, 26 February 
2017, http://www.jpost.com/Arab-Israeli-Conflict/UNRWA-
suspends-employee-allegedly-elected-to-Hamas-leadership-
482665 (accessed 25 April 2017). 
15 UN Watch, Poisoning Palestinian Children: A Report on 
UNRWA Teachers’ Incitement to Jihadist Terrorism and Antisemi-
tism, 2 February 2017, https://www.unwatch.org/130-page-
report-unrwa-teachers-incite-terrorism-antisemitism/ (ac-
cessed 25 April 2017). 
16 Ben Caspit, “Israeli Centrist Leader Finds Himself Alone 
in Battle against UN Agency”, Al-Monitor, 10 August 2016, 
https://www.i24news.tv/en/news/israel/politics/165439-
180117-israeli-lawmaker-yair-lapid-praises-us-cuts-to-unrwa-
in-exclusive-on-i24news (accessed 1 June 2018). 
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in a situation of scarce resources and surrounding 
volatile conflict. UNRWA does however regularly 
develop and update instruments designed to respond 
to the charges levelled against it. For example it runs 
a small department dedicated to countering myths 
and disinformation on social media, which reports 
changes in the organisation and monitors staff’s own 
use of social media. Regular inspections of facilities, 
external evaluations and controls of personnel lists 
also serve to ensure staff neutrality. 
The risk of UNRWA facilities becoming military 
targets was seen during the summer 2014 Gaza War, 
when the Israeli armed forces repeatedly shelled 
UNRWA schools that Palestinians were using as 
makeshift shelters. Although UNRWA had repeatedly 
informed the Israeli armed forces of the precise loca-
tions of its shelters, these attacks left at least 44 dead 
and 227 wounded. The Israeli government argued 
that Hamas militants had been storing arms in the 
schools, and indeed, three cases were indeed iden-
tified where Hamas had misused UNRWA facilities to 
store weapons. UNRWA condemned the incidents and 
announced immediate and comprehensive action to 
both identify those responsible and better protect its 
facilities and the refugees.17 In September 2014 the 
Israeli military finally opened an investigation into 
whether humanitarian facilities had been intentionally 
defined and attacked as military targets during the 
war. By summer 2015 the commission of inquiry had 
authorised police investigations into 22 of about 190 
 
17 United Nations Security Council, Letter Dated 27 April 
2015 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the 
Security-Council (S/2015/286), 27 April 2015, https://unispal. 
un.org/DPA/DPR/unispal.nsf/0/554E1CC298B3BFEF85257E 
44005ABD18 (accessed 10 November 2017); Israel Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs (MFA), IDF Special Report: Hamas’ Illegal Use 
of Civilian Infrastructure during “Operation Protective Edge”, 19 
August 2014, http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/ForeignPolicy/Terrorism/ 
Pages/IDF-report-Hamas-illegally-used-civilian-infrastructure-
during- Operation-Protective-Edge.aspx (accessed 10 Novem-
ber 2017); MFA, IDF Investigating Exceptional Incidents from 
Operation Protective Edge, 10 September 2014, http://mfa.gov.il/ 
MFA/ForeignPolicy/IsraelGaza2014/Pages/IDF-investigating-
exceptional-incidents-from-Operation-Protective-Edge-10-Sep-
2014.aspx (accessed 10 November 2017); “UNRWA Con-
demns Placement of Rockets, for a Second Time, in One of 
Its Schools”, UNRWA Press Release, 22 July 2014, https:// 
www.unrwa.org/newsroom/press-releases/unrwa-condemns-
placement-rockets-second-time-one-its-schools (accessed 
10 May 2017). 
reported cases.18 But to this day no further informa-
tion on the progress of the investigations has been 
released. Amnesty International criticised that neither 
side had “conducted genuine, independent criminal 
investigations” into its own war crimes.19 
Conflicts between UNRWA and above all Israeli 
politicians also affect the organisation’s educational 
work. Advised by UNESCO, UNRWA models its cur-
ricula principally on those used in local public 
schools, in order to ensure that its school leavers 
possess equivalent qualifications in line with local 
curriculum standards. For this reason UNRWA co-
ordinates its curriculum reforms with the responsible 
authorities in Gaza City and Ramallah. 
In practice UNRWA faces the challenge of recon-
ciling two partially antagonistic regional history 
narratives in its school textbooks. Even the smallest 
editorial alteration can very quickly provoke vehe-
ment protests from the Palestinian or Israeli govern-
ment. Immediately after the 1967 war the Israeli 
government tried to introduce its own curriculum 
in UNRWA schools, and confiscated the previous 
teaching materials.20 The move was reversed after 
an intervention by UNESCO. In spring 2017 drafts of 
revised school textbooks were circulated containing 
“corrections” to what Israel regards as a one-sided 
portrayal of the conflict by UNRWA. For example 
they recommended describing Jerusalem as the holy 
city of three religions rather than the Palestinian 
capital. After the draft became public the Palestinian 
education ministry temporarily suspended ties with 
UNRWA on the grounds that the amendments vio-
lated the Palestinian identity. Prime Minister Rami 
Hamdallah and UNRWA Commissioner General 
Pierre Krähenbühl subsequently agreed to discuss the 
incident and seek a mutually acceptable solution.21 
 
18 MFA, Operation Protective Edge: Investigation of Exeptional 
Incidents – Update 4, 11 June 2015, http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/ 
ForeignPolicy/IsraelGaza2014/Pages/Operation-Protective-Edge-
Investigation-of-exceptional-incidents-Update-4.aspx 
(accessed 29 May 2017). 
19 Amnesty International, Time to Address Impunity: Two 
Years after the 2014 Gaza/Israel War (London, July 2016), https:// 
www.amnesty.org/en/documents/mde15/4199/2016/en/ 
(accessed 29 May 2017). 
20 United Nations General Assembly, Report of the Commis-
sioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for 
Palestine Refugees in the Near East, 1 July 1967 – 30 June 1968, 
A/7213 (New York, 15 September 1968), para. 17f. 
21 Dov Lieber, “PA Suspends Ties with UNRWA over 
Planned Curriculum Reform”, Times of Israel, 13 April 2017, 
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Who Benefits from UNRWA’s Work? 
That the Palestinians benefit from the work of 
UNRWA is more or less obvious, given that it supplies 
urgently needed basic humanitarian assistance. But 
the organisation also works to prevent violence and 
 
http://www.timesofisrael.com/pa-suspends-ties-with-unwra-
over-planned-curriculum-reform/; Adam Rasgon, “UNRWA 
Reforming Curriculum in Schools”, Jerusalem Post, 20 April 
2017, http://www.jpost.com/Middle-East/UNRWA-proposes-
reform-of-curriculum-in-PA-schools-488385 (accessed 25 
April 2017). 
deescalate conflicts, in which both sides possess an 
interest. 
The refugee camps are hotbeds of anti-Israeli activ-
ism and are kept under close surveillance by Israeli 
security forces. The UN General Assembly granted 
UNRWA an explicit mandate to protect after the First 
Intifada began in autumn 1987. In the Fourth Com-
mittee of the UN General Assembly, which deals with 
special political questions and decolonisation, Israel 
has never challenged that mandate. 
UNRWA’s humanitarian and development assis-
tance contributes to preventing further deterioration 
in the living conditions of the Palestinians, which 
would encourage violent protests and resistance 
against Israeli soldiers and civilians in the Occupied 
Territories. In the 1980s and again at the end of the 
1990s, economic stagnation generated dissatisfaction 
and frustration among the Palestinians. Coupled with 
a perception that Israel was not genuinely interested 
in a peace process and instead wanted to maintain a 
long-term military occupation, this is what ultimately 
sparked both the First and Second Intifadas. Given 
that Israel has an interest in ensuring that unrest re-
mains within bounds, it also benefits from UNRWA’s 
work. UNRWA also relieves Israel of tasks it would 
otherwise be responsible for providing humanitarian 
security and education for the refugees. 
The US decision to slash Washing-
ton’s contributions to UNRWA is not 
necessarily in Israel’s interests. 
From the Israeli perspective, the activities of 
UNRWA and other international aid organisations 
ensures a certain degree of political stability in the 
Occupied Palestinian Territories. That is why in 
2016 the Israeli government also explicitly asked the 
Canadian government to resume its contributions to 
UNRWA, which the Canadian parliament had voted 
to suspend in 2010. And in 2015 Israel’s Deputy Per-
manent Representative to the United Nations, David 
Roet, said that Israel supported UNRWA’s humanitar-
ian activities and emphasised its significance for the 
Palestinian refugees’ human security.22 The US Presi-
dent Trump’s decision at the beginning of 2018 to 
 
22 United Nations General Assembly, Special Political and 
Decolonization Committee (Fourth Committee), Summary 
Record of the 21st Meeting on 2 November 2016, A/C.4/71/SR.21 
(20 January 2017), http://undocs.org/A/C.4/71/SR.21 (accessed 
5 March 2018). 
Everyday cooperation structures 
Since the beginning of the occupation in summer 1967 
a department in the Israeli defence ministry has been 
the central point of contact for UNRWA. The Coordinator 
of Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT) is 
responsible for coordinating civilian activities of the 
Israeli government, the Israeli armed forces and inter-
national organisations. UNRWA requires cooperation 
with the Israeli Civil Administration if it is to reach those 
reliant upon it. The spectrum of instruments available 
to press its demands on Israel is very small. 
UNRWA Operations Support Officers (OSO) play an 
absolutely central role in everyday cooperation. Intro-
duced at the beginning of the First Intifada, their purpose 
is to observe UNRWA’s daily work, report problems and 
assist in resolving them. They intervene primarily in cases 
where the use of violence is feared or reported, children 
have been detained, UNRWA supplies have been seized, 
or access to refugees has been denied. The first step for 
the OSO is to resolve the problem in cooperation with the 
responsible Israelis on the ground and report to his or her 
Field Director. If the conflict cannot be resolved in this 
way – for example if the OSO is denied access to a de-
tained UNRWA worker and the grounds for detention 
are not revealed – the Field Director contacts his or her 
liaison officer at COGAT. If a solution cannot be found 
at this level, the UNRWA headquarters in Jerusalem is 
activated, with the possibility of contacting the Israeli 
foreign ministry directly. 
UNRWA distinguishes between private and public 
“advocacy” when using these instruments. It stresses that 
it regards international publicity as a means to which 
it resorts only after all other efforts to find a resolution 
have failed. Most incidents in the West Bank and Gaza 
are resolved directly between UNRWA and COGAT. 
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slash Washington’s contributions to UNRWA is there-
fore not necessarily in Israel’s interests. The Israeli 
government would not be keen to fill the financial and 
operational vacuum that UNRWA would leave behind 
if it were forced to cease its operations for lack of 
funds. 
Conclusions 
The work carried out by UNRWA in the Occupied 
Territories is not unproblematic. On the one hand, 
the occupation situation constrains the effectiveness 
of the UN’s engagement. The prevailing conditions 
not only restrict the mobility of staff and goods but 
also prevent the emergence of a viable and independ-
ent local economy. UNRWA’s ambitious education 
programme, which serves as a model for school 
reforms across the region, produces numerous skilled 
workers. But in most cases their best hope is precari-
ous employment or unemployment. In view of the 
aggressive underlying mood, violence prevention and 
trauma treatment have become important spheres for 
UNRWA in the Occupied Territories. 
UNRWA cannot fulfil its mandate 
without cooperation with the Israeli 
authorities. Israel profits from the 
escalation-inhibiting effect of 
UNRWA’s work. 
Both Israel and UNRWA depend on cooperation. 
UNRWA cannot fulfil its mandate to provide humani-
tarian assistance and organise development work for 
the Palestine refugees in the Occupied Territories and 
Gaza without structural cooperation with the Israeli 
authorities. Israel in turn profits from the escalation-
inhibiting effect of UNRWA’s work. Despite the 
mutual dependency, the relationship is ambivalent 
and tense. Members of the current and recent Israeli 
governments regularly condemn UNRWA as an 
integral parameter of the Palestinian resistance. This 
serves to justify the internationally criticised occu-
pation and distract attention from the security ben-
efits Israel derives from the deescalating effects of 
UNRWA’s activities. Therefore UNRWA has to 
respond whenever accusations arise that it has been 
politically subverted. The public clashes between 
Israel and UNRWA merely serve to confirm deep-
rooted prejudices in the Israeli and Palestinian popu-
lations. In light of such accusations and prejudices 
it is legitimate to question the chances of a peace 
process whose success depends centrally on Palestin-
ians and Israelis building on reciprocal desires for 
peaceful coexistence. 
The functional partnership between UNRWA and 
Israel contributes to making bearable a status quo 
characterised by violence. To that extent one could 
assume that the partnership also has the effect of 
postponing the end of the occupation. However the 
reasons cited for maintaining the occupation are 
not connected to UNRWA’s work. In other words, 
the occupation would not be abandoned if UNRWA 
ceased its operations. Finally the political dimension 
of the relationship has contributed to UNRWA – 
which is supposed to work unpolitically – itself 
becoming a conflict actor as a voice of the otherwise 
almost voiceless Palestine refugees. 
In the interests of a fair and lasting settlement it 
would be important for the perceptions of UNRWA’s 
identity and role in the Palestinian and Israeli popu-
lation to be brought back into line with its mandate. 
That would mean the organisation being even better 
informed about the political sentiments and activities 
of its employees and capable of early intervention. 
Moreover, not all its staff are convinced of a path to 
a just and lasting peace that satisfies both Israeli and 
Palestinian requirements for security and develop-
ment. Here UNRWA needs to intervene even more 
actively, with international support. It must also 
communicate its mandate more convincingly within 
Israel and defend itself against baseless accusations. 
It is completely unclear who would assume respon-
sibility for the Palestinian refugees if UNRWA were to 
cease operating. It is not UNRWA that is responsible 
for prolonging the status quo, but Israel, the Palestin-
ian Authority and those Arab states that host Pales-
tine refugees. They all continue to use the refugee 
question as a political trump card in pursuit of their 
own regional interests. This is principally a matter for 
the UN. The subversion of its key organs by state inter-
ests, purely for their own benefit, increasingly causes 
the UN’s presence and engagement as a whole to be-
come superfluous in the eyes of people in the Middle 
East, because it lacks the impact they hope for. 
Even if the conflict is one of the oldest in the his-
tory of the UN, numerous mediation attempts have 
failed, and wars in neighbouring countries have over-
shadowed it in recent years, it would be a fallacy to 
believe that merely administering it would represent 
a realistic option. That idea is worthy neither of the 
Israelis nor the Palestinians, who have a right to 
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lasting security. Besides, the political and societal 
developments in the region are intimately bound up 
with the Middle East conflict. For example, growing 
inter-group tensions in Jordan and Lebanon, which 
both have large Palestinian minorities, present risks 
of violent conflict in the near future. These could 
quickly flashover to the Occupied Territories. 
However the Palestinian and Israeli interest in a 
fair and lasting solution should be measured not 
exclusively against public statements by Israeli and 
Palestinian politicians, who regularly assert that 
peace is impossible. As a corrective the developments 
in daily cooperation between Palestinian and Israeli 
authorities must be taken into account and support-
ed. Experience shows, firstly, that confidence-building 
and constructive cooperation are possible. Secondly, 
isolated positive examples should be regarded as evi-
dence that the transfer of local administrative struc-
tures and activities to the Palestinian side can serve 
the mutual interest by successively expanding Pales-
tinian political autonomy while at the same time ac-
knowledging Israel’s special security needs. Initiatives 
that seek to ensure that Israelis and Palestinians get 
to know each other “again” and can work together 
to reduce stereotypes and fears also deserve explicit 
support. Here UNRWA could also contribute through 
projects enabling exchange and cooperation. 
Finally resolution of the refugee question needs to 
be moved further up the peace agenda. The objective 
must be to grant a citizenship to all Palestine refugees 
who remain stateless. With its comprehensive data on 
refugee biographies UNRWA could play a central role 
in this process and at the same incrementally dissolve 
itself. 
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The Jewish-American Israel lobby has been an im-
portant actor in the Middle East conflict for decades, 
with considerable political weight in Washington. 
As well as influencing the situation in Israel and the 
Occupied Territories, the lobby has itself been trans-
formed in the course of the conflict and the ongoing 
occupation. Its role as Israel’s advocate is changing: 
The lobby itself is differentiating, making it increas-
ingly difficult to identify shared pro-Israeli positions 
and strategies; and its support within the Jewish-
American diaspora is waning. These developments 
place the current Israeli government in a quandary, 
reliant as it is on solid ties with the US lobby and 
the diaspora as a whole. 
The state of Israel has been the central touchstone 
of Jewish engagement in the United States ever since 
1948; indeed, it has even been referred to as the “reli-
gion of the American Jews”.1 This is also reflected 
in the multitude of Jewish pro-Israeli organisations, 
some of which are among the largest and most in-
fluential in the world. There are three principal 
reasons for this: Firstly, the Jewish community in the 
United States is the largest outside of Israel. Today 
between five and six million Jews live in the United 
States,2 representing about 40 percent of the world-
wide Jewish population. Secondly, the geopolitical 
hegemony of the United States gives American Jews 
greater weight than other Jewish communities, such 
as those the British or French. Thirdly, ethno-national 
minorities in the United States have access to effective 
channels to represent their interests, such as Congres-
 
1 Nathan Glazer, American Judaism (Chicago, 1989). 
2 Figures vary depending on the definition of Jewishness 
used. See Steven Bayme, “American Jewry Confronts the 
Twenty-first Century”, in American Jewry’s Comfort Level. Present 
and Future, ed. Manfred Gerstenfeld and Steven Bayme (Jeru-
salem: Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, 2010), 15–54. 
sional lobbying organisations and extra-parliamen-
tary NGOs.3 
The relationship between the Jewish diaspora in 
the United States and the state of Israel is in perma-
nent flux. Israel’s wars with the Arab states and its 
conflict with the Palestinians mark a series of stages. 
American Jews’ engagement became increasingly 
political after the Six-Day War of 1967, while the 
Yom Kippur War of 1973 exposed the vulnerability 
of Israel’s defences. In response the Jewish diaspora 
intensified its efforts to play a decisive role in US 
policy in the Middle East and to advocate for Israel’s 
defence.4 
Parts of the Jewish diaspora gradually 
began distancing themselves from the 
policies of the Israeli government. 
Israel’s abrupt change of course following Likud’s 
election victory in 1977 marked a watershed for the 
political unity of the Jewish diaspora in the United 
States. Parts of the Jewish diaspora gradually began 
distancing themselves from the policies of the Israeli 
government, in a trend reinforced by the debates 
over the 1982 Lebanon War and above all by the First 
(1987–1991) and Second Intifadas (2000–2005). 
Within the diaspora concerns over the occupation 
and Israel’s actions grew with each new escalation in 
the Israel-Palestine conflict. This had two effects on 
the American Israel lobby. On the one hand, differ-
ences over Israel’s policies within the Jewish diaspora 
also came to be reflected in the composition of the 
Israel lobby. On the other, parts of the diaspora lost 
 
3 Dov Waxman and Scott Lasensky, “Jewish Foreign Policy: 
Israel, World Jewry and the Defence of ‘Jewish Interests’”, 
Journal of Modern Jewish Studies 12, no. 2 (2013): 232–52 (236). 
4 Gabriel Sheffer, “Homeland and Diaspora: An Analytical 
Perspective on Israeli-Jewish Diaspora Relations”, Ethnopolitics 
9, no. 3–4 (2010): 379–99. 
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interest in Israeli issues, and a decline was seen in 
American Jewish engagement for Israel. 
The Differentiating Israel Lobby 
The American Israel lobby today comprises three 
camps, with the representatives of all three regarding 
themselves as thoroughly pro-Israeli defenders of 
Israel’s security. Where they differ is how this objec-
tive is to be achieved. 
The principal disagreement is over what Israel 
should do with the territories occupied since 1967 
and how important they actually are for Israel’s secu-
rity. The traditional camp follows the decisions of 
the Israeli government, which, it argues, has the best 
understanding of Israel’s interests and needs. The 
other two camps pursue their own ideological posi-
tions, even where these contradict official Israeli 
policy. While the national-religious and far-right 
nationalists warn against compromises that they fear 
could harm Israel’s Jewish identity and security, left-
liberal critics principally see dangers to democracy. 
Traditional Supporters of the 
Israeli Government 
The supporters of the Israeli government comprise 
the most important Jewish organisations in the 
United States, including the Anti-Defamation League 
(ADL), the American Jewish Committee (AJC) and the 
classical lobbying organisation American Israel Public 
Affairs Committee (AIPAC). They seek to maintain a 
consensus on Israel in the American political land-
scape and avoid particularly controversial positions 
on the Middle East conflict, as well as public criticism 
of Israel. They are concerned to preserve American 
political ties with Israel and to avert any political 
pressure Washington might seek to apply. Officially 
they toe the line of whatever government is in office 
in Israel and seek to win cross-party support for it in 
the United States.5 
Yet their assertions of political neutrality and 
rather centrist approach are hard to substantiate. In 
the course of what are now Benjamin Netanyahu’s 
four terms as prime minister, the government and 
other state institutions have shifted continuously to 
the right. So anyone in the United States who adopts 
 
5 John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, The Israel Lobby 
and U.S. Foreign Policy (New York, 2007). 
an uncritical stance towards the Israeli government 
has de facto replicated that shift. Additionally, long-
standing cooperation with the national conservatives 
in Israel has cultivated important personal relation-
ships. Howard Kohr, AIPAC CEO and Malcolm 
Hoenlein, long-serving Executive Vice Chairman 
of the Conference of Presidents of Major American 
Jewish Organizations (until February 2018) are both 
said to support Likud.6 So the decisive positions in 
these organisations are occupied by figures who at 
least do not overtly reject Israel’s hard-line nationalist 
course. 
AIPAC illustrates very clearly the gap between the 
words and deeds of traditional supporters of Israel. Its 
success and influence depend on bipartisan lobbying. 
And because large parts of the US political spectrum 
still view the two-state solution as the only tenable 
option, AIPAC officially backs it too. But with many 
AIPAC members and large parts of the present Israeli 
government rejecting the two-state solution, AIPAC’s 
work is certainly not directed towards creating a 
favourable atmosphere for talks. Instead it seeks to 
torpedo any US move in that direction.7 
AIPAC also pursues an ambivalent line on settle-
ment-building. Its absence from the settlement-build-
ing controversy represents tacit support rather than 
disinterest. For example in March 2015 at AIPAC’s 
instigation a bill was introduced to make preventing 
politically motivated boycotts of Israel and “persons 
doing business in Israel or in territories controlled by 
Israel” a principal objective in US trade negotiations.8 
AIPAC correctly assumed that requiring that the Occu-
pied Territories be treated legally identically to Israel 
– in contravention of international law and US prac-
tice since 1967 – would not cause a stir.9 
 
6 Alain Dieckhoff, “The Jewish Diaspora and Israel: Belong-
ing at Distance?” Nations and Nationalism 23, no. 2 (2017): 
271–88 (282). 
7 Connie Bruck, “Friends of Israel: The Lobbying Group 
AIPAC Has Consistently Fought the Obama Administration 
on Policy: Is It Now Losing Influence?” New Yorker, 1 Septem-
ber 2014, http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/09/01/ 
friends-israel (accessed 26 October 2017). 
8 United States-Israel Trade Enhancement Act of 2015, 
http://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/senate-bill/619/ 
text (accessed 27 October 2017). 
9 Jessica Schulberg “Inside AIPAC’s Quiet Campaign to 
Blur Israeli Settlement Lines”, Huffington Post, 28 May 2015, 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/05/28/aipac-israel-
settlements_n_7461038.html (accessed 26 October 2017). 
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In the context of a highly charged discussion over 
the continuation of the occupation – which has 
now lasted over fifty years – such manoeuvres per-
mit AIPAC to preserve the bipartisan consensus in the 
United States while at the same time lobbying for the 
current Israeli government. The supposedly neutral 
camp also receives support from a young and still 
untainted organisation, the Israeli-American Council. 
National-Religious and Far-right 
Nationalist Critics 
AIPAC and other organisations employ political 
manoeuvring to avoid any appearance of political 
partiality. In the eyes of their national-religious critics 
this negates their right to claim to be the “true” pro-
Israeli voice. As far as these critics are concerned, 
AIPAC and its associates can no longer credibly sug-
gest that they would respond sufficiently assertively 
to defend the Jewish character of the state of Israel 
with all its religious and territorial aspects. 
The indifference of traditional lobby organisations 
towards national-religious demands such as settling 
“Biblical Israel” with Jerusalem as its capital, or 
potentially even rebuilding the Temple, has led strict 
believers to turn away from them. Through “real-
politik” towards religious sites, the critics assert, 
the traditional lobby groups are risking the Jewish 
people’s ancient connection to the land of Israel and 
neglecting their duty to future Jewish generations. 
The traditional lobby organisations 
are rejected by activists who share the 
conviction that the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict is by nature intractable. 
The traditional lobby organisations are also rejected 
by those activists who share the increasingly popular 
conviction that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is a cul-
ture war and by nature intractable.10 They see demon-
strative Israeli power as the only guarantee for the 
country’s security. In this scenario of an “eternal 
status quo” there is little place for ideas about Israel’s 
future democratic structure or the legal status of non-
Jewish minorities. 
 
10 “Agree to disagree”. See Yaakov Levi, “Bennett: Annex 
Area C, or ‘Agree to Disagree’”, Arutz Sheva, 31 May 2015, 
http://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/News.aspx/196071 
(accessed 26 October 2017). 
Positions of this type are held by organisations 
like the Zionist Organization of America and the 
Emergency Committee for Israel, as well as the Young 
Israel movement, an alliance of Orthodox synagogues 
in the United States and Israel (and sister organisation 
of the National Council of Young Israel). The latter 
seeks to popularise, in the diaspora and in Israel, a 
national-religious ideology that denies territorial con-
cessions to the Palestinians.11 
The significance of these organisations lies not as 
much in their impact on US politics or the size of 
their membership within the American-Jewish dias-
pora (which is comparatively small) but in their dis-
proportionate influence on the public debate. As the 
opposition to the more moderate pro-Israeli establish-
ment they are not in the slightest interested in con-
structive criticism. Instead they restrict themselves 
to agenda-setting and absolutely uncompromisingly 
opposing adversaries in the United States and Israel.  
Finding little success with classical lobbying in 
Congress, these groups seek to generate political 
pressure using their own means and questionable 
methods. They fund national-religious media cam-
paigns against negotiations with the Palestinians 
and support settlement activities in the West Bank. 
During the Oslo peace process in the 1990s they 
founded US-based branches of the right-wing nation-
alist Israeli parties in order to support the latter’s 
political campaign against Prime Minister Yitzhak 
Rabin and later his Labor Party successors Shimon 
Peres and Ehud Barak. These diaspora activists con-
tributed to deepening the rifts in Israeli society in the 
mid-1990s, with ultra-Orthodox rabbis in the United 
States calling on Israeli soldiers to disobey orders and 
branding Rabin a traitor to Judaism. One Brooklyn 
rabbi even said that Jewish law justified assassinating 
the prime minister.12 These “shaming” methods were 
also used against American politicians, with President 
Barack Obama presenting a particularly popular target. 
The activism of the national-religious and far right 
nationalist camps draws its strength above all from 
the social position of a handful of extremely wealthy 
and well-connected individuals who enjoy dispropor-
 
11 Yossi Shain, “The Role of Diasporas in Conflict Perpetua-
tion or Resolution”, SAIS Review 22, no. 2 (2002): 115–44 (136). 
12 “N.Y. Congregation Isolates Rabbi Who Said Killing 
Rabin Permissible”, Jewish Telegraphic Agency (JTA), 12 No-
vember 1995, http://www.jta.org/1995/11/12/archive/n-y-
congregation-isolates-rabbi-who-said-killing-rabin-
permissible (accessed 13 November 2017). 
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tionate influence within the Israel lobby. These in-
clude the businessman Irving Moscowitz, who donated 
millions of dollars annually to settler organisations in 
the Occupied Territories until his death in 2016. He 
helped finance the opening of the controversial West-
ern Wall Tunnel in 1996 and supported the construc-
tion of Jewish exclaves in the heart of Arab East Jeru-
salem. Other recipients of his largesse include the 
extremist Israeli NGOs Ateret Cohanim and El’ad 
(Ir David Foundation). 
Sheldon Adelson is a generous contributor to the 
Zionist Organization of America. One of the richest 
Americans of all, he exemplifies the far-right nation-
alists’ personal and financial ties with both the tra-
ditional lobby and the Israeli government. Adelson is 
a well-known patron of Israeli Prime Minister Netan-
yahu,13 and principal sponsor of the Israeli-American 
Council.14 For a long time he championed AIPAC, but 
turned his back on the organisation after his expec-
tations were disappointed.15 
Alongside these prominent figures, numerous 
Americans make generous donations to national-
religious projects in Israel, with a whole string of 
American NGOs dedicated largely to securing such 
funding. In 2015 it was reported that more than $220 
million had flowed to the Israeli settlements over a 
period of five years.16 
The positions of the national-religious camp and 
the influence of certain of its members were boosted 
overnight by the election of Donald Trump as US 
president, which politically strengthened the US 
Evangelicals. The latter represent an important sec-
tion of Trump’s base and regard the Biblical Land of 
Israel as a religious imperative. This alliance between 
Evangelicals and the national-religious camp of the 
Jewish Israel lobby is based on shared interests and 
goals, one of which – recognition of Jerusalem as 
Israel’s capital – was achieved in December 2017. 
The growing currency of these positions in the Israeli 
 
13 Adelson publishes the Israeli free daily Israel HaYom, 
which is widely referred to as the “Bibiton” on account of its 
ideological affinity to Benjamin (“Bibi”) Netanyahu (“iton” 
being the Hebrew word for newspaper). 
14 Amir Tibon, “This Powerful Adelson-funded Israel Lobby 
Could Soon Rival AIPAC’s Influence in Washington”, Haaretz, 
31 October 2017, http://www.haaretz.com/us-news/.premium-
1.819705 (accessed 1 November 2017). 
15 Bruck, “Friends of Israel” (see note 7). 
16 Uri Blau, “Does Your Jewish Charity Donate to the 
Settlements?” Haaretz, 8 December 2015, http://www.haaretz. 
com/settlementdollars/1.690056 (accessed 26 October 2017). 
and US political processes has generated a strong shift 
to the right in the traditional camp too – at least in 
the public perception. How long that trend continues 
will depend on when the interest-driven coalition be-
hind it either collapses under the weight of religious 
differences or is weakened by a change of politics in 
Israel or the United States. The longer-term ideologi-
cal trends in the Jewish Israel lobby and the Jewish 
diaspora certainly point in a different direction. 
Left-liberal Critics 
The left-liberal critics argue for an end to the occupa-
tion, an immediate moratorium on settlement-build-
ing and the establishment of an autonomous and 
independent Palestinian state in the West Bank, Gaza 
and East Jerusalem. This camp includes the New 
Israel Fund, Americans for Peace Now and the Con-
gressional lobbying organisation J Street. 
Since it was set up in 2008, J Street has rapidly 
become the most important challenger to the tra-
ditional camps and especially AIPAC. Its base is prin-
cipally among younger Jewish Americans, most of 
whom are secular or only moderately religious. 
Although J Street to date possesses only a fraction 
of the reach of AIPAC, it has considerable potential 
to transform the Israel lobby, not least through gen-
erational change. 
The current Israeli government, 
J Street says, is more interested in 
consolidating its power than 
protecting Israel’s future. 
J Street asserts that the mainstream Israel lobby 
has been led astray by the current Israeli government 
which, it says, is more interested in consolidating its 
power than protecting Israel’s future. It blames the 
established lobby for sabotaging the peace process 
on behalf of the Israeli government, and bringing it 
to a standstill. Without a two-state solution, it argues, 
Israel’s character as a Jewish democratic state is 
endangered, because the combination of a Jewish 
majority and democratic rights for non-Jewish Israelis 
is only feasible within the internationally recognised 
borders of 1967 (the Green Line).17 The lobby also 
 
17 Otherwise the Jewish population risks becoming a 
minority. In that event Israel would have to abandon either 
its Jewish character or its democracy, in the sense of equal 
rights for Jews and Arabs. 
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neglects American interests in the region, J Street 
argues, by uncritically accepting the Israeli govern-
ment’s claim to be America’s most important, in-
dispensable ally in the Middle East.18 
For its own part, J Street claims to represent the 
majority interests of the Israeli population and the 
Jewish diaspora. Rather than listening to the ideo-
logically rigid Israeli government, J Street draws on 
the expertise of “old elites” from the Israeli security 
apparatus. This stance has earned the organisation 
outsider status within the Israel lobby, which is 
dominated by traditionalists and national conserva-
tives. In 2009 for example the Israeli ambassador 
to the United States, Michael Oren, very publicly 
rejected his invitation to a J Street conference.19 And 
the group has still not been admitted to the Confer-
ence of Major American Jewish Organizations.20 
Despite its rejection by the traditional Israel lobby, 
J Street differs more in its methods than in its posi-
tions. Like the established lobbying organisations it 
stands in the Zionist tradition. In the first place, 
J Street sees its role as securing a Jewish future in line 
with “Jewish values”. In other words, it is not unbiased 
and not primarily motivated by an understanding of 
justice rooted in universal human rights.21 
Instead, J Street’s engagement for a two-state solu-
tion is driven by concern for the future of the Zionist 
project. It supported talks with Iran in the hope that 
this will make the Iranian nuclear programme more 
transparent, but steers well clear of questioning the 
traditional lobby’s entrenched image of Iran as the 
arch-enemy. Such a move would cost J Street the sup-
port of significant sections of the Jewish community 
and endanger its survival as a lobbying organisation 
in Congress. 
There are, however, also more radical currents in 
the left-wing camp. A number of splinter groups even 
campaign explicitly for Palestinian rights. These 
would include IfNotNow and J Street’s youth move-
ment J Street U, whose slogan “pro peace, pro Israel, 
 
18 Dov Waxman, “The Real Problem in U.S.–Israeli Rela-
tions”, The Washington Quarterly 35, no. 2 (2012): 71–87. 
19 Natasha Mozgovaya, “Israel Envoy Michael Oren Rejects 
J Street Invite”, Haaretz, 20 October 2009, http://www. 
haaretz.com/jewish/2.209/israel-envoy-michael-oren-rejects-j-
street-invite-1.5767 (accessed 26 October 2017). 
20 Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish 
Organizations, Member Organizations, http://www. conference-
ofpresidents.org/about/members (accessed 26 October 2017). 
21 Jeremy Ben-Ami, A New Voice for Israel: Fighting for 
the Survival of the Jewish Nation (New York, 2012). 
pro Palestine, anti-occupation” sets it clearly apart 
from the “pro peace, pro Israel” of its parent organi-
sation.22 The most radical position is that of the anti-
Zionist Jewish Voice for Peace, which rejects Jewish 
primacy in Israel and participates in the Boycott, 
Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) movement. As out-
siders, none of these groups have any great influence 
on decision-making in Washington. 
Drifting Apart: The Israel Lobby and the 
Jewish Diaspora 
The Israel lobby continues to claim to act in the name 
of the Jewish diaspora, but has become largely unrep-
resentative of the demographic. Instead it comprises 
an exclusive circle of professional activists and 
wealthy donors. Most diaspora Jews know little about 
its activities, and have no possibility to control or 
influence them.23 For a long time Jewish Americans 
tolerated this lack of democracy, which was out-
weighed by the diaspora’s enthusiasm for the Israeli 
cause. But now the American diaspora is becoming 
increasingly detached from its lobbying organisations. 
And the resulting changes further weaken an already 
tenuous link. 
One aspect of this is that certain religious currents 
possess far more influence within the Israel lobby 
than their size would warrant. The most obvious is 
Orthodox Judaism, to which only 10 percent of 
American Jews belong.24 Surveys and studies show 
that religiosity correlates closely with strong ties to 
Israel, which would explain the prevalence of Ortho-
dox organisations in the ideological spectrum of the 
Israel lobby.25 Conservative and Reform Jews, on 
the other hand – who together dominate American 
 
22 Hillel Schenker, “Pro-Israel, Pro-Palestine, Pro-Peace, 
Anti-Occupation”, Times of Israel, 11 March 2017, blogs. 
timesofisrael.com/pro-israel-pro-palestine-pro-peace-anti-
occupation/ (accessed 26 October 2017). 
23 Waxman and Lasensky, “Jewish Foreign Policy” (see note 
3), 236. 
24 Michael Lipka, Unlike U.S., Few Jews in Israel Identify as 
Reform or Conservative (Washington, D.C.: Pew Research 
Center, 15 March 2016), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
tank/2016/03/15/unlike- u-s-few-jews-in-israel-identify-as-
reform-or-conservative/ (accessed 26 October 2017). 
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Judaism with 18 and 35 percent respectively26 – are 
considerably less well represented in the Israel lobby 
and feel less closely associated with Israel. One reason 
for this is that non-Orthodox currents have always been 
less accepted in Israel, with recent disputes over use 
of the Wailing Wall and conversion to Judaism serv-
ing as reminders.27 Non-religious Jews, finally, pay 
little heed to Israel and consequently have the weakest 
representation in the Israel lobby. At the same time 
they are the fastest-growing group in the United 
States, already representing one-third of the diaspora.28 
Another relevant factor is that in recent decades 
the Republican Party has been the strongest supporter 
of the Israeli government, to a point where „backing 
Israel has become predominantly a Republican pre-
occupation“.29 74 percent of Republicans, but only 
33 percent of Democrats sympathise more strongly 
with Israel than with the Palestinians.30 The gap 
between conservative Republicans and liberal Demo-
crats is even wider. 
In fact American Jews are disproportionately likely 
to support the Democrats and are estimated to con-
tribute up to 50 percent of Democratic Party cam-
paign funding.31 78 percent of American Jews voted 
for Democratic presidential candidate Barack Obama 
in 2008, while the figure in 2012 was still 69 percent. 
Since 1920 every presidential election has seen a 
majority of American Jews voting for the Democratic 
candidate.32 
 
26 Lipka, Unlike U.S., Few Jews in Israel Identify as Reform or Con-
servative (see note 24). 
27 Non-Orthodox currents claim a section of the Wailing 
Wall and demand recognition of non-Orthodox conversions, 
to date without success. Daniel Shapiro, Israel and American 
Jewry: Stepping Back from the Brink, INSS Insight No. 959 (Tel 
Aviv: The Institute for National Security Studies [INSS], 
31 July 2017). 
28 Lipka, Unlike U.S., Few Jews in Israel Identify as Reform or 
Conservative (see note 24). 
29 Mark Landler, “Netanyahu and Trump Skip Aipac 
Meeting”, New York Times, 27 March 2017. 
30 The World Facing Trump: Public Sees ISIS, Cyberattacks, North 
Korea as Top Threats (Washington, D.C.: Pew Research Center, 
12 January 2017), http://www.people-press.org/2017/01/12/ 
the-world-facing-trump-public-sees-isis-cyberattacks-north-
korea-as-top-threats/ (accessed 26 October 2017). 
31 David Rosenberg, “Billionaire Liberal George Soros May 
Be the Diaspora Jew of the Future”, Haaretz, 14 July 2017, 
http://www.haaretz.com/opinion/.premium-1.801186 (ac-
cessed 27 October 2017). 
32 Jewish Virtual Library, U.S. Presidential Elections: Jewish 
Voting Record (1916–Present), http://www. jewishvirtuallibrary. 
American Jews position themselves – 
also in relation to Israel – to the left 
of the Israel lobby that claims to 
speak in their name. 
So it is not necessarily surprising if most American 
Jews position themselves – also in relation to Israel 
– to the left of the Israel lobby that claims to speak 
in their name.33 Many Jews in the United States are 
highly sceptical towards the current Israeli govern-
ment. Only 38 percent believe it to be genuinely in-
terested in peace.34 Nevertheless, many older Ameri-
can Jews, whose memories of the Second World War 
and the Holocaust are still very present, tend to 
regard Israel as an exception or a special case. Social 
pressure is also an issue, with criticism of Israel still 
regarded as betrayal within the Jewish community. 
This is why most of the diaspora prefers to withdraw 
from the debate about the Middle East conflict and 
Israel’s occupation of the West Bank and Gaza.35 
Conclusions 
The transformation that the Jewish Israel lobby in 
the United States is currently experiencing could have 
far-reaching consequences for Israel’s position in the 
Middle East conflict. Dwindling international support 
forces the Israeli government to rely heavily on the 
United States, and on a strong and active Israel lobby 
in Washington. Although under President Trump the 
United States appears to be exhibiting a very strong 
pro-Israeli stance, it is less than certain that this will 
last. It would therefore be too risky for Israel to ne-
glect its proven and dependable relationship with the 
Jewish lobby and diaspora in the United States. The 
developments described here represent a long-term 
challenge for the Israeli government. 
To date Israel has been able to rely on its lobby. 
For the period 2019 to 2028 the United States has in-
creased its annual security assistance to Israel to $3.8 
billion (from $3.1 billion at present).36 It is also still 
 
org/jewish-voting-record-in-u-s-presidential-elections (ac-
cessed 27 October 2017). 
33 Peter Beinart, The Crisis of Zionism (New York, 2012), 43. 
34 Israel’s Religiously Divided Society (Washington, D.C.: Pew 
Research Center, 8 March 2016), 58. 
35 Ben-Ami, A New Voice for Israel (see note 21). 
36 White House, Fact Sheet: Memorandum of Understanding 
Reached with Israel (Washington, D.C., 14 September 2016), 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-
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likely that in the event of military conflict the entire 
lobby will rally behind Israel.37 There are, however, 
reasons to believe that Israel regards the transforma-
tion in the American Israel lobby and the loss of 
interest in the diaspora as potentially problematic 
in the longer term. 
This leads the Israeli government to seek to coun-
teract declining backing from the American diaspora 
by stepping up its support for loyal Jewish groups and 
non-Jewish pro-Israeli actors in the United States. The 
Israeli Ministry of Diaspora Affairs headed by Naftali 
Bennett, leader of the settler party Jewish Home, 
funds large-scale initiatives to promote Jewish iden-
tity abroad. Programmes tailored to young Jews seek 
to slow the process of assimilation.38 
At the same time Israeli legislature is seeking to 
tighten ties with the diaspora. While the new Nation-
ality Bill (Hebrew Hok haLeom) has yet to be adopted, 
drafts to date treat the Jewish diaspora as an integral 
part of the nation. On the one hand this formulation 
is designed to placate Conservative and Reform Jews 
who have not felt properly represented by Israel. On 
the other it seeks a new way to bind diaspora Jews who 
have internally distanced themselves from Israel.39 
Finally, the Israeli government is also working 
to compensate declining support from the Jewish 
diaspora with the engagement of non-Jewish friends 
of Israel. Prime Minister Netanyahu has addressed 
several Christians United for Israel (CUFI) confer-
ences,40 and in October 2017 Jerusalem hosted the 
first Christian Media Summit.41 
Also reflecting the decline in American Jewish 
engagement, pro-Israeli lobbying organisations are 
increasingly open to non-Jewish groups. In fact a 
 
office/2016/09/14/fact-sheet-memorandum-understanding-
reached-israel (accessed 26 October 2017). 
37 Shain, “The Role of Diasporas” (see note 11). 
38 Or Kashti, “Israel to Spend Millions to Strengthen 
Diaspora’s ‘Jewish Foundations’”, Haaretz, 7 August 2015, 
http://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/1.670022 (accessed 
26 October 2017). 
39 Amal Jamal, “Constitutionalizing Sophisticated Racism: 
Israel’s Proposed Nationality Law”, Journal of Palestine Studies 
45, no. 3 (2016): 40–51. 
40 Rebecca Shimoni Stoil, “Netanyahu: Evangelical Chris-
tians Are Israel’s Best Friends”, Times of Israel, 18 July 2017, 
http://www.timesofisrael.com/netanyahu-evangelical-
christians-are-israels-best-friends (accessed 26 October 2017). 
41 Christian Media Summit, Jerusalem, 15–18 October 2017, 
http://www.christianmediasummit.co.il/ (accessed 26 October 
2017). 
significant proportion of pro-Israeli activism today 
originates from Evangelical Christian Churches.42 But 
this development could come back to bite the Israeli 
government, which lacks the authority to ensure that 
messianic religious ideas do not win the upper hand 
over Israel’s interests. 
The Israeli government must also adjust to an 
Israel lobby that is no longer a homogenous force but 
a conglomerate of many participants with different 
positions.43 It seeks to indicate to decision-makers 
in Washington which lobbying groups they should 
regard as legitimate, apparently treating the left-
liberal camp as a greater threat to its own interests 
than the national-religious and far-right nationalist. 
Despite these efforts by the Israeli government, the 
process of differentiation in pro-Israeli lobbying will 
continue and the influence of traditional groups will 
shrink further. Instead the gulf between left and right 
will widen, further exacerbating the divides in both 
the pro-Israel lobby and the Jewish diaspora. As long 
as the occupation continues and there is no progress 
in the peace process, Israel will have to live with 
these trends. 
The differentiation of the Israel lobby offers Ger-
many and the European Union opportunities to seek 
and cultivate partners whose positions are close to 
its own. Alongside existing contacts to the traditional 
organisations, closer relations with the left-liberal 
camp would be advised. 
 
 
42 Eli Lake, “Pro-Israel Evangelicals Escape Aipac’s Shadow”, 
Bloomberg, 10 January 2017, http://www.bloomberg.com/ 
view/articles/2017-01-10/pro-israel-evangelicals-escape-aipac-
s-shadow (accessed 26 October 2017). 
43 Dov Waxman, “The Israel Lobbies: A Survey of the Pro-
Israel Community in the United States”, Israel Studies Forum 
25, no. 1 (2010): 5–28; Ron Kampeas, “Rebuke of UN Shows 
a House Divided over Meaning of ‘Pro-Israel’”, JTA, 10 Janu-
ary 2017, http://www.jta.org/2017/01/10/news-opinion/ 
politics/rebuke-of-un-shows-a-house-divided-over-meaning-
of-pro-israel (accessed 26 October 2017).  
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American Israel Public Affairs Committee 




American Jewish Committee 
Agreement on Movement and Access 




Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions 
Centre for European Policy Studies (Brussels) 
 UNRWA United Nations Relief and Works Agency for 
Palestine Refugees in the Near East 
CFSP Common Foreign and Security Policy  USSC United States Security Coordinator 
COGAT Coordinator of Government Activities in the 
Territories 
   
CUFI Christians United for Israel    
ECFR European Council on Foreign Relations    
EMP Euro-Mediterranean Partnership    
ENP European Neighbourhood Policy    
EPZ European Political Cooperation    
EU European Union    
EUBAM Rafah European Union Border Assistance Mission in 
Rafah 
   
EUISS European Union Institute for Security Studies 
(Paris) 
   
EUPOL COPPS European Union Coordinating Office for 
Palestinian Police Support 
   
FIFA Fédération Internationale de Football 
Association 
   
GRM Gaza Reconstruction Mechanism    
IDF Israel Defense Forces    
ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross    
ILO International Labour Organization    
INSS The Institute for National Security Studies 
(Tel Aviv) 
   
JTA Jewish Telegraphic Agency    
MFA Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs    
OCHA Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian 
Affairs 
   
OPEC Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting 
Countries 
   
OSO Operations Support Officer    
PA Palestinian Authority    
PLO Palestine Liberation Organisation    
SAIS The Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced 
International Studies (The Johns Hopkins 
University, Washington, D.C.) 
   
ToI The Times of Israel    
UAE United Arab Emirates    
UN United Nations    
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